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Abstract 
 
Biodiversity provides many essential and irreplaceable services to humankind including 
material goods (e.g. food, medicines), ecological functions (e.g. flood control, climate 
regulation, and nutrient cycling) and nonmaterial benefits (e.g. recreation, mental health). 
Increasing human populations and consumption have driven many habitats and species to 
the brink of extinction, threatening these very benefits on which we rely. Protected areas 
have emerged as one of the leading strategies to combat this biodiversity loss. However, 
despite recent conservation advancements, the significant time, effort and money that is 
placed into developing protected area networks, and the increase in protected area 
coverage of >30,000,000 km2 over the past 50 years, biodiversity and ecosystem services 
continue to deteriorate. This signifies shortfalls in our conservation strategies that are 
preventing protected areas from achieving their biological objectives. Many of these gaps 
have already been identified, such as biases in protection (representation), inadequate 
management and resources, and conflicts between conservation and development, all of 
which can inhibit reaching conservation goals. While widely recognized, the actions taken 
to rectify these gaps are unclear, and the synergies and trade-offs they present remain 
largely untested and unquantified. My PhD thesis identifies deficits of current protected 
area strategies (particularly related to the rapid expansion mentality) in reaching 
conservation goals and examines suggested solutions to the underperformance of 
protected areas. From this work, I discovered that marine protected areas have largely 
avoided abatable threats to biodiversity (Chapter 2, Kuempel et al. in review), that, in most 
cases, resources should be disproportionately invested in no-take protected area 
enforcement rather than expansion for the conservation of exploited species (Chapter 3, 
Kuempel et al. 2018), that the equality of habitat representation has increased by chance 
rather than strategic planning as protected areas have expanded (Chapter 4, Kuempel et 
al. 2016), and that future protected area downsizing is likely to disproportionately impact 
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those areas in most need of protection, moving us further from representation goals 
(Chapter 5, Kuempel et al. in prep). These results provide essential reference points, 
identify critical relationships between conservation targets, and demonstrate novel metrics 
to measure future progress in protected area expansion as signatory nations to the 
Strategic Plan for Biodiversity develop protected area targets post-2020. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 The Global Biodiversity Crisis 
 
The term biodiversity refers to the number of different species of plants and animals on 
Earth, the genetic information they contain and the ecosystems that they form (Redford et 
al. 2012). Since the beginning of human existence, humans have exploited biodiversity on 
both the land and in the sea for shelter, food production, medicines, energy and recreation 
(Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1992; Pimentel et al. 1997; Vitousek et al. 1997). Since the 18th century, 
humanity’s impact on the Earth has become so profound that many experts believe we 
have entered a new geological epoch- the Anthropocene (Crutzen 2006). 
 
The Anthropocene is marked by man-made chemicals that are not found in nature, 
unprecedented rates of deforestation, and climate change caused by human use of fossil 
fuels (Vitousek et al. 1997; Crutzen 2006; Knutson, T., J.P. Kossin, C. Mears, J. Perlwitz 
2017). While climate change has risen to the forefront of many discussions surrounding 
biodiversity’s fate, habitat loss, fragmentation and degradation remain the main threats to 
biodiversity worldwide (Baillie et al. 2004; Maxwell, S.L., Fuller, R.A., Brooks, T.M., 
Watson 2016).  
 
Human impacts on the Earth’s habitats and ecosystems, from the local-scale (e.g. run-off, 
overfishing) to the global-scale (e.g. climate change), are, unsurprisingly, driving perverse 
outcomes for species. Species extinctions have been recorded throughout the ~3.5 billion 
years that life has existed on Earth, with scientists identifying five previous mass extinction 
events where the Earth has lost more than 75% species in a geologically short time period 
(Barnosky et al. 2011). However, current rates of extinction are now 100-1,000 times the 
background rate seen in the fossil record (Pimm et al. 1995, 2014; Barnosky et al. 2011). 
For example, ~60% of all primates are now estimated to face extinction (Estrada et al. 
2017) and, in 2016, the Bramble Cay melomys (Melomys rubicola) that inhabited an island 
off the coast of Australia were claimed to be the first documented species extinction 
attributed solely to climate change (Gynther et al. 2016). This has led many scientists to 
think we have entered a sixth mass extinction event (Barnosky et al. 2011) and are facing 
a global biodiversity crisis. 
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Biodiversity loss will lead to reduced food security, reduced water availability, reduced 
income, reduced protection from natural disasters, and reduced human health (Chapin III 
et al. 2000; Díaz et al. 2006; Worm et al. 2006; Cardinale et al. 2012; Watts et al. 2012). 
Some of these impacts are already being felt today through longer and more intense fire 
seasons, like the recent Thomas fire in Santa Barbara, CA, and more frequent and severe 
storms, like the 2017 Atlantic hurricane season, which was one of the most destructive in 
recent history. These events are only expected to become more prevalent and will 
severely impact future generations to come (Cardinale et al. 2012).  
 
1.2 Biodiversity Conservation  
 
The tension between economic growth and nature conservation has become more 
prevalent in recent years, as the human population and demand for resources increases 
and our environmental awareness grows. While the general trend across human existence 
has been the domination of nature by humans, recent movements are emphasizing the 
importance of natural ecosystems and advocating for the conservation of habitats and 
species (Watson et al. 2014).  
 
Increasing pressure from human exploitation and the reliance of humankind on direct and 
indirect benefits from biodiversity has made it essential to preserve natural areas and 
species into the future. At the local-scale, biodiversity conservation can be achieved 
through a range of management actions such as fire management, invasive species 
control, species relocation and/or reintroduction, managing people within designated areas 
(e.g. harvest restrictions), ecosystem restoration, and/or no-take protected area 
establishment. Protected areas have emerged as the cornerstone of modern conservation 
strategies and have a prominent role in international conservation strategies (Secretariat of 
the CBD 2014). 
  
1.3 Protected areas 
 
Protected areas date back to 700 B.C. and have experienced several step changes in the 
course of their history (Watson et al. 2014). In western countries, early protected areas 
were first used by the elite for hunting and riding (Dixon & Sherman 1990), while in other 
parts of the world protected areas were used for resource management and religious 
values (Higgins-Zogib et al. 2010). It was not until 1872 that the first national park was 
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established in the United States- Yellowstone National Park. In the early 1990’s the 
definition of a protected area officially shifted to contain biodiversity values, with their 
mission restated to “protect and maintain biological diversity” (IUCN-WCMC 1994). During 
this same period, the need for representativeness across all levels of biodiversity 
(ecosystems, communities, species, etc.) gained widespread recognition (The World 
Resources Institute 1992). According to the IUCN, the current definition of a protected 
area has evolved to be “a clearly defined geographic space, recognised, dedicated and 
managed, through level or other effective means, to achieve the long term conservation of 
nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values” (Dudley 2008).  
 
With the continual battle between conserving biodiversity and providing resources to the 
ever-expanding human population, protected areas have come to the forefront of 
biodiversity conservation efforts and international conservation agreements. Global 
conservation goals have catalysed protected area establishment efforts, with many 
countries and organizations currently pushing to meet protected area coverage quotas. 
Most recently, the United Nations Strategic Plan for Biodiversity’s Aichi Target 11 calls for 
signatory countries to protect “17% of terrestrial and inland water and 10% of coastal and 
marine areas in effectively and equitable managed, ecologically representative and well-
connected systems of protected areas by 2020”. (Aichi Target 11; www.cdb.int/sp/targets). 
In response to these targets, protected areas have grown by over 92% on land and 513% 
in the sea since 1990 and protected area extent has emerged as one of the most widely 
used metrics for reporting on conservation progress (Butchart et al. 2015). 
 
1.4 Protected area Shortfalls and Aichi Target 11 
 
Conservation targets and the continual decrease in biological diversity and resources likely 
account for the large boom in protected area designation, with today’s protected area 
coverage estimated to be over 45 million km2 (UNEP-WCMC and IUCN 2017a). Protected 
areas have been shown to provide numerous benefits including the maintenance of habitat 
cover, ecosystem functions, and ecological processes, providing refuge for species, as 
well as many social and economic benefits (McNeely 1994; Bruner et al. 2001; Mulongoy 
& Chape 2004; Possingham 2006). However, many are ineffective, in design and/or 
execution, which is evidenced by the continued rate of alarming biodiversity decline 
despite major increases in both number and extent of protected areas (Butchart et al. 
2010; Pimm et al. 2014; WWF Living Planet Report 2014).  
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In this section, I provide an overview of the four main conservation objectives of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity’s Aichi Target 11 and identify deficits of current 
protected area strategies (particularly related to the rapid expansion mentality) in reaching 
conservation goals. Additionally, I discuss the trade-offs in habitat conservation that 
underpin each study presented in this thesis (Chapters 2-5) in relation to these goals.  
 
1.4.1 Area-based conservation measures 
 
The percent-area targets outlined by Aichi Target 11 mandate that 17% of land and 10% of 
the sea are protected by 2020. While there has been some criticism for the arbitrary nature 
of these targets (Barnes 2015; Watson et al. 2015; Chauvenet & Barnes 2016; Barnes et 
al. 2018), they have spurred a rapid expansion of protected area networks worldwide as 
countries strive to meet them. Now, a total of 25 million km2 of the Earth’s land and 20 
million km2 of the sea are under some level of formal protection (UNEP-WCMC and IUCN 
2017a). However, there are still many gaps within the global protected area estate, with 
over 50% of species having insufficient protection to meet current conservation targets 
(Butchart et al. 2015). 
 
Many conservation initiatives have put a strong emphasis on the area coverage aspect of 
Aichi Target 11, and currently it is the only goal projected to be met by 2020 (Tittensor et 
al. 2014). However, Aichi Target 11 also commits signatory countries to implement 
protected areas that are in areas of particular importance for biodiversity, effectively and 
equitable managed, ecologically representative, and well-connected. This raises questions 
as to whether we are truly meeting these conservation targets through current protected 
area strategies. There is considerable debate on whether protected area establishment 
alone (without adequately representing species and proper management/enforcement and 
resources) can impact biodiversity loss (Kelleher 1995; Geldmann et al. 2013), and many 
have warned of the potential compromises that the sole focus on area-based targets could 
present for other conservation objectives and the broader goal of halting biodiversity loss 
(Barnes 2015; Barnes et al. 2018). In this thesis, I aim to quantify potential trade-offs of 
protected area establishment (i.e. area-based, quantitative goals) and how this might 
impact the seemingly secondary, qualitative goals of Aichi Target 11, such as 
representation and management effectiveness. 
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1.4.2 Areas of particular importance for biodiversity 
 
Aichi Target 11 specifically states that “areas of particular importance for biodiversity and 
ecosystem services” need to be encompassed within the global protected area network. 
They define these areas as those “with high species richness or threatened species, 
threatened biomes or habitats, particularly important habitats (e.g. sensitive marine areas, 
key biodiversity areas) and areas that are important for the provision of ecosystem 
services” (Convention on Biological Diversity 2012). 
 
This definition conceptually fits within the “irreplaceability” and “vulnerability” framework 
that is central to systematic conservation planning (Pressey et al. 1993; Margules & 
Pressey 2000). This framework represents two different strategies in biodiversity 
conservation: the proactive approach and the reactive approach (Brooks et al. 2006). 
While some contend that we should be protecting the most threatened areas (reactive 
approach, (Edgar et al. 2008; Pressey & Bottrill 2008; Devillers et al. 2015), others 
maintain that we need to protect the last of the remaining large, intact habitats (proactive 
approach, Friedlander & DeMartini 2002; Graham & Clanahan 2013; Watson et al. 2016b). 
 
Historically, on land, protected areas have targeted places of little value for human use 
that are, thus, under relatively little threat (Pressey 1994; Joppa & Pfaff 2009). Recently, 
Venter et al. (2017) found that these biases persist, with both old and new protected areas 
targeting land with low agricultural suitability instead of areas with high concentrations of 
threatened species. Specifically, they found that over 30 times more threatened 
vertebrates could have been represented within protected areas had they targeted 
unrepresented species (Venter et al. 2017). 
 
In the marine realm, the prevailing strategy between reactive and proactive protection has 
received considerably less attention. There has been criticism of the continued designation 
of large, isolated protected areas that are largely away from human populations and 
fishing pressure (Mora 2006; Mora & Sale 2011; Devillers et al. 2015). However, it has 
been shown that much of the ocean that has been identified as ‘wilderness’ has very little 
protection (Jones et al. 2018a). The degree to which countries are targeting or avoiding 
threats in the sea, particularly those threats that conservation interventions such as marine 
protected areas can abate, is still unclear and has yet to be quantified. In Chapter 2, I 
uncover the predominant approach in marine protected area establishment by exploring 
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whether marine protected areas have been established in locations where the threats they 
can abate occur. Additionally, I develop an impact metric to easily quantify whether nations 
are predominately targeting or avoiding threats, and identify areas with relatively low 
protection and high threat that could provide opportunities for high conservation impact. 
Protection in these areas could contribute to safeguarding species and habitats from major 
drivers of biodiversity loss in the world’s oceans. 
 
1.4.3 Effective and Equitable Management 
 
Effective and equitable management is an essential component to ensuring the success of 
protected area networks and the long-term persistence of species. Equitable management 
makes sure that the costs and benefits of protected areas are fairly shared among all 
stakeholders, with particular emphasis on indigenous and local communities (Convention 
on Biological Diversity 2012). Effective management means that adequate planning 
measures are in place to “ensure ecological integrity and the protection of species, 
habitats and ecosystem processes”(Convention on Biological Diversity 2012). When 
effectively managed, protected areas have proven to provide significant benefits to 
habitats and species (Edgar et al. 2014; Geldmann et al. 2018). However, evidence 
suggests that most protected areas have inadequate resources and management, which 
hinders their ability to meet the objectives for which they were established (Possingham et 
al. 2006; Leverington et al. 2010; Gill et al. 2017). The dramatic increase in protected area 
extent in recent years signifies a substantial investment in protected area establishment, 
but a corresponding investment in management resources is less evident. In fact, only 
29% of the area protected globally has even been evaluated in terms of management 
effectiveness (Coad et al. 2013). 
 
The idea that protected areas are not realizing their full potential is hard to argue 
considering current inadequacies and continued declines in biodiversity and ecosystem 
services. Currently, there is an estimated management funding deficit of 44.8% in the 
ocean (Balmford et al. 2004) and of 66-74% in terrestrial protected areas in developing 
countries (Bruner et al. 2004) in order to ensure effective management. Some researchers 
have suggested that increased management may provide greater conservation outcomes 
than increased protected area establishment in certain areas (Jenkins & Joppa 2009). 
Using theoretical models, Costelloe et al. (2015) was the first to show that improving 
management effectiveness may provide greater increases in biodiversity indicators than 
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protected area expansion based on an analysis of the Living Planet Index and Red List 
Index in southern Africa.  
 
Due to the limited resources available for conservation intervention it is essential to 
determine whether additional funds are best spent on continued expansion of protected 
area networks or investment in increased management capacity to halt threats and deliver 
benefits to species. In Chapter 3, I present a theoretical ecological-economic model that 
explores the trade-off between expanding no-take protected areas and better enforcing 
existing reserves against poaching. Further, I provide guidance to decision-makers on how 
to allocate funds given any level of management and protected area extent. 
 
1.4.4 Representation 
 
A representative protected area network protects a sample of each biodiversity feature 
(comprehensiveness) as well as the variability within each feature (representativeness, 
e.g. climatic variation). While comprehensiveness and representativeness are strongly 
linked, in this thesis I follow Barr (2012) by considering “representation” to include both the 
comprehensive need to protect samples of each biodiversity feature, and the 
representative need to capture the variation within each feature.  
 
Representation was not established as a necessary component for effective protected 
area networks until 1992 (Vane-Wright et al. 1991) , but today, representation is widely 
recognised as an essential aspect of systematic conservation planning and protected area 
success. This is evidenced by the many conservation policies and initiatives that outline 
representation goals from the local to global scale. For instance, Aichi Target 11 calls for 
10% of the land to be in “ecologically representative” systems of protected areas by 2020. 
This representation target is widely interpreted and applied to mean that 10% of each 
ecoregion, which are broad scale habitat classifications, must be protected within each 
country (Convention on Biological Diversity 2012).  
 
Currently, it is estimated that only 41% of terrestrial ecoregions and 32% of marine 
ecoregions meet this goal (Butchart et al. 2015). These shortfalls are likely due to changes 
in the objectives of protected area establishment and conflicts with development that have 
resulted in a global protected area network that has targeted areas of high latitude, high 
altitude, steep slopes and soils that are not useful for agriculture (Pressey 1994). As a 
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result, the current global protected area estate does not protect habitats and species 
evenly (Pressey 1994; Watson et al. 2011; Sanderson et al. 2015).  
 
Up until 2011, the most common measure of representation was protected area coverage 
(i.e. the percentage of a particular area protected within a country), which was occasionally 
supplemented with measurements of the mean percentage protection of biodiversity 
features, or the percentage of biodiversity features that met a designated target (e.g. 10% 
protection)(Barr et al. 2011). Barr et al. (2011) developed the Protection Equality metric, a 
novel approach to measure representativeness, which was later refined by Chauvenet et 
al. (2017)  (Appendix 1). Protection Equality is a modified version of the Gini coefficient, a 
metric to assess economic inequalities (Gini 1921). 
 
Protection Equality ranges from 0 to 1 and describes how equally protected conservation 
features (e.g. habitats, species, etc.) are within a land/seascape. A value of 1 indicates 
equality of protection (all features equally represented), while values near zero indicate 
complete inequality. Protection Equality uncovers patterns that are masked by area-based 
representation measures. This can greatly facilitate the design of representative protected 
area networks and assess progress towards meeting such aspects of global conservation 
targets (Barr et al. 2011). 
 
In the whirlwind of protected area establishment that we have witnessed over the past 
several decades, has there been progress in developing a representative protected area 
network? Does rapid protected area expansion help or hinder the creation of 
representative reserves? What social, economic, and environmental aspects within a 
country affect the Protection Equality of habitats within it? Have increases in Protection 
Equality been deliberately planned, or would random reserve selection have achieved the 
same, better, or worse results? In Chapter 4, I explore these questions, evaluate progress 
and conflicts between protected area expansions and achieving equality in representation, 
investigate economic and social factors that affect a countries ability to meet targets for 
representative protected area networks, and provide insight for future conservation 
decisions. I build off work by Radeloff et al. (2013) that identified “hot moments in 
conservation”, where countries established substantial portions of their protected area 
networks in relatively short (1-5 year) time periods and evaluate how this has impacted 
representation through time using the Protection Equality metric. 
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While historical biases in protected area establishment continue to drive gaps in habitat 
and species representation, it is becoming increasingly recognised that protected areas 
are dynamic and are subject to downgrading, downsizing and/or degazettement events 
(PADDD) (Mascia & Pailler 2011). Protected area downgrading reduces the level of legal 
protection of a given protected area while downsizing and degazettement result in a loss of 
a portion or an entire protected area, respectively.  
 
The biodiversity implications of PADDD events has become an emerging area of research. 
For example, research has shown that strategic PADDD events that replace 
underperforming protected areas could increase the efficiency of protected area networks 
as a whole (Fuller et al. 2010), while others have suggested that PADDD could be used to 
strategically increase management effectiveness by concentrating management efforts in 
smaller areas (Albers 2010; Kuempel et al. 2018). It is less clear, however, how this 
potential loss in area protected may impact the representation of biodiversity within a 
protected area network. In Chapter 5, I assess this question by predicting the impact of 
future protected area establishment and downsizing events on the equality of 
representation using the Protection Equality metric and several potential future protection 
scenarios.  
 
1.5 Connectivity and Other Effective Conservation Measures 
 
While I do not specifically investigate connectivity or “other effective conservation 
measures” in this thesis, it is important to note their inclusion within Aichi Target 11’s 
objectives and recognize their significance in achieving conservation outcomes. The 
definitions of connectivity and other effective conservation measures (OECMs) are 
complex. Disconnects between definitions, data availability, and metrics to evaluate 
progress have limited their inclusion in reporting schemes. As these goals are clarified, it 
will be essential to consider their synergies and trade-offs within (e.g. Aichi Target 11) and 
between (e.g. Aichi Target 11 vs. 12, etc.) other conservation targets. Below is a brief and 
simplistic introduction of some of the challenges of implementing and meeting connectivity 
and OECM objectives that require further research that is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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1.5.1 Connectivity 
 
Across both land- and sea-scapes, population connectivity is largely recognized as an 
important component of metapopulation and landscape ecology, and thus has been 
incorporated as a major objective in many conservation initiatives (Taylor et al. 1993; 
Cowen et al. 2007; Foley et al. 2010; Kool et al. 2013). Connectivity most often refers to 
“how the spatial arrangement and the quality of elements in the landscape affect the 
movement of organisms among habitat patches” (Merriam 1984, 1991; Taylor et al. 1993; 
Bennett 1998), which, notably, varies by species and scale. The Convention on Biological 
Diversity Aichi Target 11 states that “well-connected” systems of protected areas need to 
be established by 2020. They define connectivity as using corridors, ecological networks, 
and allowing for the application of the ecosystem approach in protected area design 
(Convention on Biological Diversity 2012).  
 
Scientific research and some conservation efforts have focused on the spatial 
arrangement of protected area networks to maintain corridors, stepping stones, and other 
habitat configurations to enhance connectivity, particularly in highly degraded areas 
(Bennett 1998; Foley et al. 2010). An increase in both the quantity and quality of empirical 
data is driving the rapid advancement of connectivity analyses and tools, but there is 
currently little to no evidence that connectivity is being incorporated into on-the-ground 
decision making (Balbar, unpublished data). This is largely because connectivity metrics 
are not well defined or standardized, practitioners often lack confidence in the data or the 
expertise to work with them, and tools that appropriately represent and use connectivity 
data and patterns are lacking. Furthermore, the term “connectivity” has been used in a 
variety of ways in the literature, causing confusion about its meaning and use (Tischendorf 
& Fahrig 2000). This makes evaluating the degree of connectivity in the current global 
protected area estate difficult. In 2017, one of the first global metrics and analyses of 
protected area connectivity was developed, which defined connectivity as the ease of 
species movements and other ecological flows among protected locations. Saura et al. 
(2017) found that only a third of the world’s terrestrial ecoregions currently meet Aichi 
Target 11’s protected area connectivity goal. I expect to see significant advances in 
connectivity research in the coming years, which will facilitate analyses that evaluate the 
progress and potential trade-offs of achieving connectivity targets in the future. 
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1.5.2 Other Effective Conservation Measures 
 
The inclusion of “other effective conservation measures” (OECMs) in the 2010 Strategic 
Plan for Biodiversity was one of the most ambiguous objectives within Target 11. Like 
other non-area based goals, progress in defining, recognising and reporting on OECMs 
has lagged behind area-based targets (Leadley et al. 2014; IUCN WCPA 2018), making it 
hard to measure progress and quantify the impacts of OECMs towards conservation goals. 
Jonas et al. (2014) called attention to the fact that even four years after the adoption of 
Aichi Target 11, stakeholders had still not received guidance on what constitutes an 
OECM or how best to implement them, potentially leading to misuse and hindering 
conservation progress. Without a clear definition of OECMs it is hard to quantify the 
potential contribution of OECMs to biodiversity conservation. However, this should be an 
urgent priority in the future. 
 
Recognising these shortfalls, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) established a task-force on OECMs in late 2015. In 2018, the task force released 
the first (draft) definition of an OECM to be “a geographically defined space, not 
recognised as a protected area, which is governed and managed over the long-term in 
ways that deliver the effective in-situ conservation of biodiversity, with associated 
ecosystem services and culture and spiritual values” (IUCN WCPA 2018). This definition 
includes spatial conservation measures that may meet the definition of a protected area 
but are not designated as such, those where biodiversity conservation is a secondary 
management objective, and areas where biodiversity conservation is achieved fortuitously 
but is not stated as an explicit management objective. Thereby, OECMs complement, but 
do not replace, protected area efforts (IUCN WCPA 2018). The development of these 
guidelines will greatly facilitate the effective use and reporting of OECMs towards 
achieving conservation outcomes in the future.  
 
1.6 Thesis Overview 
 
International conservation agreements have shaped protected area establishment, 
influenced planning processes and driven conservation policies. The number of 
publications concerning the adequacy, progress, shortfalls and future directions of 
international targets to ensure outcomes for nature and people is continually growing. 
While many shortfalls have been identified, and potential solutions proposed, few have 
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attempted to quantify these trade-offs to uncover patterns that inform decision-making. In 
this thesis, I do this in the context of the United Nations Strategic Plan for Biodiversity’s 
Aichi Target 11. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to quantify key trade-offs in protected area implementation and/or 
design in the specific context of rapid protected area expansion and Aichi Target 11 
(Figure 1.1). Furthermore, I aim to propose timely, policy relevant solutions to limit 
perverse outcomes of these relationships. Each chapter presents a single trade-off and 
can be viewed as a stand-alone case study (Chapters 2-5), but all are tied together 
through the conservation objectives outlined by the United Nations Strategic Plan for 
Biodiversity and the Convention on Biological Diversity Aichi Target 11. In Chapter 2, I 
explore whether marine protected areas have been established in places where they can 
reduce the threats they are capable of abating. In Chapter 3, I investigate whether 
investing in protected area expansion or increasing management effectiveness in no-take 
protected areas delivers great benefits for an exploited species. In Chapter 4, I determine 
how ‘hot moments’ in conservation, where countries have expanded their protected area 
networks rapidly, have impacted the equitable representation of terrestrial ecoregions 
through time. Finally, in Chapter 5, I predict how future protected area downsizing and 
protection events may impact achieving representation targets. This research is a novel 
contribution to the field of Conservation Biology, is influential in informing conservation 
decisions relevant to protected areas and international targets, and is particularly timely as 
signatory nations to the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity develop targets for protected areas 
and biodiversity conservation post-2020. 
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Figure 1.1. Schematic of the components of Aichi Target 11 evaluated in this thesis. 
This thesis was written in the context of protected area objectives outlined in the 
Convention on Biological Diversity’s Aichi Target 11. Specifically, I explored trade-
offs and synergies between area-based targets and 1) important areas for 
biodiversity (Chapter 2), 2) management effectiveness (Chapter 3) and 3) 
representation (Chapters 4 and 5). Symbols for diagrams courtesy of the Integration 
and Application Network (ian.umces.edu/symbols). 
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Chapter 2 
Global marine protected area establishment largely avoids 
abatable threats to biodiversity 
 
 
2.1 Abstract 
 
Marine protected areas (MPAs) are a critical defence against biodiversity loss in the 
world’s oceans, but in order to realize a net conservation benefit they must be established 
where major threats to biodiversity occur and can be mitigated. Using the most 
comprehensive global data on marine threats, we show that protection covered <2% of 
ecoregions in national waters with high levels of abatable threats in 2013, which is ~59% 
less protection in high-threat areas than if MPAs had been placed randomly. Relatively 
low-threat ecoregions had 6.3 times more strict protection than high-threat ecoregions. We 
identify 31 ‘crisis’ ecoregions with high levels of stoppable threat but very low protection 
that present opportunities for MPAs to yield more significant conservation benefits. Efforts 
to increase the extent of the global MPA estate have been successful, but there is an 
urgent need to establish MPAs where they can reduce threats that are driving biodiversity 
loss. 
 
2.2 Introduction 
 
Marine protected areas (MPAs) are a cornerstone of modern conservation efforts (Watson 
et al. 2014) and have grown substantially over the past two decades to cover >6% of the 
world’s oceans (UNEP-WCMC and IUCN 2017a). Recently, several countries have 
received worldwide attention for declaring vast MPAs. For example, the United States 
expanded the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument to cover >1 million km2 
and Palau declared no-take protection in 80% of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
(UNEP-WCMC & IUCN 2016). Despite this growth, current global MPA coverage is below 
the 10% mandated by 2020 from the United Nation’s Strategic Plan for Biodiversity’s Aichi 
Target 11. (Convention on Biological Diversity 2010). 
 
There is ongoing debate about whether we should protect the most threatened areas 
(Pressey & Bottrill 2008; Devillers et al. 2015), or the last of the remaining large, intact land 
and seascapes (i.e. “wilderness”) (Graham & Clanahan 2013; Watson et al. 2016b). 
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However, to realize a net conservation benefit, PA establishment needs to target areas 
where the conservation value would decrease in the absence of action (i.e. it is under 
threat) and where PA establishment will reduce this threat(Maron et al. 2013).  
 
The effectiveness of MPAs is continually questioned because of shortfalls in management 
capacity and resources (Gill et al. 2017) and the sufficiency of MPA regulations to abate 
threats (Mora 2006). However, if MPAs are poorly-located (e.g. in places that do not afford 
adequate representation to species or protection from threatening processes) they will be 
ineffective regardless of the amount of regulatory support and funding they receive. A 
2015  study found that less than 3% of marine species have ≥10% of their range in strict 
MPAs, reflecting significant gaps in representation (Klein et al. 2015). Yet the potential of 
the global MPA network to protect biodiversity from human pressures that MPAs can abate 
is still unclear, making global assessments and future priority setting challenging. 
 
We used the most comprehensive data on cumulative global marine threats (Halpern et al. 
2015) to quantify whether the current MPA estate proactively targets or reactively avoids 
stoppable threats to biodiversity. We define stoppable threats as those that can be abated 
through effectively managed MPAs alone. All measures of fishing pressures, benthic 
structures and direct human impacts measured by Halpern et al. (2015) in 2008 and 2013 
were considered as ‘stoppable’ in our analysis (Appendix 2, Table S2.1). We determined 
the level of stoppable threats and protection across the world’s marine ecoregions.by 
combining spatially explicit threat and protection data with information on the potential of 
MPAs to halt these threats. This allowed us to determine whether MPA establishment has 
targeted places with high stoppable threats at the global and national scale (Fig. 2.1A). 
Furthermore, we identified areas with high levels of threat and very low protection that 
present clear opportunities for targeted MPA expansion to mitigate stoppable threats to 
biodiversity. Our analysis provides an important reference point to measure progress in 
MPA placement in relation to stoppable threats, which is critical as signatory nations to the 
Strategic Plan for Biodiversity develop MPA targets post-2020. 
 
2.3 Methods 
 
We used the 232 marine ecoregions defined by Spalding et al. (2007) to represent global 
marine biodiversity features. The study was limited to ecoregions and MPAs within 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). This limitation was  due to the worldwide challenges 
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implementing conservation actions beyond national jurisdictions, and because the majority 
of MPA designations and marine threats occur within national waters (Spalding et al. 2007; 
Halpern et al. 2008b).  
 
2.3.1 Marine protected areas 
 
The proportion of area protected in 2013 and between 2008 and 2013 was estimated by 
intersecting equal-area projections of the World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA) 
(UNEP-WCMC and IUCN 2017b) with marine ecoregions and country EEZs. Terrestrial 
PAs, those listed as “proposed”, and UNESCO Biosphere reserves were removed from 
analysis following WDPA recommendations (UNEP-WCMC 2016). MPAs without 
delineated boundary data were removed from the analysis. Missing establishment year 
data was imputed following Butchart et al. (2015b) by randomly selecting a year (with 
replacement) from all PAs within the same country with a known date of establishment.  
For countries with fewer than five PAs with known establishment date, a year was 
randomly selected from all PAs with a known date of establishment. The random 
assignment was repeated 1,000 times, and the mean value was assigned to all PAs within 
each country that were missing establishment dates.  
 
Because protected areas are managed for different purposes (i.e. some MPAs allow for 
extractive use), we used reported IUCN classifications as a proxy for management 
objectives within MPAs. IUCN categories I-II represent strict nature reserves, IUCN 
categories I-IV were considered to be designated primarily for biodiversity conservation, 
categories I-VI included MPAs that allow for some sustainable use of natural resources, 
and all categories included those listed as “Not Applicable”, “Not Reported”, or “Not 
Assigned” and represent all MPAs within the WDPA database that meet our selection 
criteria. Notably, IUCN classifications only capture management objectives not necessary 
effectiveness and exclude potentially meaningful protection in countries that do not 
subscribe to IUCN designations. Since even ineffective MPAs can provide a basis for more 
strict and effective management in the future, the results for all IUCN classes are 
presented in the main text. 
 
2.3.2 Measures of threat 
 
We considered the impact of 12 threats to marine ecosystems that were measured in both 
2008 and 2013 using the normalized (across both time periods) cumulative human impact 
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data from Halpern et al. (2015). We categorized each threat as stoppable (fishing 
pressure, benthic structures and direct human impacts) or unstoppable (land-based and 
climate change impacts) based on the ability of effectively managed MPAs alone at 
combatting each threat (Appendix 2, Table S2.1). Stoppable threats have clear marine 
origins and targets and can therefore be managed through effective marine protection. 
Unstoppable threats often originate from land or diffuse sources that cannot be directly 
managed through MPA establishment alone. Shipping data, while stoppable through MPA 
establishment, was not considered because it was not measured in both time periods. 
Using this information, we calculated the mean level of stoppable threat within each global 
and country ecoregion.  
 
Due to potential difficulties in managing or removing existing benthic structures and 
prohibiting direct human impacts, we repeated our analysis and only considered fishing 
pressure to be stoppable. These results can be found in Appendix 2 Supplementary Text 
and Figs. S2.2A and S2.2B.  
 
2.3.3 Is protection targeting stoppable threats? 
 
We assessed the current relationship between MPA establishment and stoppable threats 
by comparing the proportion of total area protected (i.e. within the MPA estate) to mean 
stoppable threat in each ecoregion in 2013. We evaluated progress in recent years by 
comparing the change in the proportion of area protected between 2008 and 2013 to mean 
stoppable threat in 2008. First, each ecoregion was classified into one of sixteen 
categories based on the quartiles of the proportion of area protected and the level 
stoppable threat across all ecoregions (dashed and solid lines Fig. 2.1A). We then used 
chi-square tests to determine whether the observed distribution of protection across 
ecoregions was independent of threat. If protection was independent of threat (i.e. 
random) we would expect equal numbers of ecoregions (6.25%) in each sector. If MPAs 
were being established to combat stoppable threats we would expect a greater number of 
ecoregions with high levels of protection and high levels of threat (top quartile of protection 
and threat, top left sector Fig. 2.1A). 
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Figure 2.1. (A) Schematic of ecoregion classifications into threat and risk 
categories. Each global marine ecoregion was plotted based on the proportion of 
area protected and mean stoppable threat in each ecoregion. They were then 
categorized based on the quartiles of stoppable threat and proportion of area 
protected across the range of all ecoregions (dashed and solid vertical and 
horizontal lines). Ecoregions were classified as low threat if they had less than the 
median level of stoppable threat and high threat. Protection in low threat ecoregions 
was considered to be avoiding threats and protection in high threat ecoregions was 
considered to be targeting threats. Ecoregions with below the median proportion of 
area protected (solid horizontal line) were identified as ‘at-risk’. ‘At-risk’ ecoregions 
were divided into four risk categories based on the quartiles of stoppable threat 
(dashed and solid vertical lines): 1) low risk (lowest quartile), 2) moderate risk 
(second quartile), 3) high risk (third quartile), and 4) crisis (highest quartile). (B) The 
proportion of area protected within each protection strategy (avoiding or targeting 
threat) in both time periods across IUCN categories. (C) The relationship between 
the proportion of area protected and the level of stoppable threat in each global 
marine ecoregion in 2013 (N=232 ecoregions) and (D) in ecoregions that increased 
protection between 2008 and 2013 (N=124 ecoregions). Axes in figure C and D are 
cube root transformed. 
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To determine the proportion of protection that was targeting or avoiding stoppable threats, 
we classified ecoregions as ‘low threat’ or ‘high threat’ based on the median level of 
stoppable threat across all ecoregions. Low threat ecoregions had less than the median 
level of stoppable threat and high threat ecoregions had more than the median level of 
stoppable threat across all ecoregions (left and right of vertical solid line Fig. 2.1A, 
respectively). MPAs established in low threat ecoregions were classified as avoiding 
threats, while those in high threat ecoregions were classified as targeting threats in both 
time periods. 
 
Finally, we showcased the general protection strategy globally and within the 20 countries 
that have at least five ecoregions within their EEZ and had protected the greatest 
proportion of their national waters as of 2013 (Appendix 2, Table S2.3). We recalculated 
the level of protection and the level of stoppable threat within each country’s ecoregions. 
Protection within ecoregions was classified as avoiding threats (protection in low threat 
ecoregions) or targeting threats (protection in high threat ecoregions) as above. An ‘impact 
metric’ was calculated based on the difference between the proportion of protection in high 
threat ecoregions and the proportion of protection in low threat ecoregions (see 
hypothetical example in Fig. S2.3). The ‘impact metric’ I for country C is calculated as: 
𝐼𝐶 =  
𝑝𝐻
𝑎𝐻
−  
𝑝𝐿
𝑎𝐿
, 
where pH is the area protected in high-threat ecoregions, pL is the area protected in low-
threat ecoregions, aH is the area in high-threat ecoregions and aL is the area in low-threat 
ecoregions within each country. The metric is bounded between -1, if only low-threat 
ecoregions are protected, and 1, if only high-threat ecoregions are protected, and results 
in a value of 0 if high and low-threat ecoregions are proportionally protected equally.  
 
We call this the ‘impact metric’ because it indicates the potential of a MPA network to have 
a meaningful conservation impact by mitigating stoppable threats. An impact metric value 
of 0 indicates that ecoregions of relatively high and low stoppable threat are proportionally 
protected equally. A negative value indicates that ecoregions with relatively low stoppable 
threat receive greater levels of protection, whereas a positive value signifies that relatively 
high stoppable threat ecoregions receive proportionally more protection. We chose this 
metric because it has an upper and lower bound that facilitates comparison between 
countries. It also accounts for the fact that the amount of protection in either threat 
20 
 
category is dependent on the total area of ecoregions within that category. Therefore, a 
country is not penalized for having less or more area with relatively high levels of 
stoppable threat.  We hypothesized that the majority of leaders in marine protection would 
have a negative impact metric (i.e. be protecting low threat ecoregions more than high 
threat ecoregions), because of the high cost of establishing MPAs in high threat areas and 
trends of avoiding areas of commercial value in terrestrial PAs (Venter et al. 2017). 
 
We assessed the performance of these countries and the global MPA network by 
comparing the impact metric calculated from the 2013 MPA system to a random solution.  
For the random protection scenario, we selected ecoregions at random (with replacement) 
and allocated area equal to the median PA size within that country until the total area 
protected in 2013 was reached (Appendix 2, Table S2.3).  The median value was used as 
it is more robust to outliers. We ensured that the proportion of area protected in each 
ecoregion never exceeded 1. We then calculated the impact metric as above.  This was 
repeated 1,000 times, with the random impact metric equal to the average impact metric 
across all simulations. Our null hypothesis was that countries were protecting area 
randomly (i.e. regardless of threat), and thus the observed and random impact metrics 
would be similar.  An observed impact metric that was outside of the 95% confidence 
interval of the mean random impact metric was significantly different than random. If the 
distribution of the random impact metric across all simulations was not normal, a bootstrap 
confidence interval was generated using the ‘boot’ package in R v3.3.3 (Canty & Ripley 
2015). 
 
2.3.4 Ecoregions ‘at-risk’ 
 
Ecoregions with below the median proportion of area protected across all ecoregions were 
identified as ‘at-risk’ due to low levels of protection coupled with varying levels of stoppable 
threat (Fig. 2.1A). We divided ‘at-risk’ ecoregions into four risk categories based on the 
quartile of stoppable threat: 1) low risk (lowest quartile), 2) moderate risk (second quartile), 
3) high risk (third quartile), and 4) crisis (highest quartile). The number of ecoregions 
crossing country borders were analysed as this may play a significant role in the effective 
protection and management of these areas. If the level of threat was independent of 
whether an ecoregion crossed country borders, we would expect the same proportion of 
‘at-risk’ ecoregions to be transboundary or single country as across all 232 global marine 
ecoregions. Since we defined ‘at-risk’ ecoregions by quartiles of stoppable threat we would 
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then expect 25% of “at-risk” transboundary and 25% of “at-risk” single country ecoregions 
to be in each risk category (see Appendix 2, Table S2.4). 
 
2.4 Results 
 
We found that a total of 9.0% of national waters had protection in 2013, but only ~21% 
was within high threat ecoregions (i.e. ecoregions with above the median level of 
stoppable threat, Fig. 2.1B). In other words, only 1.9% of ecoregions with high stoppable 
threat were protected, while ecoregions dominated by low levels of stoppable threat had 
3.8 times more area protected. These patterns remained consistent across all IUCN 
categories. MPAs with the strictest protection (IUCN classes I-II) showed the greatest 
disparity, with 6.3 times more protection in low threat ecoregions than high threat 
ecoregions (Fig. 2.1B, Fig. S2.1A).  
 
Between 2008 and 2013, nearly 6.3 million km2 were protected, but only 9.4% was in 
ecoregions with high levels of threat (0.4% of the 4.7% of marine area protected, Fig. 
2.1B). Within the strictest protection classes (IUCN I-II) only 8.4% of protection occurred in 
high threat areas (Fig. 2.1B, Fig. S2.1B). Protection increased by an average of 14.6% in 
low threat areas, but just 1.6% in high threat areas. The level of protection within 
ecoregions was significantly dependent on the level of stoppable threat in both time 
periods (χ2= 54.3, p <0.001 in 2013, and χ2= 31.6, p <0.01 between 2008 and 2013, Fig. 
2.1C and D). Notably, there were significantly fewer ecoregions with high levels of 
protection and high stoppable threat than expected if MPAs had been placed randomly.  
 
We hypothesized that the 20 countries with the largest MPA estates would exhibit negative 
impact metrics (i.e. the proportion of protection in high threat areas is less than the 
proportion of protection in low threat areas) because of potential costs of establishing 
MPAs in high threat areas. Conversely, we found that 14 countries (70%) exhibited 
positive impact metrics (Fig. 2.2A).  The majority of these (11) had an impact metric 
between 0 and 0.05 signifying that low threat and high threat ecoregions are proportionally 
protected relatively equally. Australia and Kiribati had the highest impact metrics at 0.26 
and 0.25, respectively (see Appendix 2, Table S2.2 for impact metrics by country and 
IUCN category). Surprisingly, Chile, Ecuador and South Africa target areas with low 
stoppable threats almost exclusively (Fig. 2.2B).  
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Figure 2.2. (A) The observed and average random (±95% CI, N= 1000 random simulations) impact metrics within the 20 
countries with the largest marine protected area estates as of 2013 and (B) the proportion of area protected in 2013 in high and 
low threat ecoregions. The impact metrics indicates the potential of a MPA network to have a meaningful conservation impact 
by mitigating stoppable threats and is calculated as the difference between the proportion of high threat areas that are 
protected and low threat areas that are protected. An impact metric value of 0 indicates that ecoregions of relatively high and 
low stoppable threat are proportionally protected equally. A negative value indicates that ecoregions with relatively low 
stoppable threat receive greater levels of protection (avoiding stoppable threats), whereas a positive value signifies that 
relatively high stoppable threat ecoregions receive more protection (targeting stoppable threats). The number of ecoregions in 
each country is noted in parentheses. * Indicates random impact metrics that are significantly worse than random. All other 
impact metrics are significantly better than random. 
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When compared to a random solution, the observed global MPA impact metric performed 
significantly worse (Fig. 2.2A, Appendix 2, Table S2.3).  Random MPA allocation resulted 
in an average of >2.4 times more protection in high threat ecoregions than what was 
observed. Similarly, at the national scale, the United States, New Zealand, Ecuador, South 
Africa, Chile, Canada and China had observed impact metrics that were significantly worse 
than random, whereas the remaining 13 countries had observed impact metrics 
significantly better than random (Fig. 2.2A, Appendix 2, Table S2.3).   
 
Our impact metric is easily calculated and reveals differences in the proportion of 
protection in low and high threat areas. However, fine-scale assessments will be 
imperative to maximize the conservation impact of future MPA expansion by local-scale 
implementation. For example, many have criticized the avoidance of areas with high 
potential for extractive uses in Australia’s recently announced Commonwealth Reserve 
System (Devillers et al. 2015; McGowan & Possingham 2015) despite it having the highest 
impact metric in our analysis. Similarly, Indonesia had an impact metric close to 0 (impact 
metric = 0.0052), which indicates relatively equal protection in high and low threat areas. 
However, Harris et al. (2017) found that existing MPAs in Indonesia tended to be located 
where there were lower levels of stoppable threats. These results highlight the urgent need 
for a more transparent evaluation of threats and MPA establishment to determine what 
optimal solutions should look like to achieve desired outcomes.  
 
To help target MPA establishment, we identify ‘at-risk’ ecoregions that have very low levels 
of protection (i.e. below the median proportion of area protected across all ecoregions) 
(Fig. 2.1A). ‘At-risk’ ecoregions were classified into four risk categories based on the 
quartile of stoppable threat, resulting in 33 low risk (lowest quartile), 23 moderate risk 
(second quartile), 29 high risk (third quartile) and 31 crisis (highest quartile) ecoregions 
(Fig. 2.3). These areas warrant urgent action and also represent opportunities for MPA 
establishment to deliver high conservation impact.  
 
‘At-risk’ and crisis ecoregions were found across 134 and 47 countries, respectively. Crisis 
ecoregions were predominately found in Central and Eastern Indo-Pacific, which are world 
hotspots for marine biodiversity (Roberts 2002) and hold significant conservation value. 
However, the high levels of fishing in the Indo-Pacific, and the many livelihoods that 
depend on it, will increase the social and economic costs of MPA establishment and may 
even reduce the probability of MPA success in these areas. For example, the highest 
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proportion of ineffective coral reef MPAs are found in the most threatened regions of the 
world (Burke et al. 2011). Considering the relationship between MPA establishment, 
threats, and the rights and needs of local people will be imperative to ensure equitable 
costs and outcomes of conservation action (Adams et al. 2010).  
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Figure 2.3. The spatial distribution of ‘at-risk’ marine ecoregions globally. Ecoregions below the median proportion of area 
protected are divided by quartiles of stoppable threat into four risk categories (see Fig. 2.1A): 1) low risk (bottom quartile), 2) 
moderate risk (second quartile), 3) high risk (third quartile) and 4) crisis (top quartile). 
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Of all 232 marine ecoregions, 85 (36.6%) occur within a single country and 147 (63.4%) 
cross country borders. We found that significantly more transboundary ecoregions were 
identified as ‘crisis’ ecoregions whereas significantly more ‘low risk’ ecoregions occur in a 
single country than expected by chance (χ2= 16.286, p <0.001, Appendix 2, Table S2.4). 
This highlights the importance of transboundary cooperation and conservation 
agreements, like the Coral Triangle Initiative, in achieving overall conservation outcomes.  
 
2.5 Discussion 
 
A combination of conserving threatened areas and maintaining intact, high risk habitats is 
crucial to maintain the full range of marine biodiversity in perpetuity (Watson & Venter 
2017). However, with the majority of the world’s protected ocean in relatively low threat 
ecoregions, it is important to ensure that we are not claiming false progress in marine 
conservation. The disparity between protection and stoppable threat can mislead decision-
makers and the public and overestimate the net benefits that MPA networks deliver 
(Watson et al. 2016a; Pressey et al. 2017). The often explicit goal of marine spatial 
planning to minimize conflict with resources users may reduce costs in the near term (i.e. 
opportunity costs, Ban & Klein 2009), but it also means that we are investing limited 
conservation funds in areas that will experience very little degradation over time (Ferraro & 
Pattanayak 2006; Pressey et al. 2017). Our analysis indicates that global MPA 
establishment largely avoids stoppable threats to biodiversity at this broad scale. 
 
International agreements could incentivize the protection of high risk areas by setting 
ecosystem representation and biodiversity goals (e.g. via the Key Biodiversity Area 
process led by the International Union for Nature Conservation (IUCN 2016)) that span a 
range of within feature threat classes, while simultaneously improving conservation metrics 
to capture both gains and losses for biodiversity (i.e. conservation impact). The former is 
important because of our limited understanding of within-feature variation of habitats and 
species (Devillers et al. 2015). The latter would commend protection in areas at high risk 
of degradation, but may be difficult to develop and standardize. Our impact metric attempts 
to make the relationship between MPA establishment and threat more transparent, but 
metrics that consider habitat condition at a finer scale are urgently needed (e.g. McDonald-
Madden et al. (2009)). 
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We show that MPAs with the strictest protection classes have some of the greatest 
disparity in protection relative to stoppable threats, but our results assume all MPAs are 
well managed and are intended and able to mitigate these threats. This is generous 
compared to the true conservation impact of existing MPA estates since many allow 
extractive activities and/or lack adequate management to effectively abate threats 
(Leverington et al. 2010; Gill et al. 2017). Since even currently ineffective MPAs can 
provide a basis for more strict and effective management in the future, our analysis can be 
interpreted as the potential for conservation impact of existing MPA networks. Notably, 
most of the measured stoppable threats in this analysis pertain to fishing pressure, which 
is unsurprising considering fishing is one of the most pervasive immediate threats to 
marine biodiversity (Maxwell, S.L., Fuller, R.A., Brooks, T.M., Watson 2016) and five of the 
seven stoppable threat layers were related to various fishing methods (Appendix 2, Table 
S2.1). When only fishing related threats are considered to be abatable through MPA 
establishment, the results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar (Appendix 2, 
Supplementary Text, Fig. S2.2A and S2.2B). Nevertheless, our research shows that the 
large biases in the location of MPAs in relation to the location of marine threats that MPAs 
can abate needs to be considered in future MPA establishment and conservation targets.  
 
Timely, focused action is urgently needed to safeguard marine biodiversity against rapidly 
increasing threats (Halpern et al. 2015). From our results, it is clear that the current 
approach to measuring conservation progress masks biases in MPA designation relative 
to threat that can compromise the goal of international conservation agreements: halting 
biodiversity loss. Since so little of the ocean is currently protected, there is still tremendous 
opportunity to correct these shortfalls and construct a global MPA network that targets 
major threats to marine biodiversity and results in high conservation impact. More strategic 
placement of MPAs and better ways of accounting for the benefit of marine protection 
above and beyond what would have happened in the absence of action are urgently 
needed to ensure the world’s marine biodiversity persists into the future. 
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Chapter 3 
Bigger or better: the relative benefits of protected area network 
expansion and enforcement for the conservation of an 
exploited species 
 
 
3.1 Abstract 
 
The global portfolio of protected areas is growing rapidly, despite widely-recognized 
shortfalls in management effectiveness. Pressure to meet area-coverage and management 
effectiveness objectives makes it essential to determine how limited conservation funds 
should be allocated between expanding protected area networks and better enforcing 
existing reserves. We formally explore this question for the particular case of an exploited 
species in a partially-protected system, using a general model linking protection, 
enforcement and legal/illegal resource extraction. We show that, on average, funds should 
be disproportionately invested in enforcement rather than expansion. Further, expansion 
alone, without additional enforcement, can actually reduce conservation outcomes. To help 
guide future decisions, we calculate the optimal allocation of resources between these two 
actions given any current level of enforcement and protected area coverage. In most cases, 
simultaneously investing in expansion and enforcement is the optimal decision. However, in 
places with low enforcement and high protection, contracting protected areas or strategically 
concentrating enforcement effort produces the greatest benefits.  
 
3.2 Introduction 
 
International conservation agreements are driving the most rapid expansion of protected 
areas (PAs) in history. For example, Aichi Target 11 commits signatory countries to 
enclosing 17% of terrestrial and 10% of marine environments in “effectively and equitably 
managed” PAs by 2020 (Convention on Biological Diversity 2010). Although many parts of 
the world now have substantial proportions of their land and sea territory under formal 
protection, over 50% of species have insufficient protection to meet current conservation 
targets (Butchart et al. 2015), and many PAs lack adequate management to effectively abate 
threats (Mora 2006; Craigie et al. 2010; Geldmann et al. 2014; Gill et al. 2017). While some 
initiatives are calling for even more of the Earth’s surface to be dedicated to nature (e.g. 
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“half-earth” (Wilson 2016)), others suggest that shifting efforts towards implementation and 
enforcement of existing PAs would better serve conservation (Jenkins & Joppa 2009; 
Costelloe et al. 2015). While there are alternative approaches to protect biodiversity and 
reduce threats (Buscher et al. 2017), strict PAs remain a cornerstone of modern biodiversity 
conservation. 
 
Resource constraints make it difficult to improve both the effectiveness and coverage of 
PAs. The dramatic expansion of terrestrial and marine PAs over the past 25 years (by 92% 
and 513%, respectively (Butchart et al. 2015)), reflects a substantial investment in PA 
establishment. A corresponding investment in management capacity is not as apparent, with 
many existing PAs currently lacking the means to operate effectively due to shortfalls in 
resources and/or management planning (Leverington et al. 2010; Watson et al. 2014; Gill et 
al. 2017). 
 
Effective PA management is required to stop threats that undermine the values of parks. 
Such investment is particularly vital for extractive threats, including fishing (Mora 2006; 
Bergseth et al. 2015), bushmeat hunting, and wildlife trade harvest (Hilborn et al. 2006). In 
these cases, a large part of effective management involves ensuring compliance with no-
take regulations (Keane et al. 2008; Arias 2015). Illegal harvesting (i.e. poaching) is 
particularly problematic because poachers may become more attracted to PAs as they 
become more effectively enforced and protected populations increase (Hall et al. 2008; Arias 
& Sutton 2013). Additionally, as PAs expand, enforcement resources will be diluted across 
larger areas and longer perimeters, potentially decreasing the optimal number of reserves 
(Potts & Vincent 2008). These dynamics create complex feedbacks between expansion, 
enforcement, and human behaviour that are critical to understanding compliance and 
conserving biodiversity.  
 
Ideally, maximizing expansion and enforcement would produce the best outcomes for 
conservation, but both actions are interdependent and demand the same resources. The 
optimal allocation decision is therefore not obvious. Here, we focus on the case of a 
commercially-valuable species, developing a general model that describes the coupled 
dynamics of protection and compliance in a partially-protected habitat network. We apply 
this model to 1) evaluate the impact of PA expansion without additional enforcement funds; 
2) determine how an increasing budget should be shared between enforcement and 
protection from a low protection/low enforcement state to a high protection/high enforcement 
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state; and 3) guide the allocation of resources between these two actions given any current 
level of enforcement and protection. 
 
3.3 Methods 
 
Our model describes an exploited metapopulation of both commercial and conservation 
value, and the behaviour of humans exploiting these organisms in a partially-protected 
system (Fig. 3.1). To focus on the trade-off between the extent of the PA network and the 
level of enforcement effort, the ecological and economic components of the model are 
straightforward and general. The model was parameterized to ensure that the harvested 
metapopulation was robust enough to persist without any protection, but where both the 
harvesters and population would respond to changes in protection and enforcement (see 
Appendix 3, Table S3.1 for a complete table of model parameter values. Model code is 
publicly available at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1068314). 
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Figure 3.1. Schematic of model dynamics for an exploited, space-limited species in 
a marine context. The model depicts a partially-protected system (total patches = 
M). The population (NR) on protected patches (green, R) and legally exploited 
population (NF) on unprotected patches (blue, F= M - R) are ecologically and 
economically identical. Extractive effort on protected patches is affected by the 
level of enforcement, which determines the probability of being apprehended, pB, 
and the penalty incurred when apprehended, cB. Profits on protected and 
unprotected patches (𝝅𝑹 and 𝝅𝑭, respectively) are equal to the difference between 
the market price (d) and the operational and the expected apprehension costs of 
harvesting those species. Enforcement level is varied by increasing or decreasing 
the budget for enforcement, B, which directly impacts the probability of being 
apprehended, pB; expansion is simulated by increasing the proportion of patches 
that are protected (
𝑹
𝑴
), and that are therefore visited by enforcement officers. 
Symbols for diagrams courtesy of the Integration and Application Network 
(ian.umces.edu/symbols). 
 
3.3.1 Population Model 
 
We use a spatially-implicit population model to describe a species with a two-phase life-
history: a space-limited adult stage and a dispersive juvenile stage. This basic structure 
resembles many plant, insect, and mammal species, but is most similar to a fish species in 
a patchy coastal habitat (e.g., rocky or coral reefs). Space is represented by M habitat 
patches, which could represent sites or home ranges in a contiguous land- or seascape, or 
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discrete patches in a metapopulation. The dynamics of individual patches are coupled by 
juvenile dispersal. The system is divided into R protected patches, where extractive activities 
are prohibited by a uniform level of enforcement (but are not necessarily absent), and F = 
M – R unprotected patches, where there are no harvest restrictions. Patches are ecologically 
and economically identical (e.g., equal travel costs, productivity), but experience different 
levels of extractive effort due to the enforcement of harvest restrictions on protected patches. 
The model, therefore, describes two abundance levels:  ?̅?𝑅 on each protected patch and  ?̅?𝐹 
on each exploited patch.  
 
We model abundance on the reserved and harvested patches in discrete time with the 
equations: 
 ?̅?𝑹(𝒕 + 𝟏) = ?̅?𝑹(𝒕)(𝟏 − 𝒒𝑬𝑹
𝒛 )(𝟏 − 𝒎) + 𝑰(𝒕), (1) 
 ?̅?𝑭(𝒕 + 𝟏) = ?̅?𝑭(𝒕)(𝟏 − 𝒒𝑬𝑭
𝒛 )(𝟏 − 𝒎) + 𝑰(𝒕).    (2) 
 
The total abundance of the species across the system is therefore: 
 
 𝑵𝑻(𝒕) = 𝑹?̅?𝑹(𝒕) + (𝑴 − 𝑹)?̅?𝑭(𝒕). (3) 
 
Abundance declines through natural mortality, 0 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 1, and human extractive effort on 
protected and unprotected patches: 0 ≤ 𝐸𝑅 , 𝐸𝐹 ≤ 1. On each patch, populations increase by 
the immigration of new juveniles, 𝐼(𝑡). Harvests are described by a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, determined by the catchability, 0 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 1, of the species, and a 
diminishing returns parameter, 0 < 𝑧 < 1, which reflects the effort-output elasticity or the fact 
that doubling effort does not double the yield.  
 
Together, all patches produce 𝐽 juveniles, proportional to the species’ per-capita fecundity, 
𝑓: 
 𝑱(𝒕) = 𝒇[𝑹𝑵𝑹(𝒕) + (𝑴 − 𝑹)𝑵𝑭(𝒕)]. (4) 
 
Juveniles are highly dispersive, and are distributed at an even density across protected and 
unprotected patches. We explore how this assumption affects our results in Appendix 3 
Supplementary Text S3.1. Upon arrival, juveniles experience density-dependent mortality 
before entering the adult population according to a Beverton-Holt relationship: 
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𝑰(𝒕) =
∝
𝑱(𝒕)
𝑴
𝟏 +
𝜷𝑱(𝒕)
𝑴
. 
(5) 
 
We assume that α =1 and β = 0.01 for all examples below (but see sensitivity analyses in 
Appendix 3 Supplementary Text S3.2). 
 
3.3.2 Economic model 
 
We take an instrumental approach to compliance (Tyler 1990), where resource users 
behave as rational, profit maximisers. From this perspective, protected patches carry higher 
expected extraction costs (as a result of penalties), but may also have a higher abundance 
of the target species. The amount of illegal harvesting occurring on protected patches 
reflects this expected cost. 
 
Extractive effort on protected patches is thus affected by the level of enforcement, which 
determines the probability of being apprehended, 0 ≤ 𝑝𝐵 ≤ 1, and the penalty incurred when 
apprehended (e.g., fines, equipment confiscation, lost time), cB. The expected cost of being 
apprehended while poaching is therefore 𝑝𝐵𝑐𝐵. The apprehension probability of a harvester 
who spends a unit amount of time poaching is a function of the enforcement budget, B, 
minus overheads (e.g., travel costs, staff salaries) for each PA, 𝑐𝑇: 
 
 𝒑𝑩 = (𝑩 − 𝑹𝒄𝑻)/𝑹. (6) 
 
We bound 𝑝𝐵 between 0 and 1(Appendix 3 Supplementary Figure S3.1). Note that 
because this probability is per unit time, increased poaching effort results in a higher 
expected apprehension cost (Bulte et al. 1999). Additionally, below a budget threshold that 
reflects enforcement overheads, (𝐵 < 𝑐𝑇𝑅), 𝑝𝐵 = 0, protected patches are essentially 
paper parks. Since very little is known about the relationship between the probability of 
apprehension and the amount of enforcement resources allocated we chose a linear 
relationship, but a logit functional form may also be appropriate. Profits on protected and 
unprotected patches (𝜋𝑅 and 𝜋𝐹, respectively) are equal to the difference between the unit 
market price of the resource, d, and the operational,  𝑐𝐸 , and expected apprehension 
costs, 𝑝𝐵𝑐𝐵, of harvesting: 
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 𝝅𝑹 = 𝒅𝒒𝑵𝑹𝑬𝑹
𝒛 − (𝒄𝑬 + 𝒑𝑩𝒄𝑩)𝑬𝑹 (7) 
 𝝅𝑭 = 𝒅𝒒𝑵𝑭𝑬𝑭
𝒛 − 𝒄𝑬𝑬𝑭. (8) 
 
Here, we assume harvester and enforcer operational costs are equal (𝑐𝑇 = 𝑐𝐸),  but we vary 
them substantially within our sensitivity analysis (Appendix 3 Supplementary Text S3.2). 
Because access to the harvesting sector is unrestricted, the level of poaching effort on both 
protected and unprotected patches will increase until supernormal profits dissipate (i.e., until 
𝜋𝐹 = 𝜋𝑅 = 0).  
 
3.3.3 Prioritising Expansion or Enforcement 
 
Enforcement level is varied by increasing or decreasing the enforcement budget, B; 
expansion is simulated by increasing the proportion of protected patches.  
We first test the impact of expansion without additional enforcement resources. We begin 
with only 5% of patches protected (𝑅/𝑀 = 0.05), and an enforcement budget large enough 
to stop 95% of poaching (i.e., near perfect compliance: 𝐸𝑃 𝐸𝐹⁄ = 0.05). We then simulate 
gradual PA expansion (up to 95% protection), but with no additional enforcement funds, to 
assess the impact of spreading a fixed enforcement budget over an expanding PA network.  
 
Second, we consider the optimal pathway between a low-protection/low-enforcement state, 
and a high-protection/high-enforcement state. That is, how should an increasing budget be 
shared between enforcement and protection? We start with 5% protection (𝑅/𝑀 = 0.05) and 
an enforcement budget low enough that harvesting effort on protected patches is 95% of 
harvesting effort on unprotected patches (𝐸𝑃 𝐸𝐹⁄  = 0.95). We then calculate the marginal 
benefit of directing an additional unit of funding towards increasing enforcement or 
increasing PA extent. The optimal decision will clearly depend on the relative costs of the 
two actions. Because we want to understand the intrinsic effectiveness of expansion and 
enforcement, not their relative costs, we standardise their costs. We calculate the 
improvement in 𝑁𝑇  that results from increasing 𝑅 𝑀⁄  from 5% to 10%. We then search for 
the amount of additional enforcement resources, 𝛿𝐵, that creates the same improvement. 
Managers can therefore either increase protection by 5%, or add another 𝛿𝐵 to the 
enforcement budget.  
 
Finally, based on the standardised units described above, we calculate the optimal state-
dependent conservation decision for any current level of protection and enforcement. That 
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is, for all management states (enforcement budget, B, and protection, 𝑅 𝑀⁄ ), we calculate 
whether managers should expand (by 5%), or enforce (by 𝛿𝐵). We allow managers to reduce 
the area protected (i.e., reducing R/M by 5%), if doing so improves 𝑁𝑇. To assess the 
robustness of our findings, we tested the sensitivity of our results under two alternative 
model formulations (Appendix 3, Supplementary Text S3.1) and to parameter variation of 
±50% (Appendix 3, Supplementary Text S3.2). 
 
3.4 Results 
 
With a fixed enforcement budget, our model predicts that expansion from a low-
protection/high-enforcement state will initially deliver substantial increases in abundance. In 
other words, despite a dilution of enforcement resources, the benefits from increasing PA 
size outweigh the perverse effects of increased poaching. If expansion continues, total 
abundance is maximized at some mid-point of protection, beyond which the dilution causes 
conservation benefits to decline. Abundance eventually declines to the level of an 
unprotected system (Fig. 3.2). At this point, enforcement offers no benefits because the 
entire budget is consumed by overheads. Figure 3.2 is generated from our particular 
parameterisation, but the qualitative changes in performance – diminishing returns and an 
interior maxima beyond which expansion produces worse outcomes – are common to all 
parameterisations and two alternative model formulations (Appendix 3, Figures S3.2, S3.3, 
S3.4 and S3.5). In some systems a logit functional form for the probability of being caught, 
𝑝𝐵, may be more appropriate, which would exhibit similar behaviour but would likely shift the 
point where dilution occurs. 
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Figure 3.2. Impacts of protected area expansion on total species abundance under a 
fixed enforcement budget. Relative total abundance is standardised to an 
unprotected system. At the left-hand of the figure, the enforcement budget is high 
enough to stop 95% (
𝑬𝑷
𝑬𝑭
 = 0.05) of illegal harvest in a system with 5% of patches 
protected (
𝑹
𝑴
 = 0.05). Moving to the right along the curve, PA expansion initially 
increases total abundance, but delivers diminishing positive marginal returns. Once 
protection expands above 20%, these marginal returns become negative, as 
enforcement effort becomes too diluted. Beyond 75-80% protection, the budget is 
entirely consumed by travel time, and conservation outcomes are no better than an 
unprotected system. Replication code for this figure is publicly available at 
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1068314. 
 
To maximize abundance, the optimal resource allocation from a low-protection/low-
enforcement state prioritises enforcement over expansion (grey line, Fig. 3.3). Equal 
investment in expansion and enforcement initially produces optimal improvements, but 
enforcement quickly becomes the best use of additional resources, at a ratio of 
approximately 2:1. Importantly, this preference for enforcement holds broadly true across 
our sensitivity analysis. This recommends that, on average, decision-makers aiming to 
maximize the abundance of a given exploited species should always invest at least as much 
resources into enforcement as expansion (Appendix 3 Supplementary Text S3.2 and Figure 
S3.2).  
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Figure 3.3. Total abundance (unprotected and protected patches) under varying 
levels of enforcement and protected area extent. Grey line indicates the optimal 
decision pathway from a low-enforcement/low-protection state to a high-
enforcement/high-protection state. Arrows depict the state dependent decision 
between expansion and enforcement, for all levels of enforcement and PA network 
size. Red arrows indicate combinations of PA extent and enforcement budget where 
the optimal choice is actually to contract protected areas; black arrows indicate 
when expand, enforce or both produces the greatest conservation benefits. 
 
Although enforcement is generally preferred over expansion, at low levels of protection the 
best option is to expand, since even low enforcement budgets can effectively exclude 
poachers across small areas. Moreover, small PAs are generally unable to produce larger 
populations, due to insufficient self-replenishment (Almany et al. 2009), making them less 
attractive to poachers. Interestingly, when PAs are relatively large but the enforcement 
budget is low, conservation outcomes are best achieved by contracting the PA network, 
coupled with either a constant or increased enforcement budget.  
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3.5 Discussion 
 
The pressure to expand PAs to meet international targets (e.g. Aichi Target 11) may 
compromise enforcement efforts, particularly since area targets are clear and quantifiable 
while management effectiveness is difficult to measure. We explore scenarios where 
decision makers aiming to maximise the abundance of an exploited species have two 
choices in how limited funds are spent: continue expanding PAs or increase enforcement in 
existing reserves.  
 
Our results demonstrate that PA expansion without enhanced enforcement will always 
deliver diminishing marginal returns for the conservation of an exploited species, and may 
even deliver negative returns if it spreads the enforcement effort too thinly. Notably, many 
PA networks today have low levels of enforcement –that is, measured compliance is low – 
even in relatively well-managed conservation contexts. For example, the marine reserve 
network on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef already covers >30% of reef area, but illegal 
harvesting has been estimated at 32.4% of comparable nearby unprotected reefs 
(Williamson et al. 2014). Similarly, in the 1970-80’s, 75% of Zambian elephant populations 
were lost in the Luangwa Valley because, despite substantial investments in anti-poaching 
patrols, enforcement effort was spread too thinly to stop poachers (Leader-Williams & Albon 
1988; Leader-Williams et al. 1990). In such cases, our results suggest that an expansion of 
the area under protection will deliver minimal or even negative conservation returns.  
 
To avoid this, we found that the investment in enforcement should be at least equal to the 
investment in expansion, which may not be the case across many existing PAs. PA 
establishment without the means to ensure effective enforcement – “paper parks” – has 
been a major criticism of many conservation initiatives (Dudley & Stolton 1999; Mora 2006; 
Di Minin & Toivonen 2015) and insufficient management resources have been cited across 
many PA networks (Leverington et al. 2010; Watson et al. 2014; Gill et al. 2017), which can 
limit enforcement efforts. Shortfalls in reporting on management actions and costs is likely 
contributing to these deficiencies. While expansion costs are often readily available or easy 
to estimate using proxies for area or opportunity cost (Naidoo et al. 2006; Armsworth 2014), 
enforcement budgets are commonly too convoluted to approximate or include in systematic 
planning (Ban & Klein 2009, Armsworth 2014; but see Davis et al. 2015). Improved 
transparency and accounting of management activities is urgently needed to prioritize 
actions and maximize biodiversity outcomes under constrained budgets.  
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In regions with extensive “paper parks” (i.e. high-protection/low-enforcement), our results 
show that PA contraction will deliver the greatest increase in exploited species abundance, 
particularly if resources are not available to increase enforcement effort. However, political 
difficulties in PA establishment often make downgrading, downsizing and degazettement 
(PADDD) illogical or unacceptable options. A politically feasible alternative would be to 
concentrate available enforcement resources into a subset of PAs, particularly those that 
would benefit the most from additional enforcement (i.e. those with high conservation value 
or high poaching levels).  
 
For example, consider the hypothetical PA system depicted in Fig 3.2: if 50% of habitat 
patches were protected, there would be an enforcement deficit and the PA network would 
provide little benefit. If additional enforcement funds were not available and PADDD was not 
a viable option, managers could strategically concentrate enforcement effort within 40% of 
protected patches to maximize conservation outcomes. This could be achieved through any 
mechanism that frees up money for increased enforcement in other areas such as triaging 
the most important or threatened reserves, as suggested by Leader-Williams & Albon 1988; 
Game et al. 2009; Fuller et al. 2010)), or through PA zoning schemes (e.g. strict no-take vs. 
multiple use or buffer/extraction zones). Albers (2010) showed that by strategically tailoring 
enforcement (or zoning) based on spatial patterns of de facto protection, where no patrolling 
is required, and de facto extraction, where patrolling does not deter illegal harvest, decision 
makers can maximize the amount of pristine area protected. 
 
It is important to note that the dichotomy between expansion and enforcement only exists 
within the paradigm of protected areas. Many alternative approaches are available to reduce 
illegal extraction and/or conserve biodiversity that do not involve either enforcement or 
expansion. Our results therefore do not contribute to debates about whether spatial 
management is appropriate or socially equitable (Duffy et al. 2016; Buscher et al. 2017). 
Moreover, we focus on a single threat to a single commercially valuable species whereas 
modern PA design often considers multiple species, ecological processes or ecosystem 
services and tackles multiple threats (Watson et al. 2014). Our paper ignores several 
important threats to biodiversity that can be associated with illegal harvests – the most 
obvious being habitat loss and degradation. While illegal extraction is a proximate cause of 
biodiversity loss, our results rely on the underlying assumption that habitat is maintained.  
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To provide a clear and interpretable contrast between enforcement and expansion, we 
chose a relatively simple formulation of a coupled ecological-economic system. Our 
extensive sensitivity analysis showed that our results are robust to changes in model 
parameterisations (see Appendix 3, Supplementary Text S3.1 and S3.2), but several 
caveats accompany our recommendations. First, our model is spatially homogeneous– all 
patches are of equal size, equal habitat quality, and have equal travel costs. Accounting 
for spatial heterogeneity would cause patches that are further away to be more costly to 
enforce and more costly, but perhaps more profitable, to illegally exploit. This would likely 
drive increased poaching, which we expect would increase the investment in enforcement 
over expansion. However, heterogeneity in both PA location and size can impact 
effectiveness (Geldmann et al. 2015) and implementation costs (i.e. acquisition and 
management (Bruner et al. 2004; Ban et al. 2011)) in complex ways, requiring further 
investigation. Second, we do not account for “willingness” to comply or issues of morality 
(i.e. a normative approach) that could affect poachers’ behaviour (Keane et al. 2008). 
Nevertheless, as long as additional enforcement and heavier penalties decrease illegal 
harvests, our conclusions will remain qualitatively robust. Finally, our model couples 
detection and apprehension rates and costs. Detection rates are likely to be higher than 
apprehension rates due to difficulties in proving culpability and costs of pursuing legal 
action. This would decreases the probability of incurring a penalty for illegal harvest, which 
would increase poaching and strengthen our results. Enforcement costs, however, may 
require discontinuous budget thresholds, such as the purchase of additional enforcement 
vehicles, to realise significant gains in protection probability that we did not account for in 
our model. These expenses are expected to significantly diminish in coming years with the 
implementation of vessel monitoring systems and new patrol technologies such as 
unmanned aerial vehicles (i.e. drones) (Pimm et al. 2015).  
 
The continued decline of biodiversity despite rapid PA growth calls into question the current 
focus on PA expansion. Our results reveal the close, interconnected, relationship between 
expansion, enforcement and PA network performance. They suggest that, despite 
difficulties in measuring and reporting enforcement, expansion must be associated with 
commensurate increases in enforcement resources. Our conclusions strongly underscore 
the importance of setting explicit, quantifiable goals for PA effectiveness and enforcement, 
in addition to extent.  
 
 
41 
 
Chapter 4 
Equitable representation of ecoregions is slowly improving 
despite strategic planning shortfalls 
 
4.1 Abstract 
 
Representing all ecosystem types in protected areas (PAs) is central to international 
conservation agreements (e.g. Aichi Target 11) and ensuring the persistence of 
biodiversity. In response to these agreements we have seen rapid growth of PA networks 
but we do not know how this impacts ecosystem representation. We explored this question 
by investigating drivers and trends of representation during periods of rapid land 
acquisition using the Protection Equality metric. Our research showed that 90.9% of 
studied countries have improved protection equality through time. Periods of rapid area 
expansion resulted in greater increases in protection equality, particularly through multiple, 
smaller PAs as opposed to fewer, larger PAs. However, observed increases may not be 
due to strategic planning as protection equality from random PA allocation was statistically 
similar to observed values within six country-level simulations. For maximum benefit future 
international agreements should hold countries accountable to meeting multiple objectives 
and prioritize conservation outcomes over individual targets. 
 
4.2 Introduction   
 
Protected areas (PAs) have experienced noticeable growth  in recent decades, and remain 
the primary focus of global conservation efforts (Chape et al. 2008; Watson et al. 2014). 
For example, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) Aichi Target 11 requires 
signatory countries to protect 17% of terrestrial environments in effectively and equitably 
managed, ecologically representative and well-connected systems by 2020 (Secretariat of 
the CBD 2010). For most countries, only the terrestrial percent coverage target is 
projected to be achieved by the current deadline (Tittensor et al. 2014), while the other 
targets lack definition and transparent, comparable metrics. The continued loss of habitats 
and species despite over 32.8 million km2 of conservation areas (Deguignet et al. 2014; 
WWF Living Planet Report 2014) calls into question our true progress in meeting 
conservation objectives (McDonald-Madden et al. 2009) and the role of land accumulation 
alone in conserving biodiversity (Ferraro & Pattanayak 2006). Better performance metrics 
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are needed to shift the focus on PA expansion from the quantity of area protected to the 
quality of that PA system (Barnes 2015; Watson et al. 2015)  
 
Spatial conservation planning principles prescribe that well-designed, effective PA 
networks ensure the inclusion of each biodiversity feature of interest 
(comprehensiveness), as well as the variation within each feature (representativeness) 
(Margules & Pressey 2000; Possingham et al. 2006), which are often referred to together 
as “representation”. Historically, PA selection was not systematic, leaving many habitats 
and species underrepresented (Rodrigues et al. 2004; Watson et al. 2014; Butchart et al. 
2015).  Recently, Barr et al. (2011) introduced one of the first metrics to evaluate 
ecological representation called Protection Equality (PE). Moving beyond uniform targets 
and percent-based measures, PE uses a modified version of the Gini coefficient to 
quantify the difference between a perfectly equitable distribution and the actual distribution 
of a biodiversity feature within a PA network (Barr et al. 2011). A value of 1 signifies 
perfect equality in protection, while 0 signifies complete inequality. 
 
The exponential increase in the global PA network is well documented (McDonald & 
Boucher 2011; Watson et al. 2014; Butchart et al. 2015), including periods of substantial 
growth. Radeloff et al. (2013) identified “hot moments in conservation”, where countries 
established more than 33% of their total area protected in a single year, playing a key role 
in shaping PA networks. Large land acquisitions for conservation (i.e. “hot moments” 
and/or “green grabbing” (Fairhead et al. 2012)) may become more prevalent as countries 
race to meet percent coverage targets (Blomley et al. 2013). As representation is cited as 
such an important component of effective PA systems (Margules & Pressey 2000), it is 
critical to identify how rapid PA expansion impacts ecological representation at a global 
scale to inform future conservation strategies and achieve greater biodiversity outcomes. 
 
Here, we provide the first explicit test of trade-offs between PA expansion and equality of 
representation. We aimed to determine whether PE has increased over the past 60 years 
(1954-2013) and whether large land acquisitions have positively or negatively impacted 
representation. We then tested whether observed patterns could be attributed to deliberate 
action (i.e. systematic planning) or whether they were an inevitable consequence of PA 
expansion by benchmarking observed PE within six countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Indonesia, Mongolia, and Peru) against optimal and random protection scenarios in the 
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last two decades.  Finally, we investigated the impact of country-level economic and social 
factors, as well as differences in PA implementation strategy, on annual change in PE.   
 
4.3 Methods 
 
4.3.1 Data 
 
We used the World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA) to extract information on 
terrestrial PAs of IUCN categories I-IV (IUCN & UNEP-WCMC 2015) and terrestrial 
ecoregions developed by the World Wildlife Fund to represent global biodiversity features 
(Olson et al. 2001; World Wildlife Fund 2008)(see Appendix 4, Supplementary Text S4.1). 
Countries that had at least 70% of PAs with delineated boundary and establishment year 
data, five ecoregions, and protected at least 1% of one ecoregion were selected for further 
analysis. Total ecoregion area (km2) and total area protected (km2) of each ecoregion 
within each country were calculated to assess PE, which was calculated annually as in 
Barr et al. (2011) (see Appendix 4, Supplementary Text S4.2).  
 
4.3.2 Patterns of PE through time 
 
We assessed patterns of PE from 1954-2013, and within six 10 year increments (i.e. 1954-
1963, 1964-1973, etc.), capturing the major period of PA expansion (see Watson et al. 
2014). We used Mann-Kendall non-parametric trend tests to determine trends in PE for 
each time period. Data was pre-whitened to account for potential temporal auto-correlation 
(Kulkarni & Storch 1995). The MannKendall function of the Kendall package (McLeod 
2011) in the software R v. 3.2.2 (R Core Team 2015) was used to calculate Kendall’s Tau. 
Trends were calculated from the date of the first established PA in each country (i.e. 
PE>0).  
 
Spearman’s rank correlations were used to assess the impact of change in area protected 
(area protected in a given year/total country area) on change in PE (difference in PE from 
one year to the next) in each decade. Years when there was no change in area, by 
definition, had no change in PE and were excluded from the analysis. To determine overall 
effects between countries, we also tested the correlation between total area protected and 
total PE as of 2013. 
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4.3.3 Drivers of change in PE: Inevitable or deliberate? 
 
To understand whether changes in PE are a result of better planning or could be achieved 
randomly, we compared observed PE values against PE from random and optimal 
protection scenarios within six countries in the last two decades. We chose Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, Mongolia, and Peru because they all protected substantial 
amounts of area (>27,500 km2) in both decades, which represent time before and after 
representation became an international target. For each country, we calculated the amount 
of area protected within each decade and allocated the same amount randomly or 
optimally. 
 
Optimal PE was determined by assuming countries would always protect the proportionally 
least protected ecoregions first, as it results in the largest increase in PE. We took a 
“greedy” approach, solely aiming to maximize PE without considering the quality or 
availability of land for protection. For random simulations, we considered land quality and 
availability by removing PAs designated before each decade, as well as degraded land 
types that were considered unsuitable for protection (croplands and urban and built-up 
areas, Friedl et al. 2010; Channan et al. 2014). We randomly selected planning units equal 
to the average PA size (rounded up to the nearest 100 km2, Appendix 4 Table S4.1) in 
each country and decade over 1000 simulations and calculated PE. Random PE was 
considered as the average PE of all simulations. A sensitivity analysis was performed to 
determine how planning unit size impacts random PE scores within the last decade by 
randomly allocating 100 km2, 2000 km2, and 6000 km2 planning units within each country 
and calculating PE as above. 
 
4.3.4 Economic, social, and ecological drivers of change in PE 
 
We built linear mixed effects models, with country, world region, and year as random 
effects, to investigate the relationship between periods of rapid PA expansion, PE and 
economic and social covariates. These included annual change in total area protected, 
time, a binary variable representing rapid PA expansion (“hot moments”, where countries 
protected ≥33% of their area in a single year; Radeloff et al. 2013), and economic, social 
and environmental variables (see Appendix 4, Supplementary Text S4.3). All variables 
were included as additive effects except for the interaction between “hot moments” and the 
number of PAs designated in each year, which was included to investigate the effects of 
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rapid expansion through large or small PAs. All models were run in R v. 3.2.2 and 
compared using the AICc (Burnham and Anderson 2002). The top models (∆AICc≤4) were 
averaged to obtain estimates of the effect of each variable on change in PE.  
 
4.4 Results 
 
In total, 68 countries met our selection criteria. However, Eritrea and Iraq did not protect 
enough area within our time period (1954-2013) and were removed from all analyses. 
Bhutan, Guyana, and Suriname were removed from the multivariate model because 
reliable economic and social time series data were unavailable. As a result, 66 countries 
were included in our trend and correlation analyses and 63 countries in our multivariate 
model, all of which are accountable to the goals outlined under the CBD.  
 
PE within the studied countries ranged from 0.025 in Bangladesh (1.23% protected) to 
0.743 in Greece (8.84% protected) (Appendix 4, Table S4.2). More countries protected 
area in 1984-1993 than any other period and had the most “hot moments”. There was a 
significant positive relationship between total area protected and total PE within each 
country in 2013 (rs=0.46, p≤0.0001, Fig. 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1. The correlation between the total area protected and total protection 
equality in each studied country as of 2013 (n=66). 
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4.4.1 Patterns in PE through time 
 
Overall, 60 (90.9%) countries exhibited significant trends in PE over the past 60 years; all 
of which were increasing (Fig. S4.1A). No significant overall trend was detected within 
Japan, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan, although Myanmar had the 
only overall reduction in PE over this time period.  Eight countries (Afghanistan, Angola, 
Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Germany, Mali, Morocco, and Slovenia) had 
significant positive trends in PE despite relatively small overall increases in PE (<0.1), 
while Greece, Botswana, and Bhutan had the largest increases (0.73, 0.61, and 0.64, 
respectively). In a typical decade, c46.7% of countries exhibited an increasing trend in PE 
while c3% had a significant decreasing trend (Fig. 4.2A, Appendix 4, Table S4.3, Figure 
S4.2).  
 
Twenty-six (39.4%) countries had an overall significantly positive correlation between 
change in PE and the amount of area protected, while the rest did not exhibit a significant 
relationship (Fig. S4.1B). The percent of positive correlations steadily increased, with the 
two most recent decades having the greatest percentage of significantly positive 
correlations between change in area protected and change in PE (26.8% and 21.9%, 
respectively, Fig. 4.2B, Appendix 4, Table S4.4, Figure S4.3). Japan had the only 
negative correlations.  
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Figure 4.2. A) Mann-Kendall trend results for each 10-year time interval showing the 
proportion of countries with significant increasing (green), significant decreasing 
(red) and non-significant (blue) trends in protection equality and B) Spearman’s 
correlation results for each 10 year time interval showing the proportion of 
countries with significant positive (green), significant negative (red) and non-
significant (blue) correlations between the change in protection equality and the 
change in area protected. Proportions are calculated from the number of countries 
that protected enough area to detect a trend or correlation in each time period. 
 
4.4.2 Drivers of change in PE: Inevitable or deliberate? 
 
All six countries for which we simulated random and optimal protection scenarios had 
below optimal PE values in both decades. Canada, Indonesia, Mongolia and Peru 
achieved PE values closer to optimal from 2004-2013 than from 1994-2003 (Fig. 4.3). Only 
Australia expanded its PA system in a way that was significantly greater than random PE 
from 1994-2003, while Peru and Australia had significantly lower than random PE in 1994-
2003 and 2004-2013, respectively. All other countries had PE values that were not 
statistically different from random in both decades. Results were not dependent on 
planning unit size within Brazil, Canada, Indonesia and Mongolia. In Australia and Peru, 
observed PE was significantly less than random when 100 km2 planning units were used, 
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but become non-significantly different as planning unit size increased. In all cases, smaller 
planning units resulted in higher random PE scores (Appendix 4, Table S4.5). 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Random and optimal protection equality results within six simulated 
countries. Observed (“true”) trends in protection equality from 1954-2013 with 
simulated optimal (green), random (blue), and “true” (red) protection equality (±95% 
CI) values in the last two decades. **Denotes an observed protection equality value 
significantly greater than random, while *denotes an observed protection equality 
value significantly less than random. 
 
4.4.3 Economic, social, and ecological drivers of change in PE 
 
Our complete model set for explaining drivers of change in PE contained 1024 models, 
with 19 considered to have good fit to the data (∆AICc≤4, Appendix 4, Table S4.6). Model 
selection revealed annual change in PE has decreased since 1954 (Table 4.1). Large 
increases in the amount of area protected had positive effects on the annual change in PE, 
as well as “hot moments” and the interaction between “hot moments” and the number of 
designated PAs. Countries that are not democratic, that started protecting area relatively 
later and that have a greater number of years between periods of area protection (i.e. 
changes in PE) showed significantly greater increases in annual change in PE. 
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Table 4.1. Averaged model output from multivariate model to search for drivers of 
annual change in protection equality (* denotes significance). 
 
Parameter Estimate 95% CI 
(Intercept) 0.020 (0.0123,0.0272) 
Hot moments 0.070* (0.026,0.114) 
Number of protected areas 0.001 (-0.0012,0.003) 
Change in area protected 0.011* (0.0087,0.0136) 
Hot moments x Number of 
protected areas 
0.228* (0.0789,0.3779) 
Population density -0.002 (-0.004,0.0003) 
Number of ecoregions -0.001 (-0.0035,0.0010) 
Gross Domestic Product per 
capita 
0.002 (-0.0008,0.0054) 
Political status (Non-
independent) 
-0.004 (-0.0115,0.0035) 
Political status (Democratic) -0.007* (-0.0128,-0.0016) 
Start category (Late) 0.015* (0.0079,0.0227) 
Start category (Mid) 0.011* (0.0044,0.0173) 
Start category (Mid-early) 0.006 (-0.00009,0.012) 
Protection gap 0.001* (0.00002,0.0011) 
Time since 1954 -0.0003* (-0.0004,-0.0001) 
 
4.5 Discussion 
 
Ecological representation is a cornerstone of international conservation agreements aimed 
to safeguard the world’s biodiversity.  It ensures that all biodiversity features of interest are 
included within a PA network. Testing trade-offs between actions is common practice in 
conservation, and trade-offs between Aichi Targets (e.g. 11 and 12) have already been 
identified (Di Marco et al. 2015). Evaluating trade-offs and synergies within targets, such 
as rapid land acquisitions and achieving representation, is criticalfor determining the 
impacts of conservation commitments and achieving desired outcomes.  Our initial results 
found that PE has increased through time and may be playing a larger role in conservation 
planning. However, further analyses questioned the strategic nature of these trends and 
identified potential disconnects between theory and practice. 
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A trade-off does not appear to exist between rapid PA expansion and achieving equitable 
representation.  Our a priori assumption was that large land acquisitions would result in 
little to no improvement in PE due to shortfalls in the time and resources needed to 
implement representative PA networks. In contrast, rapid PA growth resulted in larger 
changes in PE and most countries exhibited positive trends in PE through time.  
Nevertheless, we found that these increases were not driven by deliberate consideration of 
representation principles but were the fortuitous result of protecting more area. 
 
Our random protected area simulations suggest that positive trends in PE are due to 
chance rather than choice; driven by the increased probability of representing more 
ecoregions as more area is protected rather than strategic planning. The positive 
relationship between total area protected and total PE further supports this point, as well 
as our model, which revealed that despite the overall increasing trends in PE, the annual 
change in PE has decreased through time. Regardless of inevitable inefficiencies and lags 
between the introduction of theories and their execution, it is surprising that changes in PE 
today are less than in the 1950’s, before representation was defined. Some countries did 
achieve closer to optimal PE in the last decade, after the introduction of the first 
international representation target that required at least 10% of each of the world’s 
ecological regions to be conserved by 2010 (Secretariat of the CBD 2002).  However, the 
purposeful consideration of representation could have likely resulted in even greater PE. 
 
The increasing proportion of countries with positive correlations between large land 
acquisitions and large changes in PE through time may suggest that representation and 
conservation planning are playing an increasing role during rapid PA growth. Unlike the 
previous trends, these correlations do not seem driven by the amount of area protected. 
For example, Chile exhibited significant positive correlations between PA expansion and 
change in PE in the last two decades, even though more or equal area had been protected 
in the four previous decades where no significant correlation was found.  While isolating 
the factors behind this pattern is difficult, the average size of newly designated PAs in 
Chile was the smallest during these last two decades indicating that the size of individual 
PAs during large PA network expansion may play an important role in achieving equitable 
representation. 
 
Our multivariate model and sensitivity analyses support this point, revealing that rapid area 
accumulation improves changes in PE when implemented through multiple, smaller PAs 
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rather than fewer, larger PAs. Previous studies have found similar results, showing that 
large selection units (in our case, PAs) drive the overrepresentation of features (Pressey & 
Logan 1998) or allows entire features to fall into unprotected gaps (Kendall et al. 2015). 
With large PA expansion predicted to increase in coming years in an effort to meet percent 
coverage targets (Blomley et al. 2013), and others promoting the need for “mega reserves” 
(Laurance 2005), it will be important to consider the role of scale in achieving conservation 
outcomes. 
 
Our model also revealed that countries that started protecting area relatively later tend to 
have greater annual change in PE. Historical biases in representation (Pressey 1994; 
Joppa & Pfaff 2009; Watson et al. 2011) likely create a significant disadvantage for 
countries that have a longer history of area protection, while countries that started 
protecting area later may have incorporated new knowledge in PA design. The positive 
impact of breaks between PA designations may signify that these periods are spent 
planning the strategic placement of PAs. However, this relationship, as well as other 
potential mechanisms driving changes in PE (e.g. the use of conservation planning tools, 
education, funding, etc.), may be difficult to quantify and should be investigated further at a 
finer scale. 
 
We used the best publicly available global data but it has some limitations, which we 
discuss briefly below (see Appendix 4, Supplementary Text S4.4 and Table S4.7 for 
additional caveats). Due to data availability, we included only a subset of countries that 
reported sufficient establishment year and boundary data. Every major world region was 
represented in our final selection; however some countries (e.g. the United States, Russia 
and China) could not be included due to this constraint.  This may have limited our ability 
to identify significant drivers of annual change in PE in our multivariate model.  
Additionally, reported establishment year may reflect the date of reclassification or 
reporting, not PA designation, which could skew PA expansion to later dates and 
ultimately affect the accumulation of PE through time.  Complementing our findings with 
regional analyses is likely to uncover further insight that we were unable to capture, or 
inadvertently missed, at this scale.  For example, fine-scale data on conservation 
funding/aid, land use change, and political structure may uncover additional factors 
governing the effective implementation of PE. 
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Uncertainty surrounding biodiversity makes equitable ecological representation appealing 
as it safeguards every feature to the same degree. However, PE is just one potential 
metric to measure representation. Threats and the importance of features are often 
uneven in the landscape, which may prioritize protection of one feature over another 
(Myers et al. 2000; Dirzo & Raven 2003; Brooks et al. 2006). For example, Aichi Target 11 
highlights the need to protect areas of “particular importance for biodiversity” (Secretariat 
of the CBD 2010), which may impact the equality of representation and require a different 
approach.  
 
Implementing clear, quantifiable, and achievable targets will be instrumental in conserving 
biodiversity. Representation, no matter the definition, will only be effective if other 
objectives within PA networks are met (e.g. management, connectivity, etc.). Global 
conservation agreements need to simultaneously consider representation with other 
conservation targets and balance trade-offs to maximize the overarching goal: halting 
biodiversity loss. 
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Chapter 5 
Protected area downsizing decreases the equality of 
representation across terrestrial ecoregions in the tropics 
and subtropics 
 
5.1 Abstract 
 
Protected areas remain a key tool in the fight against biodiversity loss worldwide. 
Legally established protected areas are often considered permanent fixtures, but it 
has only recently become apparent that protected area networks are actually quite 
dynamic, and are subject to rapid expansion, or downgrading, downsizing and/or 
degazettement events (PADDD). The impact of these processes on total area 
protected has been studied extensively but the impact on representation, a 
fundamental aspect of systematic conservation planning and international 
conservation agreements (e.g. Aichi Target 11), is not known. Here we explore how 
future protected area expansion and downsizing will impact representation (i.e. 
Protection Equality) by 2045. We found that in >75% of countries, random protection 
achieved greater Protection Equality than business as usual scenarios, which, in 
some cases, did worse than if there was no protection at all. Protected area 
downsizing decreased the equality of representation in the majority of countries 
analyzed (>60%) across all protection scenarios. As the proportion of area lost to 
downsizing increased, relative Protection Equality values significantly decreased. 
However, optimal protection strategies increased Protection Equality by an average 
of ~1.6 times by 2045, providing an optimistic outlook for representation if biases in 
protection strategies are corrected. Targeted protected area expansion, policies that 
promote robust protected areas, and a deeper understanding of the influence of 
PADDD on conservation objectives is urgently needed for the development of 
sustainable protected area networks that contribute to conservation outcomes. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
 
The inclusion of a representative sample of each species and/or habitat type (i.e. 
representation) within a protected area is considered best practice for ensuring 
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diversity across levels is conserved (Margules & Pressey 2000; Possingham et al. 
2006). This is reflected at the highest levels of global decision making and 
agreements, with the inclusion of representation objectives in the United Nation’s 
Strategic Plan for Biodiversity Aichi Target 11. Aichi Target 11 commits 196 
signatory countries to conserving 17% of their terrestrial area in representative, 
equitably managed, and well-connected reserve systems by 2020. This 
representation goal has largely been interpreted as ensuring 17% of each country’s 
ecoregions is protected in the near term (Convention on Biological Diversity 2012). 
However, the historically uneven protection of habitats and species within protected 
area networks due to suitability for other uses, remains a key issue within the global 
protected area network today (Pressey 1994; Joppa & Pfaff 2009; Barr et al. 2011). 
 
Conservation targets, like Aichi Target 11, have endured criticism for placing 
protected area expansion as one of the central mechanisms for delivering 
biodiversity conservation (Barnes 2015; Chauvenet & Barnes 2016; Barnes et al. 
2018). Area coverage targets are quantifiable and unambiguous in comparison to 
other objectives (e.g. adequacy, management effectiveness, representation), making 
them easier to implement and measure (Butchart et al. 2016). As a result, global 
protected area extent has increased substantially in recent years (Watson et al. 
2014). However, there is little evidence that other outlined goals, such as 
representation, management effectiveness or a reduction in the rate of extinction 
(Aichi Target 12), are being purposefully achieved (Coad et al. 2013; Kuempel et al. 
2016, 2018; Pressey et al. 2017; Barnes et al. 2018; Geldmann et al. 2018).  
 
Legally established protected areas are often considered permanent fixtures in the 
conservation landscape.  It has only recently become apparent that protected area 
networks are actually quite dynamic, and are subject to downgrading, downsizing 
and/or degazettement events (PADDD) – not just expansion and improvement as we 
may intend (Mascia & Pailler 2011). Protected area downgrading reduces the level of 
legal protection of a given protected area while downsizing and degazettement result 
in a loss of area protected. Our understanding of what drives PADDD is limited, but 
larger protected area size, and the interaction between protected area size and local 
population density, have shown to be associated with higher probabilities of PADDD 
events in a given protected area (Symes et al. 2016). PADDD is seldom considered 
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in spatial conservation planning, but plays a role in contemporary conservation 
efforts and can have important implications for achieving conservation outcomes 
(Mascia & Pailler 2011). 
 
The loss of protected area through downsizing and degazettement events holds a 
negative connotation and is often deemed as a politically unacceptable conservation 
action. While reducing the quantity of area protected moves countries further from 
area coverage targets (Mascia et al. 2014), research suggests that PADDD events 
do not always correlate with a decrease in biodiversity benefits. For example, some 
studies have suggested that PADDD may increase management effectiveness by 
concentrating management efforts in smaller areas, particularly given limited 
resources (Albers 2010; Kuempel et al. 2018). Strategic PADDD events that replace 
underperforming protected areas could even increase the efficiency of protected 
area networks as a whole (Fuller et al. 2010; Kareiva 2010).  
 
The concept of representation combines area-based measures with the more 
specific, qualitative goal of sampling each biodiversity feature in the land or 
seascape and, therefore, will be impacted by future protection and downsizing 
events. However, the dynamics between protection, downsizing and representation 
are currently unclear. In some cases, equality of habitat representation may improve 
if protected area expansion targets underrepresented features and protected area is 
lost in already overrepresented ecoregions. Conversely, equality of protection could 
decrease if PADDD occurs in already underrepresented conservation features and 
protection strategies continue to avoid areas with competing land uses. Or perhaps, 
future protection and PADDD may counteract each other leading to little relative 
change in habitat representation. 
 
We aimed to quantify the impacts of future protected area expansion and predicted 
downsizing events on the evenness of habitat representation using the Protection 
Equality metric (Barr et al. 2011; Chauvenet et al. 2017b). Protection Equality 
measures the evenness of representation of a conservation feature in an area, like 
the protection level of ecoregions within a country, and provides more detailed 
information on the distribution of protection than other measures such as the 
percentage of area or number of features that meet a specified protection target (e.g. 
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17%)(Barr et al. 2011; Chauvenet et al. 2017b). We considered four protection 
scenarios (worst case (no protection), optimal protection, random protection, and 
business as usual (BAU) protection) and simulated expected downsizing events from 
2015-2045 to evaluate the relationship between protected area expansion, 
downsizing, and representation.  
 
5.3 Methods 
 
5.3.1 Data 
 
We used the World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA, accessed January 2017) 
to estimate protected area coverage (IUCN & UNEP-WCMC 2015) and terrestrial 
ecoregions developed by the World Wildlife Fund to represent broad-scale global 
biodiversity features (Olson et al. 2001; World Wildlife Fund 2008).  Country and 
protected area selection followed Symes et al. (2016). All strictly marine protected 
areas were removed from the WDPA dataset (MARINE = 2), as well as all protected 
areas designated internationally (i.e. UNESCO biosphere reserves), all those listed 
as ‘proposed’, and all privately managed protected areas (Gov_Type  =  “Individual 
land owners” OR “non-profit organisations” OR “for-profit organisations”). Only 
protected areas that had an establishment date of 2015 or earlier were used in our 
analysis. Missing establishment year data was imputed following (Butchart et al. 
2015) by randomly selecting a year (with replacement) from all protected areas 
within the same country with a known date of establishment.  For countries with 
fewer than five protected areas with known establishment date, a year was randomly 
selected from all protected areas with a known date of establishment. The random 
assignment was repeated 1,000 times, and the mean value was assigned to all 
protected areas within each country that were missing establishment dates. 
 
For our analysis, country selection was limited to countries within tropical and 
subtropical regions (between 40o North and 40o South) that had an enacted 
downsizing event between 1980 and 2010. To limit inaccuracies in Protection 
Equality calculations due to small numbers of habitat features and/or inaccurate 
protected area boundary data (i.e. point data), only countries that 1) had at least 
70% of protected areas with delineated boundary data, 2) had more than three 
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ecoregions and 3) protected at least 1% of one ecoregion were considered for 
further analyses. Circular buffers equal to the reported area were used for protected 
areas that did not have delineated boundary data (i.e. point data). Total ecoregion 
area (km2) and total area protected (km2) of each ecoregion within each country 
were calculated based on reported ISO3 codes in the WDPA dataset in ArcGIS 10.5 
using Mollweide equal-area projections. 
 
Data on PADDD events was sourced from PADDDtracker.org Data Release Version 
1.0 (World Wildlife Fund, January 2014). We limited our study to downsizing events 
because downgrading does not affect the areal representation of habitat features in 
protected area networks (i.e. there is no loss in area protected), and degazettement 
events are rare and therefore impossible to meaningfully analyse and predict. In 
order to ensure our predictions were on a timescale that is policy relevant and to 
avoid issues with the original temporal assumptions, our model only considered 
downsizing events that took place between 1980 and 2010. 
 
5.3.2 Simulations 
 
To explore how protection and downsizing events may impact representation goals 
in the future, we simulated the amount of area protected and the amount of area lost 
to downsizing in each country ecoregion between 2015 and 2045.  
 
5.3.2.1 Protection scenarios 
 
We considered four protection scenarios: 1) no future protection (worst case 
scenario), 2) optimal ecoregion representation, 3) random protection allocation, and 
4) business as usual (BAU).  For all scenarios we calculated the total amount of area 
protected from 1985 to 2015 and assumed the same amount of area would be 
protected from 2015 to 2045 (i.e. a constant rate of protection). Protection rates were 
calculated across countries for optimal and random simulations and within country 
ecoregions for BAU simulations. For the optimal protection scenario, we took a 
“greedy” approach, solely aiming to maximize Protection Equality without considering 
the quality of the land for protection (i.e. conversion).  We allocated protected area in 
1 km2 increments to ecoregions within each country, calculated Protection Equality, 
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and always chose to add protected area to the ecoregion that improved Protection 
Equality the most. This was repeated until area equal to the amount of protection 
from 1985-2015 had been achieved. 
 
For BAU and random simulations, we considered the availability of land for 
protection by calculating the expected amount of land that would be converted in 
each country ecoregion from 2015-2045.  To do this, we used the annual rate of 
conversion in each country’s ecoregions between 1993 and 2009 based on the 
Human Footprint dataset (HFP, Venter et al. (2016), Appendix 5 Supplementary 
Text). Ecoregions were divided into 1 km raster grids and each cell was assigned to 
one of three categories: protected, converted, or available in 1993 and 2009. Cells 
overlapping protected areas were considered to be “protected”, cells not overlapping 
PAs with HFP values higher than 3 (on a 0-50 scale) were considered ‘converted’ 
and all other cells were considered to be ‘available’ for future protection. The sum of 
the amount of available, converted and protected area in each country ecoregion 
always equalled the total area of that country ecoregion. 
 
For BAU simulations, we assumed that the rate of protection within each country 
ecoregion over the past 30 years would remain constant over the next 30 years.  If 
the amount of area to be protected from 2015 to 2045 was greater than the amount 
of land available in an ecoregion due to conversion, only the amount of available 
land was protected.  Random protection was simulated by randomly selecting 
ecoregions (with replacement) within each country and adding area equal to the 
median protected area size in that country until the area protected between 1985 
and 2015 was allocated. This was repeated 1,000 times.  
 
Protection scenarios were run without downsizing events to explore how 
representation may change as a result of future protection, and with downsizing 
events (described below) to predict the impacts of downsizing on future protection 
scenarios. 
 
5.3.2.2 Protected area downsizing 
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We constructed generalised linear mixed effects models (GLMM) with a random 
intercept for country to determine the probability of a downsizing event occurring 
within a given protected area. We modelled the probability of downsizing in a given 
protected area as a function of protected area size, accessibility, altitude, local 
population density, spatially explicit gross domestic product (GDP) and potential 
agricultural rents as in Symes et al. (2016). The resulting model predicted the 
probability of a downsize event taking place in a protected area in a given 30 year 
period.  
 
The chance of a protected area undergoing downsizing in a simulation run was 
dependent on a country-level probability of downsizing and its own chance of 
PADDD calculated from the model described above, using a Monte Carlo simulation 
approach.  We assumed that the chance of a downsizing event in each simulation 
run at the country level was random, because the observed probability of downsizing 
in each country is currently unknown. To do this, we randomly generated the 
probability of downsizing events by sampling from a uniform distribution between 0 
and 1 for each simulation. A protected area underwent downsizing if its probability of 
PADDD (calculated using the statistical model described above) was greater than 
the random number. The extent of the downsize events was based on the proportion 
of the protected areas lost in observed downsize events of each country between 
1980 and 2010 for which we had data, and randomly sampled from that distribution. 
The distribution of downsize extents in our simulations are, therefore, identical to the 
actual distribution of downsize extents observed at the country scale.  
 
In some cases, a single protected area encompasses several different ecoregion 
types, with some ecoregions potentially having a higher probability of downsizing 
then others. For example, ecoregions that are desirable for agricultural activities may 
be more vulnerable to downsizing events. Because we do not currently know how 
downsizing dynamics vary at the ecoregion scale within a single protected area, we 
took a conservative approach and applied the assigned downsize proportion to all of 
the ecoregions within a protected area that was predicted to undergo a downsize 
event equally. For example, if a protected area underwent a downsize event that 
removed 20% of its area and contained three ecoregions, the area of each ecoregion 
in that protected area was reduced by 20%. Thus, our downsizing simulations 
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predicted the expected area lost in each country ecoregion in the given 30 year time 
period. 
 
5.3.3 Evaluating representation 
 
We used the Protection Equality metric to evaluate the impact of downsizing and 
protection simulations on representation within protected area networks (Chauvenet 
et al. 2017b). Protection Equality is a measure of the evenness of protection of 
conservation features (i.e. representation) within a given protected area network, 
with a value of 1 representing perfect equality and a value of 0 representing perfect 
inequality of protection. Protection Equality (proportional) is calculated using the 
equation: 
PE𝑝 =
1
𝑁 × (
1
2
∑
𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑖
+  ∑
𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑖
𝑁−1
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 × (𝑁 − 𝑖))
 
1
2 ×
∑
𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 , 
 
where N is the number of conservation features (e.g. ecoregions) in the area of 
interest (e.g. country), ai is the total area of conservation feature i inside the region of 
interest, and pi is the total amount of area protected of conservation feature i in the 
region of interest. Protection Equality was calculated using the ProtectEqual package 
in R v3.4.4 including a correction factor for small sample size (Chauvenet et al. 
2017a, 2017b).  
 
We calculated Protection Equality before and after predicted losses in area from 
downsizing events to evaluate the impacts of downsizing on the equality of 
representation of ecoregions within each country. Protection Equality before 
downsizing events was based on the amount of area protected within ecoregions in 
each protection scenario (worst case, optimal, random and BAU). In the random 
protection scenario, the average Protection Equality across each of the 1,000 
random protection simulations was used. To determine Protection Equality after 
downsizing, we subtracted the predicted area lost to downsizing from each of the 
1,000 downsizing simulation from the predicted amount of area protected in each 
protection scenario and calculated Protection Equality. We then calculated the mean 
Protection Equality value for each protection scenario across downsizing 
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simulations. To evaluate relative changes in Protection Equality, we calculated the 
ratio between Protection Equality after downsizing and Protection Equality before 
downsizing in each country across protection scenarios (hereafter the Protection 
Equality ratio). The relationship between downsizing and the Protection Equality ratio 
was investigated using Spearman’s rank correlations.  
 
5.3.4 Case studies 
 
We identified countries with seemingly outlier Protection Equality ratios to investigate 
patterns driving relatively large changes in Protection Equality before and after 
downsizing events in further detail. We explored country level dynamics by looking at 
the levels of protection and predicted downsizing at the ecoregion scale within 
strategic case studies. 
 
5.4 Results 
 
5.4.1 Simulations 
 
The selection criteria resulted in the inclusion of 36 countries in the analysis 
(Appendix 5, Table S5.1). All countries were predicted to experience some level of 
downsizing and protection from 2015-2045. The average decrease in area protected 
from downsizing events within each country ranged from 39.6 km2 in Belize to 
30,260.72 km2 in Zambia. Uganda was predicted to lose the most area relative to 
2015 protection levels (~34%) followed by Mali, Kenya and Rwanda, while Ghana 
was predicted to lose the least (~0.2%, Appendix 5 Figure S5.1). Bhutan was 
expected to protect the greatest proportion of area across all scenarios and 
Madagascar was expected to protect the least (Appendix 5 Figure S5.2). Twenty-
five (69%) countries are expected to have >50% of their area converted by 2045, 
with some up to >99% (e.g. Madagascar and Guinea, Appendix 5 Figure S5.3). 
 
5.4.2 Evaluating representation 
 
In 2015, PE ranged from 0.089 in Mali to 0.734 in Gabon (Appendix 5 Figure S5.4). 
The majority of countries (N=23, 64%) had relatively high Protection Equality scores 
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(>0.4). Nearly all countries experienced an increase in Protection Equality with an 
increase in area protected across the optimal, random and BAU protection scenarios 
(Figure 5.1). However, in some cases, BAU and random protection resulted in 
reserve networks that decreased the equality of representation compared to if there 
was no protection at all. Protection Equality decreased in Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Cambodia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Venezuela under BAU 
protection and Cote d’Ivoire, Congo, Indonesia, Cambodia, Nigeria, Rwanda and 
South Africa with random protection. Twenty-eight (77.7%) countries had lower 
Protection Equality scores under BAU scenarios than random protection, further 
highlighting how current protection practices are unlikely to lead to a representative 
protected area network.  
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Figure 5.1. The change in Protection Equality from business as usual (BAU), 
random and optimal protection scenarios compared to Protection Equality in 
2015 across countries. 
 
As expected, optimal protection scenarios always produced the greatest Protection 
Equality values. Guatemala achieved the greatest increase in Protection Equality 
from 0.19 to 0.88 and Ghana reached nearly perfect Protection Equality of 0.99. On 
average, countries increased equality of ecoregion protection by ~1.9 times under 
optimal scenarios, demonstrating great room for improvement in representation with 
careful planning and reductions in conversion rates.  
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When downsizing events were considered, the majority of countries decreased 
Protection Equality across all protection scenarios (Protection Equality ratios < 1, 
Figure 5.2), showing how downsizing overall negatively impacts representation. 
Based on the distribution of the data, Mali was identified as an obvious outlier and 
was removed from this analysis (Appendix 5, Figure S5.5). However, including Mali 
did not change the significance of the results. Across all scenarios, as the proportion 
of area lost to downsizing increased the Protection Equality ratio significantly 
decreased (worst case, rs=-0.65, p < 0.0001; BAU, rs = -0.64, p < 0.0001; random, rs 
= -0.59, p = 0.0002; optimal, rs = -0.75, p<0.0001).  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. The relationship between the Protection Equality ratio and the 
average proportion of area lost from 2015 protection levels in each country 
across protection scenarios (worst, business as usual (BAU), random, and 
optimal). Mali was identified as an outlier and removed from this analysis. 
 
Downsizing combined with random future protection resulted in the most countries 
decreasing Protection Equality (89%), followed by optimal protection (78%), worst 
case (72%) and BAU protection (64%). Only Mali experienced a drastic relative 
increase in Protection Equality from downsizing events, with a Protection Equality 
ratio ranging from 1.2 to 1.45, while Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya had the greatest 
relative decreases in the worst, optimal and BAU scenarios. This pattern varied with 
65 
 
random protection where Uganda experienced the greatest Protection Equality ratio 
of 1.02, and Mali, Kenya and Rwanda had the lowest ratios.  
 
5.4.3 Case Studies 
 
Mali, Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda were outliers across all scenarios, and Congo 
was an additional outlier in the worst case, random and BAU scenarios (Appendix 5 
Figure S5.5). We chose to explore Mali and Uganda at the country level because 
they were consistent outliers across all scenarios but showed varying patterns of 
change in Protection Equality from downsizing events in the worst case, BAU and 
optimal scenarios compared to random protection. In Mali, the large increase in the 
Protection Equality ratio seems to be driven by two factors. First, there are large 
inequalities in protection between ecoregions in 2015, with a Protection Equality 
value of 0.089 (Figure 5.3A). Of the six ecoregions, two ecoregions have zero 
protection, while the Sahelian Acacia savanna has 14.7% protection. This is 6.7, 
21.5 and 108 times more protection than the remaining three ecoregions. These 
inequalities persist under the BAU protection scenario, with a Protection Equality 
value of 0.1. The optimal protection scenario reaches a Protection Equality values of 
0.547. This is largely the result of more equal protection in the least protected 
ecoregions, but a large inequality between these and the Sahelian Acacia savanna 
still exists. Second, downsizing seems to target the most represented ecoregion, the 
Sahelian Acacia savanna, thus increasing the equality of protection as a whole. In 
the random protection scenario, however, the inequalities in protection seem to be 
offset by an increased level of protection in the West Saharan montane xeric 
woodlands. Random protection results in 18.7% protection in the West Saharan 
montane xeric woodlands and 15.6% protection in the Sahelian Acacia savanna, 
while the protection level in the other four ecoregion remains relatively low. The 
downsizing in the Sahelian Acacia savanna, therefore, acts to increase the inequality 
of protection and results in a relatively large decrease in the Protection Equality ratio. 
 
In Uganda, protection and downsizing are more widespread across all ecoregions. 
This leads to a higher Protection Equality value in 2015 of 0.45, which increases 
across all protection scenarios, reaching a value of 0.58 with optimal protection 
(Figure 5.3B). Downsizing occurs across nearly all ecoregions, and while somewhat 
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proportional to the protection level, decreases Protection Equality to 0.42, 0.44, and 
0.52 in the worst case, BAU and optimal scenarios, respectively. Conversely, 
additional protection in the most underrepresented ecoregion, the Lake ecoregion, in 
the random protection scenario offsets some of the loss in area protected and results 
in a slight increase in Protection Equality after downsizing. 
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Figure 5.3. Ecoregion level changes in protection area coverage from downsizing and protection scenarios in A) Mali and 
B) Uganda. 
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5.5 Discussion 
 
In this paper, we quantified the predicted impacts of future protected area expansion and 
downsizing events on the equality of habitat representation. We show that current patterns 
of protection (BAU) will continue to exacerbate inequalities in representation that are, in 
most cases, worse than if protection was established randomly. Future protected area 
downsizing is likely to have detrimental impacts on achieving Protection Equality and 
hence habitat representation goals. These results highlight the need for targeted protected 
area expansion and for the incorporation of downsizing events into conservation 
frameworks. More flexible and dynamic definitions of protected areas, that reflect the 
increasing prevalence of PADDD events, need to be considered in systematic 
conservation planning and future conservation targets. This will facilitate appropriate 
conservation actions to offset the negative impacts and/or capitalize on the positive 
impacts of downsizing events in achieving equitable representation and biodiversity 
outcomes. 
 
Over 75% of the countries we analysed achieved worse Protection Equality values than if 
protected areas were expanded randomly, providing further evidence of the 
implementation gap between best-practice scientific recommendations, conservation 
policy and on-the-ground action for representation, a key systematic conservation planning 
principle (Margules & Pressey 2000; Possingham et al. 2006). These results echo those of 
Knight et al. (2008) who found that two-thirds of the conservation plans that they analysed 
did not lead to conservation action, and Kuempel et al. (2016) who found similar trends in 
six leading countries in protected area establishment. However, Sinclair et al. (2018) found 
that 74% of implementation-oriented spatial conservation prioritisations had led to on-the-
ground action in a recent survey, suggesting this gap may be closing. The degree to which 
this actions meets international and systematic planning principles is still unclear. 
 
The fact that many BAU scenarios resulted in a decreased Protection Equality compared 
to the worst case scenario of no protection, further shows how failing to recognize and 
correct weakness in current protected area expansion strategies will exacerbate shortfalls 
in the protected area network and lead to an overstatement of achieving conservation 
objectives (Pressey et al. 2017; Barnes et al. 2018). For example, in 2015, Indonesia had 
14 (37%) ecoregions that met the 17% Aichi coverage target, which increased to 17 (45%) 
under BAU protection scenarios. Based on these metrics alone, Indonesia would be 
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praised for coming closer to reaching area coverage and representation targets. However, 
BAU protection also led to greater inequality of protection across ecoregions, with a 
decrease in Protection Equality from 0.52 to 0.49 compared to if there had been no 
protection at all. This exemplifies the utility of the Protection Equality metric in measuring 
and reporting on progress towards representation goals and shows how these inequalities 
can increase if biases in current protected area expansion strategies persist. Fortunately, 
our optimal protection scenarios proves that if future protection is targeted to sites that 
complement the representation of the existing reserve network, Protection Equality can be 
achieved or drastically increased over a relatively short timeframe. In Indonesia, Protection 
Equality increased by 1.6 times, to a value of 0.83, under optimal protection scenarios, 
with 36 ecoregions meeting the Aichi coverage target.  
 
The random protection scenario resulted in a decrease in Protection Equality in the most 
countries (86%), but had the weakest correlation between the Protection Equality ratio and 
the area lost to downsizing. This pattern is likely due to our assumption that downsizing at 
the country level was also random, allowing random protection to compensate for area lost 
to downsizing. Approximately 78% of countries decreased Protection Equality in the 
optimal scenario, which also had the strongest negative correlation between the Protection 
Equality ratio and the area lost to downsizing, most likely because in these instances the 
highest Protection Equality values were achieved, and therefore, there was more to lose. 
By incorporating multiple time steps in our analysis, optimal protection could offset 
downsizing as it occurs, reversing this trend and resulting in the greatest compensation for 
the area lost to downsizing.  
 
Previous research indicates that ecoregions with the greatest amounts of protection (i.e. 
those that are overrepresented in the protected area network) are likely those in areas with 
steep slopes and little value for human use (Pressey et al. 2002; Joppa & Pfaff 2009). 
Symes et al. (2016) found a small but significant positive effect of altitude on PADDD 
occurrence within a protected area, which would support the higher levels of downsizing 
seen in these ecoregions. However, they also found that larger protected areas are more 
likely to experience PADDD due to their high value for other land uses, as well as a 
synergistic relationship with population that is in opposition to this finding. Given that our 
downsizing models were based on PADDD occurrences to date, ecoregions that are highly 
represented are likely within more or larger protected areas, which may make them 
statistically more likely to undergo downsizing events. The fact that our approach impacted 
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all ecoregions within a protected area equally may contribute to this effect. Symes et al. 
(2016) cited their modelling approach and the potential of upland areas being more 
suitable for agriculture in arid environments as possible explanations, however we echo 
their call for further research at a finer scale to determine the mechanisms driving these 
results.  
 
We aimed to predict the expected relationship between future protected area downsizing 
and expansion on representation goals. Due to uncertainties surrounding PADDD 
dynamics, several assumptions had to be made that may influence our results. First, we 
assumed that a given downsizing event would impact all ecoregions within a protected 
area equally. In terms of measuring proportional Protection Equality, this is an optimistic 
approach because it ensures a proportionally equal decrease across ecoregions. In reality, 
it is likely that some ecoregions are more affected by downsizing in a given protected area 
than others due to competition with other land uses and other political or social factors. 
This would likely lead to higher amounts of downsizing in the least represented 
ecoregions, resulting in more severe decreases in the equality of representation. However, 
probabilities of downsizing events at the ecoregion scale are currently unknown. 
 
Second, we assumed protection and downsizing are independent events that do not 
influence one another. In other words, future protection did not impact the level of 
downsizing experienced across protected areas or ecoregions and vice versa. Once a 
country has the legal framework in place to enact PADDD events, it may make it easier to 
implement PADDD in the future (Bernard et al. 2014; De Marques & Peres 2015). 
Therefore we may see increased PADDD events with increased protection. In our 
analysis, as the proportion of area lost to downsizing increased, the Protection Equality 
ratio decreased (i.e. the Protection Equality ratio after downsizing decreased relative to the 
Protection Equality ratio before downsizing), leading us to believe that this would further 
exacerbate these negative trends. However, if future protection is placed in ways that 
offset PADDD these impacts could be minimized. Our results suggest that the BAU 
scenario may offset PADDD events the most, however this is likely an artefact of our 
modelling approach, as discussed above.  
 
On a similar note, our simulations were limited by the available data on downsizing in our 
datasets. For example, an ecoregion that was not within a protected area as of 2015 was 
never predicted to experience a downsizing event because it had never been within a 
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protected area and thus had never undergone downsizing before. This can be seen by the 
fact that ecoregions with zero representation in protected area networks in 2015 
subsequently did not experience any downsizing events within the future protection. This is 
likely the reason we see a decrease in Protection Equality in Mali and an increase in 
Uganda in the random protection scenario. In these cases, random protection occurred in 
ecoregions that initially had very little or zero protection and resulted in an increase in 
Protection Equality. However, due to these limitations in our model, downsizing did not 
occur in these newly represented areas. In Mali this resulted in a decrease in Protection 
Equality while in Uganda this led to an increase. In reality, ecoregions with no 
representation today may be those that have the most competition with other uses (hence 
their little protection) and thus may be more susceptible to downsizing if protection occurs. 
A better understanding of the timescales over which downsizing operates and additional 
time steps in our protection and downsizing simulations would give a better picture of real 
world dynamics and should be explored in the future. 
 
Finally, we only considered one aspect of PADDD, downsizing. Research on the 
representation of conservation features within varying protection classes (e.g. strict no-
take vs. multiple use) and how this changes given downgrading events should be explored 
to ensure adequate protection is provided across all conservation features of interest. 
While degazettement events are currently the most rare PADDD event (Symes et al. 
2016), as data improves and they potentially become more prevalent, their impacts on 
representation should we explored. If degazettement follows similar patterns as 
downsizing, we would expect even larger changes in Protection Equality with the complete 
loss of protected areas as opposed to only a loss of a proportion of a reserve. 
 
Ensuring proportionally equal amounts of conservation features are represented in a 
protected area network is a valid goal and may help safeguard against the many 
ecological uncertainties surrounding the importance of habitats and species for biodiversity 
outcomes. However, there is currently no clear definition of what good ecological 
representation looks like or how varying definitions may translate to conservation 
outcomes (Chauvenet et al. 2017b; McIntosh et al. 2017). It is important to remember that 
the current Protection Equality metric only proves that a country represents ecoregions 
equally. For example, the same perfect Protection Equality score of 1 could be achieved 
by protecting 1% of all ecoregions in a country or 100% of all ecoregions. As our results 
show, Protection Equality provides a more nuanced depiction of the distribution of 
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protection across conservation features than other measures of representation (Barr et al. 
2011; Chauvenet et al. 2017b), but it is a specific goal whose implications need to be 
carefully considered. Our results advocate for the use of Protection Equality in evaluating 
proposed PADDD events, in addition to other currently used area-based metrics. 
 
Increasing social and economic pressures call for protected areas that can be resilient and 
robust to change through time (Lee & Jetz 2008; Cumming et al. 2015). Understanding the 
drivers of PADDD events and determining their influence on network level objectives (e.g. 
representation), both positive and negative, is critical for developing sustainable protected 
area networks that contribute to conservation outcomes. Not all PADDD events are 
necessarily bad, but understanding the circumstances that drive negative or positive 
change from a single protected area perspective to the global protected area network as a 
whole can help inform conservation decisions that result in the best outcomes for 
biodiversity. Policies that promote protected area resilience, or that require the justification 
and evaluation of PADDD impacts the integrity of protected area network in terms of 
quantitative and qualitative objectives, are needed as PADDD becomes increasingly part 
of the conservation landscape. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
 
6.1 Overview 
 
This thesis aimed to quantify the trade-offs and synergies of protected area expansion with 
fundamental goals found in international conservation agreements and the principles of 
spatial conservation planning. Specifically, I focused on the relationship between area-
based conservation measures and representation (Chapters 4 and 5), management 
effectiveness (Chapter 3) and areas of particular importance for biodiversity (Chapter 2) 
as outlined in the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Aichi Target 11. I set out to answer 
three main questions: is marine protected area establishment targeting stoppable threats 
(Chapter 2), should we invest in expanding no-take protected area networks or increasing 
enforcement in existing no-take protected areas (Chapter 3), how does rapid protected 
area expansion impact the equality of ecological representation (Chapter 4), and how will 
protected area downsizing impact representation goals in the future (Chapter 5)? I 
developed novel approaches and metrics to answer these questions and evaluated the 
performance of current protected area networks in achieving international conservation 
objectives. I found that continued protected area expansion could hinder conservation 
outcomes if protected areas are not strategically placed (Chapters 2 and 4) and allocation 
of resources is not carefully considered (Chapters 3), whereas concentrating resources 
into smaller areas may improve the cost-efficiency of management (Chapter 3) but could 
move us further from representation goals through downsizing events (Chapters 5). In 
general, I found that protected area expansion has not been done in a systematic way and 
that, in many cases, random establishment of protected areas would have performed 
better in achieving non-area based conservation goals (Chapters 2, 4 and 5). Together, 
these findings expose significant shortfalls in the global protected area network, provide 
essential baselines to measure future progress, and highlight important aspects of 
protected area expansion that should be strongly consider in the development of future 
protected areas and conservation targets. Here, I provide a synthesis of how this thesis 
has advanced our knowledge of protected area dynamics, review the limitations, discuss 
how each chapter can influence spatial prioritisation going forward, and highlight research 
questions that merit further investigation. 
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6. 2 Scientific advances and conservation implications 
 
6.2.1 Areas of particular importance for biodiversity 
 
I presented a novel reframing of the issue of placing protected areas in the sea and 
provided compelling, quantitative evidence that the current global marine protected area 
estate has continually targeted areas that avoid threats that they are intended to abate. 
Previous literature that has shown biases in protected area placement in relation to threat 
has only considered specific habitats, like coral reefs (Burke et al. 2011), specific case 
studies (Harris et al. 2017) or subsets of MPAs (Devillers et al. 2015; Davies et al. 2017), 
and in most cases have considered the singular threat of fishing (Devillers et al. 2015). 
When multiple threats have been considered the distinction between stoppable and 
unstoppable threats has not been made. For example, Davies et al. (2017) recently 
claimed to find that cumulative human impacts are higher within large MPAs than outside 
of them, which they claim contradicts the criticism that large MPAs are mainly located in 
pristine areas. However, I argue their approach is flawed because many of the 19 
pressures they included in their analysis, such as land-based run-off and climate change 
impacts, cannot be effectively mitigated by MPA establishment alone, confounding the 
relationship between MPAs as conservation tools and threats to marine biodiversity that 
they can effectively manage.  
 
The confusion about how we should deal with threats in prioritising actions in space in the 
scientific literature is largely because the actions have been unclear, hence there is 
uncertainty about whether the threat should be avoided or tackled. If we prioritise 
unstoppable threats spatially, we are essentially only prioritising a place since a specific 
action is unable to abate these threats. Prioritising species or places does not clarify what 
actions should be taken to avert species’ decline and thus can result in misallocated funds 
and overestimates of conservation progress (Brown et al. 2015; Barnes et al. 2018). By 
prioritising stoppable threats, in the context of specific actions that can abate them, we win 
because we deliver a benefit relative to business as usual. However, the specific 
objectives of these actions must be clear and should consider at least some of the political, 
economic and social constraints on actions (Brown et al. 2015). 
 
In order to entangle these dynamics, my study was one of the first to make the important 
distinction between stoppable and unstoppable threats and to establish the connection 
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between stoppable threats and the specific conservation actions (e.g. establishing MPAs) 
that can abate them. This enable me to perform one of the first studies that quantified the 
relationship between stoppable threats and protection at the global scale (but see Devillers 
et al. (2015)). While it is clear that MPAs are not being established in the right places to 
meet representation goals (see Klein et al. 2015), my analysis showed that they are also 
not being placed in areas where they can play a significant role in abating stoppable 
threats, with <2% of MPAs in relatively high threat areas.  
 
I not only draw attention to this critical bias, but propose a simple metric to measure the 
discrepancy in protection in high and low threat areas across scales. Additionally, I identify 
31 extremely vulnerable, ‘crisis’, ecoregions that have high threat and very low protection 
where action can be taken to correct this major shortfall. This research is presented at a 
critical time for biodiversity conservation, as nations measure their current conservation 
progress mainly by achieving the 10% ocean protection target by 2020. This is inadequate 
and our 2020 CBD targets should reward actions that abate stoppable threats, not 
unstoppable threats (Secretariat of the CBD 2011). 
 
6.2.2 Effective and equitable management 
 
Due to ineffective management (e.g. paper parks, Mora (2006)), shortfalls in management 
resources (Balmford et al. 2004), and the unquestionable link between the two (Gill et al. 
2017; Geldmann et al. 2018), a long standing question in protected area research has 
been: is it more important to cover more species or ensure the persistence of those that 
already occur in protected areas (e.g. Armsworth et al. (2017))? This is a particularly timely 
question given the political atmosphere surrounding conservation and the impending 2020 
deadline for Aichi Target 11 that is only two years away. In Chapter 3, I took an interesting 
and novel approach to answer this question by determining how resources should be 
shared between expanding no-take protected areas and better enforcing existing reserves 
for the conservation of an exploited species. This is one of only a few studies to 
quantitatively evaluate the trade-off between investing in expansion and enforcement for 
biodiversity outcomes.  
 
Costelloe et al. (2015) is one of the only other studies to have used quantitative models to 
suggest increasing management may provide greater outcomes for biodiversity than 
protected area expansion. However, the goal of their study was to assess the use of 
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indicators to evaluate different continental-scale policy actions whereas my study aimed to 
help inform on-the-ground decision makers of the complex feedbacks, potential trade-offs 
and outcomes of expanding and enforcing no-take areas. In doing so, I describe how 
these two actions, which currently form the basis of modern conservation efforts, can 
impact protected area network performance. My model also made it possible to suggest 
potential solutions to combat resource dilution in current protected area networks and 
provides guidance on choosing between investment in expansion and/or enforcement 
given any current level of protected area extent and management in a given protected 
area estate. I clearly show the interconnected nature of protected area extent and 
management effectiveness, which underscores the importance of setting explicit, 
quantifiable goals for protected area effectiveness, in addition to extent, for achieving 
outcomes for biodiversity conservation.  
 
6.2.3 Representation 
 
The concept and theory surrounding representation has been around for decades, and 
many studies have shown biases in the location of protected areas for the protection of 
habitats and species (Pressey 1994; Joppa & Pfaff 2009; Butchart et al. 2015; Klein et al. 
2015). However, my analysis, in Chapter 4, was the first to use a formal metric, Protection 
Equality, to measure this bias, and to specifically focus on periods of rapid protected area 
expansion. This study provides a high contribution to conservation efforts and international 
conservation agreements simply by reporting where nations stand today. By using a formal 
metric this analysis is easily repeatable and can be used to measure future progress in 
meeting area-based and representation goals. My choice to consider rapid protected area 
expansion (i.e. “green grabbing”) had not been considered before and is particularly timely 
because this is likely to increase as countries take last minute efforts to reach area-based 
goals as the Aichi Target 11 2020 deadline approaches (Fairhead et al. 2012).  
 
Understanding how conservation opportunity impacts fundamental conservation 
objectives, like representation, is extremely valuable given that conservation is considered 
a ‘crisis’ discipline and is heavily influenced by political actions that work on much shorter 
time scales than environmental change. My results provided further evidence of the 
disconnect between conservation theory and on-the-ground implementation that must be 
corrected in order to deliver best practice conservation actions. 
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In Chapter 5, I again used the formal metric of Protection Equality to explore the 
anticipated impacts of protected area downsizing and future protection on representation 
goals. Protected area downsizing has increased in recent years, as has its recognised 
importance in the conservation landscape (Mascia & Pailler 2011). Protected area 
downsizing, downgrading and degazettement (PADDD) is often viewed as a step 
backward for conservation, as it does decrease the amount or legal status of area under 
protection. However, several studies that have explored the impact of PADDD on more 
qualitative goals of protected areas, such as management effectiveness, have suggested 
that strategic PADDD events could increase the efficacy of protected areas as a whole 
(Fuller et al. 2010; Kuempel et al. 2018). Representation combines both quantitative and 
qualitative components of protected areas so that influence of PADDD on representation is 
less clear and had not been explored before. Protection patterns revealed similar results 
as Chapter 4, providing further evidence of the implementation gap between best-practice 
scientific recommendations, conservation policy and on-the-ground action for 
representation. As the proportion of area lost to downsizing increased there were 
significantly greater decreases in Protection Equality, signifying negative impacts of 
downsizing on representation. By connecting historical trends to predicted future change in 
protection I was able to reveal interesting country-level dynamics and gain unique insight 
into how downsizing events may influence network level conservation objectives (i.e. 
representation) in the future. Determining patterns driving changes in representation can 
help create more resilient and robust protected area networks and inform conservation 
decisions to offset the negative and capitalize on the positive impacts of downsizing to 
better conserve biodiversity.  
 
6.3 Research limitations and future research priorities 
 
6.3.1 Combatting threats 
 
For conservation actions to be successful, it is essential that we uncover the drivers and 
determine the most efficient solutions to the major threats to biodiversity. There are 
several issues related to the consideration and quantification of threats in this thesis 
(particularly Chapters 2 and 3) that merit further investigation.   
 
‘Stoppable’ threats are still the dominant drivers of current species loss (Maxwell, S.L., 
Fuller, R.A., Brooks, T.M., Watson 2016) and there is an urgent need to link threats to the 
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species and ecosystems that they impact. This will help to distinguish between the threats 
that conservation actions can and cannot abate, which is instrumental in determining 
where, when, and what conservation actions result in the best outcomes for biodiversity. 
However, just because land-based stressors and climate change cannot be abated 
through MPA implementation alone does not reduce the tremendous impacts that these 
‘unstoppable’ threats have on the world’s oceans.  
 
There are several ways that unstoppable threats could be used to prioritise conservation 
action and, particularly, marine protected area establishment, in the future. One option is 
to prioritise areas where stoppable threats are relatively high but unstoppable threats are 
relatively low. Alternatively, unstoppable threats could be used as a measure of risk or 
uncertainty. The former method is gaining attention with some systematic conservation 
planning tools such as Marxan with Probabilities, which allows for the consideration of data 
uncertainty (Tulloch et al. 2013) or catastrophic events/threats (Game et al. 2008) in 
planning exercises. To truly reduce threats from terrestrial sources and climate change in 
the marine realm, we urgently need policies and legislation that reduce the causes of 
these threats, and a greater consideration of the interconnected nature of terrestrial and 
marine systems (e.g. land-sea planning, Klein et al. (2010)). 
 
In Chapter 2, there is also a strong focus on ‘current’ threats (as opposed to ‘future’ 
threats). Proponents of proactive biodiversity protection advocate for the protection of 
intact areas that hold unique biodiversity value (i.e. “wilderness”, (Mittermeier et al. 2003; 
Watson et al. 2009, 2016b; Graham & Clanahan 2013)). These areas are often remote, 
and far from current human influences, but have the potential to be impacted in the future 
as threats and human populations expand. For example, scientists pushed for the 
protection of deep sea canyons off the Atlantic coast of Canada to protect deep sea corals 
that are highly sensitive to disturbance. While not currently threatened, due to their depth 
and distance from shore, researchers wanted to ensure they were safeguarded from future 
fishing pressure and oil exploration as technology improves (Metaxas, personal 
communication). 
 
Uncertainties surrounding the distribution and timescales over which threats are expected 
to intensify make it difficult to determine the expected conservation benefit of these 
actions. I believe that the avoidance of protecting biodiversity from current threats, largely 
due to political, social and economic limitations, is one of the primary reasons why we 
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have seen so little impact of our MPA network despite its rapid growth. However, a 
combination of protecting currently threatened and vulnerable intact areas will be 
necessary to maintain all levels of biodiversity in perpetuity. Future policies should make 
sure that protecting intact areas, which is generally less costly (both economically and 
socially), occurs alongside but not in place of protecting high threat areas, which is 
generally more ‘difficult’. Determining where and when it is most cost-effective to establish 
protection that combats current threats versus anticipated threats should be a high priority 
for future research.   
 
In Chapter 3, the consideration of different or multi-threat problems, in my model of 
protected area expansion and enforcement would help to broaden its utility and help 
conservation practitioners navigate these challenging decisions under a variety of different 
circumstances. For example, in this chapter I focus on illegal extraction for a single 
exploited species in no-take protected areas. While illegal exploitation is a major concern 
in many protected area networks, habitat loss is still the most urgent threat to biodiversity 
worldwide (Maxwell, S.L., Fuller, R.A., Brooks, T.M., Watson 2016). In the modelled 
system, the risk of no compliance is illegal harvesting, which has different temporal and 
spatial dynamics than the risk of habitat loss and degradation. To address issues of 
adequacy, which is discussed in a later section, we must understand the relationship 
between habitat loss and species extinction rates in the land and in the sea (Fahrig 2001). 
I anticipate that non-compliance actions that lead to the destruction of habitats or 
fundamental processes necessary for the persistence of species would only strengthen the 
emphasis on investing in management schemes, but I look forward to seeing these issues 
tackled in the future. 
 
In 2001, a report by the National Research Council was one of the first to propose that 
priorities in implementing MPAs should include vulnerable areas rather than solely 
achieving area-based measures (National Research Council 2001). Only recently has the 
idea of conservation impact, or considering the counterfactual of conservation actions, 
gained widespread attention (Ferraro & Pattanayak 2006; Maron et al. 2013; Pressey et al. 
2017). My relatively simple approach of evaluating the potential conservation impact of the 
global MPA network in Chapter 2 is the first step in identifying how well MPAs target 
vulnerable areas and contribute to conservation impact. However, an important question 
remains: do MPAs that are targeting threats have adequate policies and resources to 
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actually reduce these threats? In order to answer this question, we would need to know 
the objective of each MPA and evaluate how well that objective is being met.  
 
I will discuss data limitations of management objectives in the follow section, but assuming 
management objectives were known, a causal link between conservation impacts and 
outcomes against appropriate counterfactuals would be necessary. On land, protected 
areas have rarely been evaluated through causal connections between management 
inputs and conservation outcomes (Geldmann et al. 2013), and very few have been 
performed in the sea. In Chapter 2, I show that random protected area placement would 
have protected more high threat area than the current MPA network. However, to draw 
definitive conclusions, appropriate analyses comparing threats by matching randomly 
placed marine protected areas with observed marine protected areas, or matching similar 
locations inside and outside of parks could help determine what effect the current MPA 
network has compared to if no action had been taken.  
 
Another important consideration is whether protected areas are reducing threats or only 
shifting them to other locations (i.e. displacement). The issue of displacing humans and 
the threats that they create has been a major criticism of protected areas to date and 
threatens to negate the benefits they are intended to produce (Agrawal & Redford 2009; 
Buscher et al. 2017). The issue of displacement was not discussed in this thesis but could 
hold major implications, particularly for calculating the conservation impact of protecting 
high threat areas and the determining the true benefits received from increasing 
management effectiveness within protected areas, which could affect decisions regarding 
resource allocation and investment. Research needs to consider the potential impacts and 
consequences of displacement in conservation prioritization, evaluation and decision 
making. 
 
6.3.2 Reporting management objectives and costs 
 
A reoccurring limitation to the work in this thesis is a lack of transparency and reporting in 
protected areas. Information beyond just the extent of area protected proved hard to come 
by and limited potential analyses. Specifically, information on management objectives, 
effectiveness and costs would have provided greater insight to my work and would have 
allowed for me to draw more clear and robust conclusions.  
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As discussed in the section above, being able to identify clear management objectives 
within each protected area globally would have allowed me to determine what threats 
individual MPAs are intended to abate. This would have provided a more nuanced 
quantification of protection relative to threat in Chapter 2, and would ensure that countries 
who score relatively well (i.e. have relatively high protection in high threat ecoregions) in 
this analysis do not just have a network of ‘paper parks’. Determining the management 
objectives of individual MPAs is extremely challenging because, worldwide, MPAs use a 
wide variety of zoning and management schemes – from no-take to single use to multiple-
use areas/zones (e.g. The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park), and data is limited (Di Minin & 
Toivonen 2015). Most global analyses, like mine in Chapter 2, have opted to use IUCN 
classifications as a proxy for management objectives. However, MPAs can be 
misreported, the IUCN classification may not reflect the true regulatory enforcement in the 
park, and many countries do not prescribe to these classifications and thus meaningful 
protection may be excluded by using IUCN classification alone. To facilitate conservation 
impact analyses, reporting on management objectives, from all stages of protected area 
design through to designation and adaptive management, should become a priority in 
protected areas globally. The reasons why these objectives were chosen, the actions 
being taken to achieve them, and the resources allocated to implementing these actions 
also need to be reported in a transparent and comparable way to be able to derive true 
insights on when, where, what and why conservation actions succeed or fail. 
 
In Chapter 3, I standardised management costs in relation to protected area expansion in 
our theoretical model. In order to apply this theoretical model to a case study, which would 
enable me to further test these assumptions and potentially develop more specific general 
rules for investment in expansion vs. enforcement, transparent documentation of 
management costs before and after protected area expansion are needed. Most reported 
changes to protected area management involve an increase in the size of the protected 
area. Increases in management budgets are rarely reported. In fact, I could not locate a 
single, transparent reported increase in enforcement budgets alongside protected area 
expansion, let alone how enforcement budgets were being spent. In our case, 
enforcement and illegal extraction are often taboo subjects and much of this information 
may be deemed confidential, which hinders these analyses. However, in general, costs 
and how money is allocated between actions is not well reported or accounted for in 
conservation science (Craigie & Pressey 2018; Iacona et al. 2018). 
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In Chapter 4, I attempted to uncover economic and social factors that affect the ability of 
countries to meet representation targets. I used economic indicators, like GDP, but a more 
sensible measure would have been to include conservation funding. This would be a more 
precise measure of resources needed to achieve equality of representation. Some 
relatively new research has given us insight on country-level conservation spending (e.g. 
Miller et al. 2013; Waldron et al. 2013). However, given that my analysis spanned the 
years from 1954-2013 and these reports only cover 1980-2008 and 2001-2008, 
respectively, I was unable to use this data in my model. Future research could explore 
conservation funding as a driver of representation and Protection Equality over a shorter, 
more comparable time period.  
 
6.3.3 Fine-scale analyses and the research-implementation gap 
 
Most of my work in this thesis used global ecoregions to represent biodiversity features at 
a broad scale. Currently, marine and terrestrial ecoregions are the most comprehensive 
and commonly used biodiversity units at the global scale because they define 
biogeographically distinct units, but further work should explore how the patterns in my 
research change at finer spatial scales. The results that I present in this thesis only give a 
broad overview of the many nuanced patterns of biodiversity, threat and conservation 
action that are often unevenly distributed within broad individual features such as 
ecoregions. In order to translate these large-scale analyses to inform local implementation, 
it will be necessary to explore these potential trade-offs through strategic case studies. 
Increased availability of information, as I discussed in the section above, will help to 
complete such analyses, and in some cases, fine scale data may already be available.  
 
For example, in Chapter 2, fine-scale analysis within ‘crisis’ ecoregions that identify high 
risk areas with high biodiversity value could be used to prioritise future MPA 
implementation. Further, criticisms of the Australia MPA network and research in 
Indonesia have suggested opposing results to our impact metric that should be explored in 
more detail. In Chapter 3, applying my model to a case study would allow for more 
detailed implications of the trade-offs of expansion and enforcement. In Chapter 4, looking 
at representation and related policies at regional, national and international scales could 
help us understand the patterns of conservation action and outcomes from both top-down 
and bottom-up perspectives and could play an instrumental role in implementing 
conservation policies in the future. And lastly, in Chapter 5, further detail on how 
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downsizing impacts protected at the ecoregion scale (e.g. are all ecoregions within a 
protected area impacted equally, or some more than others?), as well as more nuanced 
patterns (e.g. additional time steps of future protection and downsizing) could reveal 
further insight into the changes that will most impact the achievement of representation 
goals in the future. Additional time steps, in particular, could help determine how varying 
protection scenarios could best compensate for the loss of area to downsizing and would 
likely lead to bigger differences between BAU, random and optimal protection scenarios 
for achieving representation. 
 
Additionally, the data on threats that was used in Chapter 2 was the cumulative human 
impact maps developed by Halpern et al. 2008. This data largely included various forms of 
fishing pressure as well as measures of direct human impact and benthic structures. This 
is the best available data at the global scale, and fishing pressure is one of the most 
pervasive immediate threats to marine biodiversity (Maxwell, S.L., Fuller, R.A., Brooks, 
T.M., Watson 2016). However, fine scale mapping and the availability of time series data 
of additional threats (e.g. invasive species, shipping, etc.), combined with more rigorous 
classifications of their origins and impacts at the ecosystem and species levels, would 
provide valuable information for the prioritisation of conservation actions in the sea.  
 
While it is widely recognized that conservation policies, like Aichi Target 11, have played a 
strong role in shaping the current protected area network, the relationships between 
science, policy and on-the-ground implementation are complicated and still unclear.  In 
Chapters 2, 4 and 5, I showed that random placement of protected areas often achieved 
significantly greater outcomes for the equality of representation and targeting threats than 
currently established protected area networks. However, in some cases, observed 
networks performed better than random protected area placement. This puts into question 
whether better performance in some areas is fortuitous or the result of strategic planning.  
 
For example, in Chapter 4 Australia was the only nation that expanded its protected area 
system in a way that was significantly greater than random from 1994 to 2003. Australia 
has embraced the concept of representation and it is seen in conservation policies from 
the national to regional scale. Whether the specific consideration of representation in 
conservation planning drove this result, or whether it was strictly by chance is an 
interesting and currently unresolved question. I was unable to tease out these dynamics 
during this thesis but it remains a large area of interest that has instrumental implications 
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for how science informs policy and how policy is translated into on-the-ground 
conservation action. Promisingly, new research suggests that perhaps the research 
implementation gap is closing as academics and practitioners work together in designing 
and implementing spatial conservation prioritization initiatives (Sinclair et al. 2018). 
 
6.3.4 Evaluating and measuring conservation progress in the future 
 
Metrics and indicators are critical for developing and measuring progress of conservation 
policies and actions. For conservation actions to meet their full potential a step change 
from outputs (i.e. amount of area protected) to outcomes is urgently needed. While outputs 
document the amount, quality or volume of a conservation objective and can provide 
simple summary statistics, outcomes reveal the extent and kinds of impact the 
conservation action has in reaching higher level goals. Area-based metrics have been 
prominent in reporting schemes to date, but as this thesis shows, can misguide decision 
makers and the public on conservation progress and can perpetuate trade-offs with non-
area based conservation goals. As Barnes et al. (2018) notes, the ineffectiveness of 
indicators after being designated as policy targets has negatively impacted our efforts to 
halt biodiversity loss because effort has shifted to improving the indicator (i.e. protected 
area extent) itself rather than achieving biodiversity conservation (see Goodhart’s Law). 
 
Conservation, let alone the intricacies and dynamics of biodiversity, is complex making it 
hard to develop metrics that are easy to measure, transparent, comparable, and directly 
correlate to conservation outcomes. However, biodiversity conservation is not the first or 
only field that has been tasked with this challenge, but we have lagged behind in offering 
potential solutions. For example, the fields of finance and public health have numerous 
examples of metrics that describe complex systems, such as gross domestic product 
(GDP), mortality risk, and the Dow Jones index. While none are without flaws or criticism, 
many have been used for decades and have played important roles in measuring 
progress, shaping public perception, and driving policy and action from the global to the 
household levels. 
 
In this thesis I used two metrics, Protection Equality and the ‘impact’ metric, both of which 
could be expanded further to improve their applicability to conservation evaluation. 
Weighting schemes, in particular, seem like an obvious next step that could greatly 
influence the applicability of these metrics to today’s conservation problems. For example, 
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not all conservation features are created equal. Some are considered more valuable for 
ecosystem services, rarity, or endemism while others are more common or under less 
threat and thus may be less of a conservation priority. Incorporating a weighting scheme 
that reflects the desirability of each ecoregion for protection could help account for these 
differences. Threats to biodiversity are also not equal, and thus could be weighted by their 
expected impact on different conservation features. This would affect whether features are 
classified as ‘high’ or ‘low’ threat areas in calculating the impact metric in Chapter 2.  
 
Another advancement that could provide a large contribution to conservation decision 
making is the incorporation of habitat condition into both the Protection Equality and the 
impact metric. Given that human impacts have touched nearly every corner of the Earth 
(Halpern et al. 2008a, 2015; Venter et al. 2016) there is significant variation in habitat 
condition within feature classes, such as ecoregions. Incorporating habitat condition into 
the calculation of the amount of habitat available for protection in the Protection Equality 
metric would account for the loss of area that is no longer suitable for protection 
(Chauvenet et al. 2017b). However, this would also benefit countries with more area 
converted by reducing the total area of an ecoregion and thus making it seem like a higher 
proportion of area is protected, which may lead to perverse outcomes. In Chapter 5, the 
optimal protection scenario represents a very optimistic approach that did not consider 
habitat condition. By accounting for land conversion it is likely that much lower Protection 
Equality values would have been achieved. Data on habitat condition in the sea could 
identify disparities in the rates of conversion to protection  (see Hoekstra et al. 2005; 
Watson et al. 2016), and could help determine the net positive change in a conservation 
asset relative to all change (see McDonald-Madden et al. 2009). This would be particularly 
useful in the world’s ocean and would help to further prioritise areas at high risk of being 
lost in the future. Currently, habitat condition data is much easier to obtain for terrestrial 
systems, whereas little is known about habitat condition in the sea. 
 
Finally, a relatively simple improvement to Protection Equality would be to incorporate 
conservation targets, like the 17% land protection target in Aichi Target 11. This would 
result in a ‘bounded’ Protection Equality metric. All ecoregions with protection over that 
designated target would be considered equal so, unlike the current Protection Equality 
metric, countries would not be penalised for over-representing features. Whether 
Protection Equality or any of the other current metrics to measure representation are the 
‘correct’ or appropriate approach is unclear because there is currently no real definition of 
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what ‘good’ representation looks like, or how much protected area is enough to slow 
patterns of biodiversity decline (Tear et al. 2018). 
 
6.3.5 Adequacy 
 
One glaring issue with Aichi Target 11 is the fact that even if all components are achieved, 
it is still uncertain, and more likely improbable, that this action will be enough to stabilise or 
reverse biodiversity decline. This is especially true given that most protected areas are 
ineffective and one-third of global protected terrestrial area is under intense human 
pressure (Jones et al. 2018b). The question of “how much is enough”, while seemingly 
simple, has remained one of the most challenging questions for scientists to answer (Tear 
et al. 2018).  
 
Indeed, through this thesis, I unveiled many of the ways that the current global protected 
area network is inadequate in conservation biodiversity, particularly in targeting threats or 
areas of particular importance for biodiversity (Chapter 2), achieving management 
effectiveness (Chapter 3), and representing samples of biodiversity features (Chapters 4 
and 5). However, I did not consider the specific requirements for the persistence of 
individual species, which ignores a major limitation in addressing adequacy in 
conservation efforts. While considering a single species abundance in Chapter 3 can be 
considered a proxy for this species persistence, the objective of protected areas is not 
usually just increasing population size but ensuring that population can be maintained in 
perpetuity. Incorporating modelling approaches that quantify reductions in extinction risk 
from conservation action, as well as considering multiple species and/or ecosystem 
processes, will be integral in informing decisions in the future. 
 
It is certain that anything less than 100% of effectively protected area will be inadequate to 
halt biodiversity loss at all levels. However, 100% protection is not a practical or realistic 
goal, given that nearly all area on earth has been impacted by human use (Halpern et al. 
2008a; Venter et al. 2016). For this reason, and due to the limited resource available for 
conservation action, it is essential that protected areas are strategically and systematically 
implemented to deliver the greatest benefits to conservation. This is in contrast to today’s 
global protected area network that biases protection towards low threat areas and often 
does not achieve outcomes greater than if protection was placed randomly (Chapter 2, 4, 
5).  
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It is also important to recognize that protected areas are not a panacea for biodiversity 
decline. In fact, protected areas have been subject to criticism from social scientists as a 
technocratic solution that fails to consider the social-economic drivers of biodiversity loss 
and the negative consequences on the human population (Duffy et al. 2016; Buscher et al. 
2017). As discussed earlier, conservation actions (e.g. protected areas) are inherently 
spatial, which has led to the displacement of millions of people (Agrawal & Redford 2009). 
This not only has immense social implications but can also negate the benefits of 
protected areas because human impacts are not reduced but instead shifted to other 
areas. In light of this, Buscher et al. (2017) advocates for us “to rethink and nurture already 
existing and freshly emerging alternative conservation movements that are more 
democratic, equitable and humane”. Scientific evidence suggests that alternative options 
may be equally or more effective than the current protected area model, with McClanahan 
et al. (2006) finding that traditionally managed and co-managed marine areas can achieve 
greater compliance and subsequent conservation outcomes for coral reefs than those 
primarily for biodiversity conservation. The benefits from private land conservation and 
direct payments for biodiversity conservation are also becoming increasingly clear, and 
should be developed, not ignored, in future conservation efforts (Ferraro & Kiss 2002; 
Bingham et al. 2017).  
 
Incorporating and accounting for the role of these management actions may be difficult 
within the current framework of international conservation agreements, but they should not 
be ignored as they can play a key role in achieving biodiversity outcomes. As one 
example, these approaches are more likely to help mitigate impacts of displacement, of 
both people and the threats they create, which is another important aspect of protected 
areas that was not discussed in this thesis.  
 
The inclusion of “other effective conservation measures” (OECMs) in Aichi Target 11 
provides an opportunity for these alternatives to meaningfully contribute to meeting 
outlined international conservation targets. However, further clarification on the definition 
of OECMs and how to quantify their contribution is needed to ensure they are used 
effectively. Protected areas have proven to provide benefits when implemented effectively. 
However, the pursuit of novel conservation opportunities that meet social, economic and 
environmental goals more equitably should be a high priority in the future. This will be 
particularly important given international policies that seek to meet these triple bottom line 
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goals such as the United Nation’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, United 
Nations 2015). 
 
6.3.6 Future international conservation agreements 
 
This thesis focused on the objectives within a singular international conservation target, 
Aichi Target 11. However, it is important to note the interrelated and hierarchical nature of 
many conservation targets from the local, national to global level. The research presented 
here explored trade-offs within Aichi Target 11 itself, but Aichi Target 11 is just one of 20 
targets of the 2011-2020 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity. Considering the synergies and 
trade-offs within Aichi Target 11, between Aichi Targets and across other international 
policies becomes exponentially more complex. For example, I show that despite the 
interconnected nature of protected area extent, representation, and effective management, 
the singular focus on extent has led to a poor job of achieving all three. Furthermore, Di 
Marco et al. (2015) exposed the multifaceted interactions between Aichi Target 11, 5, 12, 
and 15. As the 2020 closing date of the 2011 Aichi Biodiversity targets approaches, it is 
important to look ahead and use the information we have gained from implementing these 
targets to help inform future policies and actions. There will no doubt be a 2021-2030 
Strategic Plan for Biodiversity that, hopefully, builds on the lessons we have learned during 
this transformative time for conservation (Convention on Biological Diversity 2017).  
 
In the next term, the relationships within and between conservation objectives are likely to 
become even more confounded with the introduction of other international policies such as 
the United Nation’s 2030 SDGs (United Nations 2015). While there is some degree of 
overlap between the Aichi Biodiversity Targets and the SDGs, such as SDG14 and 15 to 
conserve and sustainably use life below water and on land (United Nations 2015), others 
seem in complete opposition, such as achieving zero poverty and hunger (SDG1 and 2). In 
pursuing these goals there is likely to be trade-offs that could be antagonistic to 
conservation, or increase threats. Future work should continue to evaluate the interactions 
between global level targets and should continue exploring strategic ways that we can best 
achieve seemingly conflicting goals.  
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Figure 6.1. The 17 United Nations Sustainable Development goals reproduced from 
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/. Each 
goal has a set of targets (for a total of 169 targets) to be achieved by 2030. 
 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
 
This thesis showed that a singular focus on area-based conservation measures for 
achieving biodiversity outcomes can, at best, result in the misallocation of limited 
conservation funds to poorly sited (Chapters 2, 4) or ineffectively managed (Chapter 3) 
protected areas and, at worst, can lead to perverse outcomes from conservation 
interventions similar to if protection was placed randomly or if there was no protection at all 
(Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5). The qualitative component of area-based targets (e.g. 10% of 
the sea and 17% of land protected by 2020) has caused an obsessive focus on protected 
area extent. Credible metrics about other issues like representation, management 
effectiveness, and habitat condition (not just extent) are urgently needed. A shift from the 
quantity of area protected to the quality of that protection will be critical in ensuring the 
effective investment of limited time and resources and to maximize returns from future 
conservation interventions. While the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
recognises that the Aichi Biodiversity Targets cannot be achieved in isolation and are often 
strongly dependent on each other (Secretariat of the CBD 2014), the trade-offs and 
synergies within individual targets needs to be widely acknowledged. Action needs to be 
taken to minimize negative impacts of these relationships in post-2020 targets and to 
provide clear guidance to decision makers on how best to achieve these goals.  
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Protected areas underpin global, national and regional conservation efforts. When 
protected areas are efficiently and effectively implemented according to scientific best-
practice, they can produce significant conservation benefits (Edgar et al. 2014; Geldmann 
et al. 2015). Even currently underperforming protected areas have the potential to provide 
meaningful conservation outcomes in the future. However, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that they are not the universal cure for the global biodiversity crisis, and they are 
significantly limited by available funding and resources. In order to reverse the decline of 
biodiversity hard decisions will need to be made about how best to spend limited 
conservation funds, and innovative solutions need to be sought out and explored.  
 
Effectively communicating the outcomes of our scientific research to policy makers and the 
public will be pivotal in bringing about political and behavioural shifts for the betterment of 
the planet. This is arguably one of the most important aspects of being a conservation 
scientist and ultimately is the true driver of real, tangible change. Given the state of 
habitats and species worldwide, and the current political atmosphere, it is one of the most 
challenging yet exciting times to be in the fight for nature conservation. Evaluating the 
trade-offs between quantitative and qualitative conservation objectives is a key step in 
identifying the shortfalls and synergies of conservation action and guiding conservation 
decision making and policy in the future. 
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Abstract 
 
Protected Areas (PAs) are a central part of biodiversity conservation strategies around the 
world. Today, PAs cover c15% of the Earth’s land mass and c3% of the global oceans. 
These numbers are expected to grow rapidly to meet the Convention on Biological 
Diversity’s Aichi Biodiversity target 11, which aims to see 17% and 10% of terrestrial and 
marine biomes protected, respectively, by 2020. This target also requires countries to 
ensure that PAs protect an “ecologically representative” sample of their biodiversity. At 
present, there is no clear definition of what desirable ecological representation looks like, 
or guidelines of how to standardize its assessment as the PA estate grows. We propose a 
systematic approach to measure ecological representation in PA networks using the 
Protection Equality (PE) metric, which measures how equally ecological features, such as 
habitats, within a country’s borders are protected. We present an R package and two 
Protection Equality (PE) measures; proportional to area PE, and fixed area PE, which 
measure the representativeness of a country’s PA network. We illustrate the PE metrics 
with two case studies: coral reef protection across countries and ecoregions in the Coral 
Triangle, and representation of ecoregions of six of the largest countries in the world. Our 
results provide repeatable transparency to the issue of representation in PA networks and 
provide a starting point for further discussion, evaluation and testing of representation 
metrics. They also highlight clear shortcomings in current PA networks, particularly where 
they are biased towards certain assemblage types or habitats. Our proposed metrics 
should be used to report on measuring progress towards the representation component of 
Aichi Target 11. The PE metrics can be used to measure the representation of any kind of 
ecological feature including: species, ecoregions, processes or habitats. 
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Introduction 
Protected Areas (PAs) are a central part of biodiversity conservation strategies around the 
world. There are currently more than 200,000 PAs under International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) designation that cover c.15% of the Earth’s land mass [1–
3], and c.3% of the global oceans [4]. A sharp increase in those numbers, especially in the 
sea, is expected in the coming years as countries that signed the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) aim to protect 17% and 10% of terrestrial and marine jurisdictions 
respectively, by 2020 (Aichi Target 11, [5]). Moreover, the CBD states these targets should 
be achieved through “effectively and equitably managed, ecologically representative and 
well-connected systems of protected areas” [5]. At present, there are no globally accepted 
metrics that evaluate how well systems of PAs meet all these objectives. 
Ecological representation is a key principle of systematic conservation planning that 
broadly aims to ensure a PA system protects a sample of all biodiversity present [6]. 
Usually, this is accomplished through setting quantitative targets for individual 
conservation features (e.g. species or habitats) to be protected. Despite some criticisms 
(e.g. the arbitrariness in target amounts [7, 8]), target-based conservation planning is now 
commonplace and driving biodiversity commitments at both global and national levels. 
However, questions remain regarding the adequacy of target amounts and comparability 
between countries. For example, what biodiversity outcomes do we achieve with 17% 
protection of terrestrial habitats? Does it make sense to protect an equal percentage of 
ecologically or geo-politically defined units, such as ecoregions? What is good ecological 
representation, and how should we measure it? 
Barr et al. [9] identified the need for a comparable measure of ecological representation 
between countries as part of a systematic conservation planning approach. The authors 
adapted the Protection Equality (PE) metric from the Gini coefficient [10] and introduced it 
as a way to determine the level of representation of a PA network. They discovered that it 
was more independent of the total area protected than other common measures of 
representation. The Gini coefficient is an index used in economics to measure the 
difference between how a perfectly equitable distribution of individual income accumulates 
and the actual distribution of income (called the Lorenz curve, [11]). It has been adapted to 
measure inequality in various others fields, such as: education [12], size hierarchy in plant 
populations [13], the use of carbon sources in bacterial soil communities [14], and access 
of urban residents to green space [15]. However, until the recent work by Barr and 
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colleagues [9] it had not been applied to issues of conservation concern, besides 
investigating changes to income following a new conservation policy (e.g. [16–18]). As part 
of the PA evaluation toolkit under Aichi Target 11, the PE metric could allow for 
comparisons of representation across different countries’ PA systems, especially as total 
area increases rapidly under international agreements for biodiversity protection. 
Barr and colleagues [9] proposed a PE metric that measures ecological representation of 
conservation features as the “proportional amount” of each feature under protection. For 
example, if 10% of each ecoregion is conserved, we achieve perfectly equitable 
representation. An alternative approach would be to protect a “fixed amount” of each 
feature (e.g. 1000 km2 of each ecoregion). These two approaches embody distinct policies 
under the representation component of Aichi Target 11 with very different outcomes for 
overall biodiversity. Here, we extend the work of Barr et al. [9] and compare the outcome 
of measuring protection using both ecological representation approaches using two case 
studies: (1) coral reef habitat protection in the Coral Triangle Marine Protected Area 
System (CTMPAS) and (2) large scale patterns of terrestrial protection in six of the world’s 
largest countries. 
We present a refined measure of the PE metric proposed by Barr et al. (proportional PE) 
and propose an additional way to calculate PE (fixed area PE). Moreover, the Gini 
coefficient, on which the PE metric is based, was built using large numbers of habitats or 
ecosystem types. This leads to an over-inflation of the PE metric for smaller numbers of 
conservation features. Hence, we also introduce a correction factor for PE. The two PE 
versions with the correcting factor are available as part of a new R package 
called ProtectEqual [19] (see S1 Appendix of published text). 
Materials and Methods 
 
Mathematical formulation 
 
Protection Equality metric (PE)  
 
Consider a region of interest (e.g. a country, a state or a continent) of total area atot, that 
contains N conservation features, indexed by the subscript i, with i ∈ Z+. Each 
conservation feature i has an area ai inside the region of interest such that: 
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𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 .  
Let the amount of conservation feature i, that is designated as a Protected Area (PA) be 
denoted pi, with 0 < pi < ai.  
 
We rank the level of protection of conservation features in ascending order (either fixed 
area protection pi (in ha for example) or proportion of the ecoregion protected pi/ai) and 
calculate the cumulative level of protection of conservation features yi for i=1,2,…N, using 
y𝑖 = ∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑖
𝑗=1
  𝑜𝑟  y𝑖 = ∑
𝑝𝑗
𝑎𝑗
𝑖
𝑗=1
 .  
To estimate PE, we plot yi against i/N for i=1,2,…N (illustrated in Fig. S1.1). PE is then 
calculated by estimating the area under the curve formed by the protection of the 
conservation features (U; Fig. S1.1; equivalent to the Lorenz curve) divided by the total 
area under the line of perfect equality (U+V; Fig. S1.1).  
 
𝑃𝐸 =
𝑈
𝑈+𝑉
 . 
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Figure S1.1. Illustration of how Protection Equality is calculated (here N=5). The line 
of perfect equality is shown in grey. The black curve is equivalent to the Lorenz 
curve and formed by the cumulative level of protection of each ecoregion i against 
i/N, with 1 ≤ i ≤ N. On the y-axis, y1 to yN are either cumulative fixed area protection 
(pi) or cumulative proportional protection (pi /ai). The dashed lines highlight the 
triangles and rectangles used to approximate area U, with PE calculated as the ratio 
of U over U+V.  
 
The steps to derive formulas for fixed area (PEf) and proportional (PEp) are detailed in the 
appendix of the published version of this paper. Each PE metric can be calculated as 
follows: 
PE𝑓 =
1
𝑁 × (
1
2
∑ 𝑝𝑖 +  ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑁−1
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 × (𝑁 − 𝑖))
1
2 ×
∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 ; 
PE𝑝 =
1
𝑁 × (
1
2
∑
𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑖
+  ∑
𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑖
𝑁−1
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 ×  (𝑁 − 𝑖))
 
1
2 ×
∑
𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 . 
 
Corrected Protection Equality metric 
 
When the number of conservation features N is small, the worst value that can be obtained 
for PE, even with maximum inequality, is substantially greater than 0. For example, 
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imagine a region of interest with N conservation features with only one of them with some 
protection but none for the others, which would represent the greatest possible inequality 
in protection. When there are two conservation features, the minimum PE is 1/2 and when 
there are three then PE is 1/3 even though you would expect a country or region with 
complete inequality of conservation features to have a PE of 0. As N increases, however, 
(e.g. N=100) PE tends to 0. To solve this problem, we created a correction factor that 
rescales PE between 0 and 1 when N is small.  
PE𝑐 = (PE −
1
𝑁
) ∗ (
𝑁
𝑁 − 1
). 
 
PEc is lower than PE for small N values but tends to PE as N increases (both fixed and 
proportional PE). Under perfect inequality corrected PEf and PEp now always equal zero. 
We used the corrected PE formulation in the following analysis.  
 
Simulations 
 
With two possible ways of measuring PE, the first question is, how and why do they differ? 
We compared the performance of PEf and PEp under two different scenarios. Scenario 1: 
when 10% of all ecoregions in a country/region are protected (hence PEp is equal to 1), 
how does PEf perform as the variability in ecoregion size increases? Scenario 2: when 100 
ha of all ecoregions in a country/region are protected (hence PEf  is equal to 1), how does 
PEp perform as the variability in ecoregion size increases? We simulated this for 5, 10, 100 
and 1000 ecoregions, and tested the two different PE metrics when areas of all ecoregions 
in a country/region were identical and when they differed in size.  
 
Case studies 
 
Case study 1: Representation of coral reef habitat protection in the CTMPAS  
 
The Coral Triangle encompasses six nations: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Timor Leste and is considered the epicentre of the world’s marine 
tropical biodiversity [20, 21]. These countries are signatories to the Coral Triangle Initiative on 
Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security (CTI-CFF, [22]), a multilateral partnership focused on 
improving coral reef sustainability and biodiversity in the region, with a focus on livelihoods and 
food security for the 120 million people dependent on coral reef ecosystems for sustenance, 
income and cultural identity [22]. Seascape management, which includes marine protected areas 
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(MPAs), is an important component of the CTI-CFF. The Coral Triangle encompasses 21 distinct 
biogeographic ecoregions [23]. These ecoregions are important as they act as ecological 
jurisdictions that represent species assemblage turnover, providing a non-political stratification 
system to evaluate levels of PE across the region, beyond country borders. 
In line with the CTI-CFF’s aim to develop a representative network of MPAs, Beger and 
colleagues [24] conducted a gap analysis for both ecoregion and country level coral reef 
protection. Using the most up to date boundaries of MPAs available from the Coral 
Triangle Atlas (http://ctatlas.reefbase.org/) and partners across the region (2013), reef 
habitats were intersected with MPA boundaries in ArcGIS to determine the amount of coral 
habitat offered any kind of protection, and the amount protected within estimated no-take 
areas. Given that the level of enforcement across MPAs is difficult to verify for this region 
all MPAs were treated equally with respect to their level of protection when calculating the 
area of an ecoregion protected, pi. Beger and colleagues [24] acknowledge this approach 
is subject to estimation errors for the true amount of protected habitats [21, 25]. Additional 
data processing methods, assessment, and geoprocessing rules are described in [24] for 
the coral habitat and MPA dataset. Given that this work formally precedes expanding 
conservation efforts in the region, it is an ideal case study to evaluate our PE metrics. 
We calculated the fixed area and proportional PE of coral habitat within the Coral Triangle 
region. We investigated two levels of grouping: first PEp and PEf were calculated across 
countries (i.e. using amount of coral habitat protected in each country; N = 6); second 
PEp and PEf were calculated across ecoregions (i.e. using amount of coral habitat 
protected in each ecoregion regardless of the country; N = 21). For each grouping we also 
recorded the total piand ai, the average proportion of coral within the areas (pi/ai), and the 
number of countries or ecoregions that offered some level of coral protection (pi >0). 
Case study 2: Large scale patterns of representation  
We investigated PE for the six largest countries in the world for which >90% of their PAs 
had well-defined boundaries in the World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA; accessed 
December 2016, [26]) in order to illustrate how our two measures of PE compare at a large 
scale. Only terrestrial PAs, with a designated IUCN category I-IV (i.e. those managed 
primarily for biodiversity), were considered in our analysis. Based on the above criteria, the 
six countries were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Democratic Republic of (DR) 
Congo, and the United States. It is worth noting that although China and Russia are bigger 
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than Argentina and DR Congo, only 10.5% and 16.4% of their respective PAs had clearly 
delineated boundaries in the WDPA database; the rest were only recorded as a point 
location. As a result, we discarded both countries from the analysis. All selected countries 
are larger than two million square kilometres. 
We used the 825 ecoregions developed by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) [27] to divide 
each country into ecoregions; the ecoregions “Lakes”, “Rock and Ice” and “Mangroves” 
were excluded to account for spatial mismatches between countries [9]. PA coverage was 
estimated using the 2015 version of the WDPA database and spatial processing 
suggestions from UNEP-WCMC [28]. Total area (ai) and total protected area of each 
ecoregion within each country (pi) were extracted using ArcGIS (version 10.2) by 
intersecting three layers: an equal-area projection of countries, the WWF ecoregions, and 
the WDPA terrestrial PAs. All countries had 17 or more ecoregions. 
We calculated the proportional and fixed area PE of ecoregions within all six countries. For 
each country, we recorded both PEp and PEf, total protected area pi, mean pi and ai across 
all ecoregions, the mean and median pi / ai across all ecoregions, the percent of the 
country under protection as well the number of ecoregions with more than zero area 
protected. 
Results 
 
Simulation  
 
If all conservation features have the same size, ai = Ca ∀ i, and each has the same area 
protected pi = Cp ∀ i, where Ca and Cp are constant, then we know PEf = PEp = 1. We thus 
might expect PEf and PEp to change as the variability in the size of conservation features 
increases. We assessed the values of PEf and PEp when conservation features are 
protected in the same proportion pi = Cai where C is a constant (scenario 1 where PEp is 
always 1) and when conservation features are protected by a fixed amount pi = C 
(scenario 2 where PEf is always 1) respectively, as a function of the coefficient of variation 
of the area, ai, of all conservation features in a region (Fig. S1.2). As the coefficient of 
variation of ai increases (i.e. there is a larger disparity between the size of all the 
conservation features), both of the PE metrics decrease (measured as PEf for scenario 1, 
and PEp for scenario 2). PEp decreases much faster than PEf  as a function of variation in ai 
for their respective scenarios, although the difference between the two measures is small 
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up to a coefficient of variation of ai of c. 20%. This implies that countries aiming for 
protection proportional to ai, can achieve a higher representation score than countries 
aiming for a fixed level of protection, regardless of the metric used to measure 
representation. However, this difference only matters if the country’s ecoregions have 
large differences in size; it is also more pronounced when N is small.  
 
 
Figure S1.2. Results of simulation of Protection Equality (PE) under two scenarios 
as a function of the coefficient of variation of ecoregion area ai. (A) When 
ecoregions are protected at fixed proportion of ai, e.g. 5%, and (B) When ecoregions 
are protected at a fixed area, e.g. 100 ha. We simulated 4 different numbers of 
ecoregions: 5, 10, 100, 1000. 
 
Thus, countries with only a few ecoregions can achieve better proportional and fixed area 
PE by aiming to protect an equal percentage of each ecoregion, unless ecoregions are 
similar in size. If countries have many ecoregions, they are less affected by this pattern 
and can reach high PE by either protecting a set percentage or a set amount of each 
ecoregion. As a result, PEp and PEf values should not be contrasted with each other and 
countries should be compared using the same metric.  
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Case Studies  
 
Case study 1: Representation of the coral reef habitat protection in the CTMPAS 
 
At both the country and ecoregion level, the PE values for the Coral Triangle were 
relatively low (all <0.44; Table S1.1; Figs. S1.3 and S1.4), indicating unequal 
representation of coral reef habitat protection among countries and among ecoregions.  
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Table S1.1. Proportional (PEp) and fixed area (PEf) Protection Equality of coral reef habitat in the Coral Triangle region, for its 
six countries, and its 21 ecoregions.  
 
Unit PEp PEf Total 
pi 
(km2) 
Total ai 
(km2) 
Mean 
(pi / ai) 
 
Median 
(pi / ai) 
 
Min 
(pi /ai) 
 
Max 
(pi / ai) 
 
N Number of Units 
with > 0% coral 
protection (% of N) 
Country 0.44 0.18 8356.5
2 
58080.73 0.123 0.057 0.03 0.325 6 6 (100) 
Ecoregion 0.38 0.30 9240.8
0 
60769.04 0.210 0.142 0.00 0.816 21 17 (80.95) 
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Figure S1.3. Coral reef habitat Protection Equality (PE) within countries and 
ecoregions in the Coral Triangle region. The graphs are displayed on the 
standardized scale. Corresponding PE values are given in Table S1.1 and were 
calculated using the PEp (triangles) and PEf (dots) metrics.  
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Figure S1.4. Boxplot of the (A) total coral area (ai), (B) protected coral area (pi) and 
(C) proportion of coral protected (pi/ai) in the coral triangle within countries and 
within ecoregions. Shown is data for six countries and 21 ecoregions. 
 
At the country level, a much higher coral reef protection PE was achieved using the 
proportional PE than the fixed area PE, with PEf being half the size of PEp (Table S1.1; 
Figs S1.3 and S1.4). The very small PEf value is explained by the fact that the amount of 
coral each country protected, pi, ranged from 12 to 6400 km2 across the six countries (i.e. 
two orders of magnitude) while the proportion of each country’s protected coral, pi/ai, 
ranged between 3 and 33%. This is indicative of the uneven distribution of coral reef 
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habitat across countries. The six countries were therefore more equal in terms of 
proportional protection than fixed area protection of their coral reef habitats.  
At the ecoregional level, the difference between PEf and PEp was much smaller (Table 
S1.1; Figs S1.3 and S1.4) with both values being less than 0.4. This implies that within 
ecoregions, the fixed and proportional level of protection of coral reef habitat is similar, 
although still quite small. The pi values of all 21 ecoregions ranged from 0 to 2235.4 km2, 
which is a much smaller disparity than within countries. The proportional protection (pi/ai), 
however, spanned between 0 and 82%, which is a large range of values across 21 
ecoregions. This difference explains why PEf within ecoregions was higher than within 
countries, while PEp within countries was higher than within ecoregions.  
 
Case study 2: Large scale patterns of representation 
 
Similarly to our case study of the Coral Triangle, none of the six largest countries had a PE 
over 0.50, indicating a below average PE at the global scale (Table S1.2; Figs S1.5 and 
S1.6). Australia had the highest proportional and fixed area PE, while DR Congo had the 
lowest in both. Argentina and Brazil, and Canada and the USA, had similar fixed area PE 
values (PEf), respectively, despite all four countries having large differences in number of 
ecoregions. This shows that countries with more ecoregions can score similar PE to those 
with fewer ecoregions. Canada and the USA have near identical PEp, and similar mean 
percentages of protected area across ecoregions, yet the US has a much higher % of the 
country protected; this implies that either Canada is doing better than expected for its size 
or that the US is doing worse in terms of proportional protection (Table S1.2). Similarly for 
Argentina and Brazil, which have almost identical PEp values, the latter shows a much 
higher mean pi value than the former but they have similar mean ai values. This indicates 
that Brazil, despite having more than twice as many ecoregions, protects a larger 
proportion of each on average than Argentina (Table S1.2). Surprisingly, DR Congo had a 
similar average proportion of ecoregion protected to Australia, Canada, and the US, but 
scored much lower for PEp. This could be explained by a large variance in pi /ai for DR 
Congo with several ecoregions with little or no protection, and a few with a very high 
protection percentage (Figs S1.6). Indeed, the median pi /ai for DR Congo is <1% (and only 
53% of ecoregions have protection; Table S1.2), while for Australia, Canada and the USA, 
it is >4% (and > 94% of ecoregions have protection; Table S1.2). 
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Table S1.2. Proportional (PEp) and fixed (PEf) Protection Equality of the six largest countries in the world with > 90% of their PA 
delimited in the WDPA database [25]. 
 
Unit PEp 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PEf Total 
pi 
(km2) 
Total 
ai 
(km2) 
Mean 
pi 
(km2) 
Mean 
ai 
(km2) 
Mean pi / Mean 
ai  
Mean 
(pi/ai) 
  
Median 
(pi/ai) 
  
Proportio
n Country 
protected 
N Number of 
ecoregions 
with > 0% 
protection 
(%) 
Argentina 0.29 0.32 58240 27824
94 
3236 154583 0.021 0.050 0.0113 0.021 18 18 (100) 
Australia 0.46 0.48 53157
6 
77101
33 
13630 197696 0.069 0.127 0.0692 0.069 39 38 (97.44) 
Brazil 0.27 0.23 47095
8 
84941
25 
9812 176961 0.055 0.066 0.0140 0.055 48 40 (83.34) 
Canada 0.35 0.33 59605
7 
95660
50 
11687 187570 0.062 0.104 0.0490 0.062 51 48 (94.12) 
DR Congo 0.14 0.18 11266
2 
23266
21 
6627 136860 0.048 0.108 0.0001 0.048 17 9 (52.94) 
United 
States 
0.34 0.27 75945
1 
92546
10 
8255 100594 0.082 0.111 0.0404 0.082 92 88 (95.65) 
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Figure S1.5. Protection Equality graph for the ecoregions of the six biggest countries 
in the world with > 90% of their PA clearly delimited in the WDPA database [25]. The 
graphs are displayed on the standardized scale. Corresponding PE values are given in 
Table S1.2 and were calculated using the PEp (triangles) and PEf (dots) metrics. 
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Figure S1.6. Boxplot of the (A) total ecoregion area, (B) protected ecoregion area and 
(C) proportion of ecoregion protected in the six largest countries: Australia (AUS), 
Argentina (ARG), Brazil (BRA), Canada (CAN), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
and United States of America (USA). 
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Discussion 
In this paper, we build on the work of Barr et al. [9] to present two metrics to measure 
ecological representation of PA networks. The proportional (PEp) and fixed-area (PEf) PE 
metrics measure how equitably habitats are being represented within PA networks; the former 
looks at proportional protection—what fraction of each habitat is conserved, while the latter 
looks at absolute protection independent of how much of each habitat is available. We thus 
provide tools to compare countries in a systematic manner that is more informative than 
simply referring to the amount or percentage of area protected. Moreover, the open-access 
ProtectEqual R package [19] allows easy calculation of the two metrics. Thus, they can be 
incorporated in cost-benefit analyses as part of decision-making as managers can calculate 
the representation benefit of different actions, and knowing their cost, choose the most cost-
efficient solution. We therefore believe that the PE metrics should be included in PA reporting 
under Aichi Target 11. 
Our case studies demonstrate how PEf and PEp behave in real life situations, but also 
highlight their shortcomings. Neither metric is informative without contextual information such 
as, the available area for protection, or mean and median protection rates. PE should be used 
as part of a wider range of metrics to measure PA effectiveness. It could also be extended in 
several ways. First, ecoregions are a coarse classification of habitat types and within them we 
expect some habitats to be more degraded than others. Land cover classification could be 
used to refine the measure of habitat available (ai) as this value may be much smaller than 
the total ecoregion area; it can help determine whether there is any habitat left within the 
ecoregion that is suitable to put under protection for biodiversity conservation. Second, not all 
ecoregions are equal, and those that are widely distributed might be less of a global priority to 
protect than those that are restricted to one or a few countries. One requirement of Aichi 
Target 11 is that areas important for biodiversity should be a conservation priority. We thus 
could introduce a weighting system that reflects the desirability of each ecoregion for 
protection; the same is true for ecological relevance. 
The two PE metrics assess the results of two potentially very different policies: should we 
expect countries to protect a set percentage of each habitat present within their borders or 
should we expect them to protect a set amount of each habitat? In other words, while 
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representation is a key goal, there are at least two interpretations. Both policies have 
advantages and drawbacks. For example, protecting a fixed percentage of each habitat 
means that large habitats will receive more protection, in terms of total surface area. In 
practice, this results in a protection bias towards more abundant habitats. Protecting a set 
amount of each habitat ensures an equitable area of each is placed under protection. In 
practice, to achieve a high PE value, this amount is dictated by whichever habitat has the 
smallest area, creating a bias towards sparse habitats. The ecological implications of 
favouring one PE metric over the other over time can be drastic, and are important to 
understand and acknowledge. Favouring one or the other and aiming to improve that PE 
score with each protected area decision can end up shaping the reserve network in very 
different ways. Let us consider two extreme cases. If, on one hand, the smallest habitats 
within a country are more “desirable” (e.g. globally rare or endemic, or providing more 
ecosystem value), then their protection and representation is maximised by protecting a fixed 
area amount of all habitats (i.e. obtaining a larger PEp score). Conversely, if the largest 
habitats are more “desirable” to the decision-makers, then protecting a set percentage can 
maximize their protection and the country’s ecological representation as measured by PEf. 
By having two variants of the PE metrics, there may be incentive for countries to “game the 
system” by presenting the PE metric yielding the highest value each time reporting is 
required. Indeed, it is theoretically possible to increase proportional PE and decrease fixed-
area PE, and vice-versa. A country as large as Australia could protect 100 km2 of each 
ecoregion, thus scoring PEf = 1, but effectively protecting very little of its area. Alternatively, it 
could only protect 100% of the most abundant ecoregion, possibly millions of km2, and score 
PEf = 0 and PEp = 0 because there would be no ecological representation. Neither of these 
alternatives is ideal as ecological representation aims to protect the functional advantage of a 
diverse environment, but protecting too little of everything achieves no biodiversity benefits. It 
is important, for transparency and accountability, but also comparability, to calculate and 
report on the same metric(s) over time. If only one version of the metric is chosen, the 
reporting needs to be consistent (i.e. use the proportional PEp every time) to measure the 
impact of decisions. This is because PEp values are comparable between each other, but not 
with PEf values. However, we recommend calculating both metrics rather than choosing only 
one for reporting in an international policy context, in order to make results comparable 
between countries. 
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Given the percent area target of CBD Aichi Target 11, the proportional PE metric is the most 
appropriate to specifically report against it. Nevertheless, any given country that calculates 
PEpacross ecoregions and gets a perfect score of 1, only proves that it is meeting the equal 
representation goal as it could be only protecting 1% of each ecoregion; this is why 
mean pi/ai(average percent protected) is also needed to give context to the PE score. 
We acknowledge that some of the metrics already available in the conservation literature to 
measure community diversity could be adapted to the problem of PA representation. To 
illustrate, imagine that the set of ecoregions within a country is equivalent to a species 
community, and the aim is to measure components of its diversity. The equivalent of species 
richness is simply the count of ecoregions, species abundance is the amount of each 
ecoregion that is under protection, and an individual is a unit of a protected ecoregion, e.g. 1 
ha. Could well-known diversity metrics be used to describe the PA network? For example, the 
Shannon-Wiener index is an often-used measure of diversity, although it truly measures 
entropy [29], which quantifies the uncertainty in predicting the “identity” of an individual that is 
taken at random from the dataset. Here, the individual identity is to which the ecoregion 
belongs. Similar to our PE metrics, if all abundance is concentrated in one type (i.e. all 
protected area is part of one ecoregion), and the other types are very rare (even if there are 
many of them), the entropy approaches zero. The issue with Shannon-Wiener, however, is 
that it is not bounded by an upper limit, which renders comparison between countries difficult. 
Another common diversity index is the Gini-Simpson coefficient, which is not an entropy but a 
probability [30]; bounded between 0 and 1, it represents the probability that two individuals 
picked up at random are not from the same species or ecoregion. The coefficient is zero 
when one ecoregion dominates and it is one when ecoregions are uniformly distributed, the 
probability of selecting each ecoregion is equal. In practice, however, it is a measure of 
whether one ecoregion is more dominant than others in the PA network [31]. While 
informative, the Gini-Simpson index measures a different aspect than the PE metrics, i.e. the 
evenness of ecoregions across the PA network. 
Management recommendations 
In order to apply the PE metrics to assess representation inside a reserve network, decision-
makers should observe a systematic procedure: 
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1) Define their objective: what do they want to achieve? For example, the objective may 
be to meet CBD targets such as Aichi Target 11. 
2) Define specific parameters that will remain the same over time: What do they want to 
measure (e.g. ecoregions and/or specific habitat type)? At what spatial scale (e.g. 
regional and/or national) and temporal scale (e.g. annually or less often)?  
3) Calculate the PE metrics for baseline reference (ProtectEqual package [18]), which will 
be used for future comparison and assessing the impact of decisions. This choice must 
be clearly justified, as it is possible for PE to increase by chance as PA network 
expand, without representation being an explicit goal [31].  
4) At every reporting time-step, if the PA network has changed, managers should 
recalculate both metrics to assess progress towards the set objective. PE metrics can 
also be used as part of cost-benefit analyses to identify the most cost-efficient actions 
for a reserve network; benefit is measured as the improvement in PE and cost is a 
function of which area is being protected.  
 
Conclusion 
 
There is no clear definition of what good ecological representation is inside PAs. As a starting 
point, using proportional and fixed area targets for all conservation features present is the 
most reasonable conceptual approach that is also well established amongst managers. Our 
proposed metrics can assess how well each country performs against both measures of 
representation, and allow for transparent comparison. There needs to be further research into 
what sort of ecological representation yields the highest biodiversity outcomes, and how these 
targets can be integrated into international agreements. In this paper, we suggest several 
potential modifications to the PE metrics, which would account for a finer scale evaluation of 
the biodiversity outcomes of PAs.   
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Appendix 2: Supplementary Materials for Chapter 2 
 
Supplementary Text 
 
To test the sensitivity of our results to different threat classifications, we considered two threat 
scenarios. The first scenario defined all threats that could potentially be mitigated through 
MPAs as ‘stoppable’ and included all measures of fishing pressure, benthic structures, and 
direct human impacts (results presented in Chapter 2 main text). The second approach only 
considered fishing pressure to be stoppable, given potential difficulties in managing or 
removing existing benthic structures and prohibiting direct human impacts, which largely refer 
to intertidal trampling and would require strict, zero-entry protection.  
 
When fishing pressure is the only threat that is considered to be abatable through MPA 
establishment, stoppable threats range from 0 to 0.96 (median = 0.088). This confirms that 
most measured stoppable threats included in this analysis can be attributed to fishing 
pressure and results in qualitative and quantitatively similar results. Since five of the seven 
stoppable threat layers were related to fishing pressure this is unsurprising. Between 2008 
and 2013 threats were slightly higher, ranging from 0 to 1.02 (median = 0.096). 
 
When direct human impacts and benthic structures are considered to be ‘stoppable’ along 
with fishing, stoppable threats ranged from 0 to 1.5 between 2008 and 2013 (median = 0.13). 
The higher median level of stoppable threat impacts the classification of high and low threat 
ecoregions, thus explaining any differences in protection when these threats are excluded.  
 
Is protection targeting fishing pressure? 
 
A total of 9.0% of national waters had protection in 2013, but only 2.4% was considered to be 
in high threat areas (compared to 1.8%). Ecoregions classified as low stoppable threat had 
2.8 (compared to 3.8) times more area protected than ecoregions with high stoppable threat. 
Additionally, 40 (compared to 41) low threat ecoregions (34.5%) had met the 10% CBD target 
in comparison to only 15 (compared to 14) high threat ecoregions (12.9%). Between 2008 
and 2013, nearly 6.3 million km2 were protected, however only 9.8% (compared to 9.4%) of 
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this protection targeted ecoregions with high levels of threat (still approximately 0.5% of the 
4.7% of marine area protected during this period). The average increase in protection 
between 2008 and 2013 was 14.4% (compared to 14.6%) in relatively low threat areas, but 
just 1.7% (compared to 1.6%) in relatively high threat areas. The level of protection within 
ecoregions was still significantly dependent on the level of stoppable threat in both time 
periods (χ2= 42.1, p <0.001 in 2013, and χ2= 38.8, p =0.017 between 2008 and 2013, Fig. 
S2.2A and S2.2B in original publication). Notably, there were significantly fewer ecoregions 
with high levels of protection and high stoppable threat than would be expected if protection 
were protection. 
 
Fourteen countries (70%) still exhibited positive impact indices when only fishing pressure 
was considered.  The majority of these (11, compared to 11) had an impact metric between 0 
and 0.05 signifying that low threat and high threat ecoregions are proportionally protected 
relatively equally. Kiribati and Australia still had the highest impact indices, however when 
only fishing pressure is considered Kiribati has a slightly higher value than Australia at 0.24, 
while Australia’s impact metric is 0.22. Argentina, Chile, China, Ecuador, New Zealand, and 
South Africa all still had negative impact indices and Chile, Ecuador and South Africa are 
targeting areas with low stoppable threats almost exclusively (>97% of protection as of 2013 in 
low threat ecoregions). 
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Figure S2.1. The relationship between the proportion of area protected and the level of stoppable threat (fishing 
impacts, benthic structures, direct human impacts) in (A) each global marine ecoregion in 2013 (N=232 ecoregions) 
and (B) in ecoregions that increased protection between 2008 and 2013 (N=124 ecoregions) within each IUCN 
classification. Vertical lines denote the quartiles of the proportion of stoppable threat and horizontal lines denote the 
quartiles of proportion of area protected across ecoregions. Axes are cube root transformed.  
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Figure S2.2. The relationship between the proportion of area protected and the level of stoppable threat (fishing 
impacts only) in (A) each global marine ecoregion in 2013 (N=232 ecoregions) and (B) in ecoregions that increased 
protection between 2008 and 2013 (N=124 ecoregions) within each IUCN classification. Vertical lines denote the 
quartiles of the proportion of stoppable threat and horizontal lines denote the quartiles of proportion of area protected 
across ecoregions. Axes are cube root transformed. 
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Figure S2.3. Diagram depicting the calculation of the ‘impact’ metric in a theoretical 
country. The impact metric is calculated by first designating ecoregions as low 
threat or high threat within a country. High threat ecoregions have above the 
median level of stoppable threat across all ecoregions within the country. Low 
threat ecoregions have below the median level of stoppable threat across all 
ecoregions within the country.  Then the total area of high threat ecoregions (dark 
gray), the total area of low threat ecoregions (white) and the amount of protection 
within high (dark gray with lines) and low (white with lines) threat ecoregions is 
quantified. The metric is then calculated as the proportion of protection within high 
threat ecoregions minus the proportion of protection in low threat ecoregions. 
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Appendix 3: Supplementary Materials for Chapter 3 
 
Supplementary Table 
 
Table S3.1. Parameters used in bioeconomic model. These were not chosen to 
describe a specific system. They were chosen to ensure that the harvested 
metapopulation was robust enough to persist without any protection, but where 
both the harvesters and population would respond to changes in protection and 
enforcement effort. Replication code for the model is publicly available at 
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1068314. 
 
Model Parameter Value 
Market price of target species (d) 1 
Overheads per unit enforcement (cT) 0.018 
Overheads per unit harvesting (cE) 0.018 
Catchability of target species (q) 0.7 
Penalty when caught (C) 1 
Per-female fecundity (f ) 2 
Beverton-Holt Parameters (α, β) α = 1, β = 0.01 
Diminishing returns exponent (z) 0.5 
Natural mortality (m) 0.1 
Total number of habitat patches (M) 50 
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Supplementary Text 
 
Supplementary Text S3.1. Alternative model formulations 
 
Our model applies the familiar Cobb-Douglas production function to describe how harvests 
increase with effort. In this model, z measures the effort-output elasticity, whereby 
increasing effort yields diminishing marginal increases in the harvest. Our model also 
assumed that the species were obligate juvenile dispersers, and were homogeneously 
distributed across the landscape. To ensure our results were robust to these structural 
assumptions, we explored how two alternative model formulations impacted our results. 
First, we explored the use of an exponential survival curve on population abundance on 
each habitat patch. Second, we developed a model where our assumption of a well-mixed 
pool of dispersing juveniles is relaxed. The alternative formulations did not alter our 
conclusions.   
 
Exponential survival curve 
 
Population model: In this model we assume an exponential survival curve in our spatially-
implicit population model. Here, both natural mortality (m) and harvesting mortality 
(𝑞𝐸𝐹 or 𝑞𝐸𝑅 on harvested and protected patches, respectively) are defined as instantaneous 
rates and annual survival can be described as: 
 𝑒−(𝑚+𝑞𝐸). (S1) 
This changes equations (1) and (2) that describe the abundance on each habitat patch in 
discrete time in our Cobb-Douglas model to: 
 ?̅?𝑅(𝑡 + 1) = ?̅?𝑅(𝑡)𝑒
−(𝑚+𝑞𝐸𝑅) + 𝐼(𝑡), (S2) 
 ?̅?𝐹(𝑡 + 1) = ?̅?𝐹(𝑡)𝑒
−(𝑚+𝑞𝐸𝐹) + 𝐼(𝑡). (S3) 
The rest of the model remains unchanged. 
 
Results: Both the exponential and Cobb-Douglas model descriptions (used in the body of 
the manuscript) showed similar trends in annual survival (Supplementary Figure S3.3). 
The optimal peak and subsequent decline in conservation benefits of protected area 
expansion without additional enforcement is sharper under the exponential formulation, but 
the same general interior maxima, beyond which expansion produces worse outcomes 
was still evident (Supplementary Figure S3.4). Benefits (i.e. total abundance) still exhibit a 
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diluting trend as the PA system is expanded beyond a certain size without additional 
enforcement.  
 
Local retention model 
 
Population model: We assumed a well-mixed pool of dispersing juveniles in our model. 
However, in many cases, at least some local retention of juveniles is likely to exist. To 
explore how local retention might impact our results, we developed a model where this 
assumption is relaxed. In this alternative model, a proportion of the juveniles (ƙ) return to 
their natal habitat patch, while the remainder are well-mixed among all patches. The 
number of juveniles produced by each patch is still proportional to the species’ per-capita 
fecundity. However, the amount immigrating to each patch is: 
 
𝐼𝑅 = 𝑘𝑓𝑁𝑅(𝑡) + (1 − 𝑘)𝑓[𝑅𝑁𝑅(𝑡) + (𝑀 − 𝑅)𝑁𝐹(𝑡)]/𝑀  
𝐼𝐹 = 𝑘𝑓𝑁𝐹(𝑡) + (1 − 𝑘)𝑓[𝑅𝑁𝑅(𝑡) + (𝑀 − 𝑅)𝑁𝐹(𝑡)]/𝑀  
 
We explored increasing values of ƙ to determine how increased juvenile retention 
impacted the qualitative results of our model.  
 
Results:  Our qualitative results were strengthened as juvenile retention increased. 
Specifically, (1) without additional enforcement resources, an increase in the size of the 
protected area network will even more rapidly lead to negative consequences for the 
species’ abundance; and (2) the benefits for the conservation objective function, even at 
the optimal PA size, will not be as large when some juveniles do not disperse. This can be 
attributed to two processes: 1) juvenile retention increases the efficiency of protected 
areas at accumulating a higher density (i.e. they work better) driving the peak of 
Supplementary Figure S3.5 to the left and 2) when the PA network expands without 
additional enforcement, the benefits dilute more rapidly as local retention increases (as 
seen by the curves merging after the optimal peak, even given higher levels of juvenile 
retention). This is likely because protected patches become more attractive to poachers, 
increasing illegal harvest.  
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Supplementary Text S3.2. Parameterization sensitivity analysis 
 
Our parameter choices apply to a system where a primary target species is motivating 
profitable extraction. The parameters themselves are arbitrary, but were chosen to ensure 
that the harvested metapopulation was robust enough to persist without any protection and 
that both the harvesters and population would respond to changes in protection and 
enforcement. 
To avoid our conclusions being specific to our model definition we tested the sensitivity of 
our results to model parameterization by varying each nominal value within ±50%. The 
standardization of increasing enforcement and expansion amounts were recalculated for 
each new parameter combination. While a small number of parameterisations result in a 
solution that narrowly favours expansion over enforcement (markers below the red line, 
Supplementary Figure S3.2), on average, the sensitivity analysis shows that a 
disproportionate investment in enforcement over expansion should be made to maximize 
species abundance (blue line, Supplementary Figure S3.2). This result reinforces our main 
conclusions. 
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Supplementary Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S3.1. Changes in the probability of being caught (𝒑𝑩) as a function of R/M 
(proportion of reserved patches) and B (enforcement budget). We define 𝒑𝑩 as: 
𝒑𝑩 = (𝑩 − 𝑹𝒄𝑻)/𝑹. 
We bound 𝒑𝑩 between 0 and 1. The figure shows that the fluctuation in 𝒑𝑩 is 
consistent with the linear relationship we have used but that, in most cases, it is not 
equal to 1 or 0. It also shows that, for this set of parameters, the optimal 𝒑𝑩 is ~0.3 
as this is roughly the path that the optimal route between increasing enforcement 
budget and protected area extent follows. White areas indicate where 𝒑𝑩 is 
constrained to 1 or 0. 
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Figure S3.2. Changes in the optimal allocation of increasing resources between 
expansion and enforcement, across a range of 1,000 different parameter 
combinations. Each parameter was varied independently by as much as ±50%. 
Then, starting from a low-protection (5%) and low-enforcement (𝑬𝑷 𝑬𝑭⁄  = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟓) 
state, at coordinate (1,1), we determined whether additional funds should be 
directed to increased enforcement (y-axis), or an expanded protected area network 
(x-axis). The amount of additional resources offered was standardised for each 
parameter combination, as explained in Chapter 3 main text. Thus, each step on the 
x-axis represents an additional 5% protection, but each step on the y-axis 
represents a different amount of additional enforcement resources (𝜹𝑩 in Chapter 3 
main text). Each black marker is a step on the optimal route between low-
enforcement/low-protection and high-enforcement/high-protection (positions have 
been varied by a small random amount to avoid overlapping). The red line depicts 
the 1:1 line where the cumulative investment has been allocated equally to 
expansion and enforcement. The blue line is the average route of all 
parameterisations. It shows that, on average, investment should disproportionately 
target enforcement over expansion.  
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Figure S3.3. Annual survival curve of the population model as defined by an 
exponential model formulation (red) versus the Cobb-Douglas model formulation 
that is used in the body of the text (blue).  
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Figure S3.4. The impact of protected area expansion without additional enforcement 
using an exponential model formulation to define annual survival.  Compared with 
results from the Cobb-Douglas model, the qualitative conclusions remain 
unchanged. 
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Figure S3.5. Impacts of protected area expansion without additional enforcement 
under varying levels of juvenile retention. ƙ signifies increasing levels of retention, 
with the blue line (ƙ =0) the same as the Cobb-Douglas model definition used in 
Chapter 3 main text. 
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Appendix 4: Supplementary Materials for Chapter 4 
 
Supplementary Text 
 
Supplementary Text S4.1. Data sources, selection criteria, and spatial analysis  
 
Global protected area (PA) coverage was estimated from the World Database on 
Protected Areas (WDPA) (IUCN & UNEP-WCMC 2015) and spatial processing 
suggestions from UNEP-WCMC (Bubb, P.J., Fish, L. and Kapos 2009). Only terrestrial 
PAs with IUCN category I-IV (managed primarily for biodiversity, as in Barr et al. (2011) ), 
“designated” status, and that stated an establishment date were considered. Point data 
was included by creating circular buffers with areas equal to the reported total areas found 
in the WDPA database. Missing data on establishment year was not imputed if none was 
available. Total ecoregion area (km2) and total PA (km2) of each ecoregion within each 
country were calculated by intersecting refined equal-area projections (Mollweide) of 
countries, ecoregions and terrestrial PAs. Protection equality was calculated annually as in 
Barr et al. (2011) (see Supplementary Text S4.2).  
 
A map of 867 terrestrial ecoregions developed by the World Wildlife Fund (Olson et al. 
2001; World Wildlife Fund 2008) was used to represent global terrestrial biodiversity. The 
ecoregions of “Lakes”, “Rock and Ice” and “Mangroves” were excluded to account for 
spatial mismatches between countries and aquatic environments, following Barr et al. 
(2011).  Countries were selected for analyses if 1) they had at least 70% of terrestrial PAs 
(IUCN I-IV and designated status) with delineated boundary and establishment year data, 
2) they contained at least five ecoregions, and 3) they provided at least 1% protection for 
at least one ecoregion. Countries included overseas departments, territories, and 
collectivities to reflect the country boundaries and commitments of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. All calculations were performed for each country from 1954-2013, 
which captures the major expansion of protected area systems (see Watson et al. 2014). 
In addition, fine scale differences were assessed within six 10-year increments that 
correspond to major conservation developments related to representation such as 
international conservation agreements and advancements in representation theory. 
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Supplementary Text S4.2. Equations to calculate protection equality. Adapted from 
Chauvenet et al. unpublished and Barr et al. (2011). 
 
Let’s consider a region of interest (in our case, countries) of total area atot, which contains 
N ecoregions i, with i ≥ 1. Each ecoregion i has an area ai inside the region of interest such 
that: 
𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
The amount of ecoregion i, which is designated as a Protected Area (PA) is denoted as pi, 
with 0 < pi < ai.  
 
We rank the level of protection of ecoregions in ascending order of proportion of the 
ecoregion protected (pi/ai) and calculate the cumulative level of protection of ecoregions yi 
for i=1,2,…N: 
y𝑖 = ∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑖
𝑗=1
   𝑜𝑟   y𝑖 = ∑
𝑝𝑗
𝑎𝑗
𝑖
𝑗=1
   
To estimate PE, we plot yi against i/N for i=1,2,…N.  PE is then calculated by estimating 
the area under the curve formed by the protection of ecoregions (U; equivalent to the 
Lorenz curve) and the area between the curve formed by the protection of ecoregions and 
the line of perfect equality (V). Then PE is simply expressed as: 
𝑃𝐸 =
𝑈
𝑈 + 𝑉
 
Or, 
𝑃𝐸 =
1
𝑁 × (
1
2
∑
𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑖
+  ∑
𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑖
𝑁−1
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 × (𝑁 − 𝑖))
1
2 ×
∑
𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
Corrected PE 
 
When the number of ecoregion N is small, the minimum value that can be obtained for PE 
at maximum inequality is > 0. We thus created a correcting factor to apply to PE that 
rescales PE between 0 and 1 when N is small.  
PE𝑐 = (PE −
1
𝑁
) ∗ (
𝑁
𝑁 − 1
) 
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Supplementary Text S4.3. Description and data sources of variables used to search 
for drivers of annual change in Protection Equality in our multivariate model. 
 
We were primarily interested in considering the annual change in protection equality as a 
function of the annual change in area protected to assess the impacts of rapid expansion 
on the equality of ecoregion representation.  Protection equality was calculated annually 
as in Barr et al. (2011) with a correction for small sample size (see Supplementary Text 
S4.2) and change was determined as the difference in protection equality from one year to 
the next.  All non-zero values of change in protection equality were removed, as a lack of 
change in protection equality values are driven by the lack of area protection within a year. 
There were only eight incidents where the proportion of area protected increased with no 
change in PE.  All these events resulted from a country establishing their first protected 
areas within the same ecoregion and were removed from the dataset.  The proportion of 
total area protected within each country (change in area protected (km2) = total area 
protected in each year/total country area; estimated in spatial analysis from the World 
Database on Protected Areas (see Supplementary Text S4.1)) was used to determine how 
large changes in area impact changes in protection equality and how this is influenced as 
choices about where to protect area become more limited. 
 
To determine if progress has been made inachieving greater changes in protection 
equality in recent years compared to historically, a time variable was included and was 
measured as the number of years since 1954 (i.e. 1, 2, 3…60).  We hypothesized that 
greater changes in protection equality would be seen in more recent decades due to major 
representation developments and global conservation targets (Justus & Sarkar (2002)).  
Additionally, we included several economic, social, and environmental factors that have 
been shown to influence protected areas, and that we hypothesized may drive changes in 
protection equality within countries including: political status, gross domestic product (per 
capita), population density, number of protected areas designated per year, number of 
ecoregions per country, “hot moments in conservation”, number of years between changes 
in protection equality (protection gaps), and the start of protected area designation within 
each country.  
 
A categorical variable reflecting the date that each country first established a PA was 
included as historical protection has been shown to influence the representation of PA 
networks (Pressey 1994; Watson et al. 2011).  Countries were divided into groups (Early 
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(16), Mid-Early (16), Mid (16), Late (15)) based on the date of the first PA establishment. 
Countries that started building their PA networks earlier may have a bias process that 
could affect the change in PE that they are able to achieve.  
 
Developed countries have been shown to protect more land in stricter reserve systems, 
supporting the hypothesis that environmental protection is an improvement made only 
after other more basic needs are met (McDonald and Boucher 2011).  Protection equality 
may be an amenity secondary to land protection that could require greater resources to 
accomplish. We used per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) as a proxy for economic 
development, which was obtained from Angus Madison’s historical database (“The 
Maddison-Project” 2013).  Per-capita GDP for countries that split during this time period 
was calculated as in McDonald & Boucher (2011). Values for countries with missing data 
were extrapolated from the Angus Maddison database by calculating the logarithmic 
growth rate of reported per-capita GDP from the United Nations National accounts data 
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/). All values are reported in 1990 International Geary-Khamis 
$US, a measure that corrects for different purchasing power.   
 
Land protection is a highly political process that affects decisions about where protected 
areas are placed. Additionally, independent countries tend to protect more land (McDonald 
& Boucher 2011), and “hot moments” in conservation have been linked to periods of 
political instability (Radeloff et al. 2013). We obtained political status data from the Polity 4 
database (“polity2” variable, Marshall & Gurr (2013)), which ranks countries from -
10(Autocratic) to 10 (Democratic) through time.  We simplified these variables into three 
categories (Autocratic (-10 to -4), Democratic/Mixed (-3 to 10) or Not Independent) 
following McDonald and Boucher (2011). 
 
We included annual population density within each country to assess the effects of general 
competition for space due to agricultural, commercial and residential pressures induced by 
population growth.  Data was collated from the United Nations World Population 
Prospects: The 2015 Revision (United Nations 2015) and divided by the total area of each 
country (km2) calculated during the spatial analysis. 
 
The number of PAs designated within each year was calculated from the WDPA database 
and were used to investigate the impacts of creating small vs. large reserves on protection 
equality, and whether rapidly expanding PA networks through several small or single large 
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reserves impacts annual change in PE.  Furthermore, we used “hot moments in 
conservation” to represent periods of rapid PA expansion by calculating the percentage of 
area protected each year out of the total area protected within each country, following 
Radeloff et al. (2013).  ”Hot moments” are defined as years when countries increase 
protected areas by 33% or more in relation to their total protected area”. This was included 
as a categorical variable in the model (1 signifying a hot moment, and 0 otherwise). An 
interaction term between “hot moments” and the number of newly designated PAs each 
year was included to investigate differences in rapid expansion strategy (i.e. creating 
several PAs as opposed to a single PA) on the change in PE. 
 
Number of ecoregions within each country was included as the only static variable 
because it has not changed through time.  We included the number of ecoregions in each 
country, which were calculated in the spatial analysis using the terrestrial ecoregions of the 
world (Olson et al. 2001), to determine how the number of features that need to be 
represented affects protection equality (see number of ecoregions in each country in Table 
S4.2).  A greater number of biodiversity features to equally protect may make it harder to 
achieve protection equality or affect the levels of change in protection equality.  Although 
ecoregion classifications were not established until 2001, well into our time period, we 
believe that other habitat classifications used to describe principles of representation are 
likely captured within these large-scale biodiversity features.  Given that the terrestrial 
ecoregions are the best available habitat classification at a global scale we believe it is 
reasonable to evaluate protection equality at this level 
 
Finally, a protection gap variable was included that represented the number of years 
between a change in protection equality.  We hypothesized that countries that had larger 
gaps between periods of protection may be taking more time to plan and implement 
protected areas, resulting in greater equality in representation. 
 
Drivers of annual change in protection equality were considered using a linear mixed 
effects model, with country, year, and world region as random effects.  In total, 63 
countries were considered in the final model for the period from 1954-2013.  World region 
was modified from the United Nations classifications and adjusted to have c7 regions per 
category (Central Africa, East Africa, Former Soviet Bloc, Middle East, N. 
America/Australasia, South America, Southeast Asia, West Africa, and Western Europe).  
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The model considered continuous measures all variable except the interaction between 
hot moments and the number of PAs designated within a year.  
 
Models were compared using the AICc (Burnham and Anderson 2002). The top models 
(∆AICc≤4, Table S4.6) were averaged to obtain estimates of the effect of each variable on 
change in PE. To satisfy the assumption that there is no correlation among predictor 
variables in our model, we tested for multicollinearity using the corvif function in R v 3.2.2 
(Zuur et al. 2009).  All explanatory variables had a Variance Inflation Factor less than 4, 
signifying a lack of correlation between variables.Autocorrelation and variogram plots were 
visually inspected to test for temporal and spatial autocorrelation, respectively and found 
no apparent trends.  
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Supplementary Text S4.4. Additional data limitations and caveats 
 
In our descriptive statistics, multiple statistical tests were performed that may have 
increased the chance of type I errors in our results.  To test for the potential impacts of 
this, we performed a correlated Bonferroni technique (Drezner & Drezner 2009) on our 
Mann-Kendall trend results in each time period.  While the proportions of countries with 
significant trends decreased (Table S4.7), the narrative of our results was not affected 
and, therefore, we did not include corrected values in the main text of Chapter 4.   
 
Our optimal and random protection simulations also carry some limitations.  Our 
calculations likely overestimated optimal PE values as continued land degradation limits 
the availability and suitability of land for protection (Hoekstra et al. 2005) . This caveat is 
important to consider in the future, but did not impact our results. We were primarily 
interested in comparing observed and random scenarios that did account for land use and 
availability.  The conclusions drawn from our simulations reflect only a subset of the 66 
countries included in our study.  To make differences between observed, random, and 
optimal protection equality values more distinct, we chose the six countries that protected 
the most area in both of the last two decades for our random and optimal simulations. It is 
vital to consider this relationship in other countries and at a finer scale to draw further 
insight into our results.   
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Supplementary Tables 
 
Table S4.1. Area protected, average protected area size between 1994-2003 and 
2004-2013 and corresponding planning unit (PU) size used for random simulations. 
 
Country 
1994-2003 2004-2013 
Area 
Protected 
Avg. PA Size PU Size Area 
Protected 
Avg. PA 
Size 
PU Size 
Australia 84,090.2 47.64 km2 100 km2 92,447.01 
km2 
75.9 km2 100 km2 
Brazil 100,116 841.92 km2 900 km2 178,186 km2 3300 km2 3,300 
km2 
Canada 150,613 158.54 km2 200 km2 86,199.96 
km2 
30.65 km2 100 km2 
Indonesia 62,362.1 1,117.95 km2 1200 
km2 
32,284.2 km2 1,166.34 
km2 
1,200 
km2 
Mongolia 64,464.12 4,036.039 
km2 
4100 
km2 
61,401 km2 2,461.61 
km2 
2,500 
km2 
Peru 27,933.1 6,940.253 
km2 
7000 
km2 
28,408.5 km2 5,698.68 
km2 
5,700 
km2 
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Table S4.2. Summary table of each country as of 2013 under our selection criteria. 
Country Number of Ecoregions Area (km2) Total Area Protected (%) Protection Equality (PE) 
Afghanistan 16 643514.3 0.43 0.059 
Angola 14 1254602 4.25 0.088 
Argentina 18 2785975 2.15 0.298 
Australia 42 7718395 6.27 0.445 
Bangladesh 7 138697.6 1.03 0.023 
Bhutan 9 40190.67 38.06 0.643 
Bolivia 16 1088702 16.08 0.389 
Botswana 7 580982.9 18.91 0.685 
Brazil 48 8524418 5.54 0.272 
Bulgaria 6 111012.3 2.53 0.276 
Cambodia 7 182534.2 19.02 0.360 
Cameroon 12 468048.5 7.71 0.310 
Canada 51 9928774 5.98 0.349 
C. African Republic 6 624316.6 11.78 0.129 
Chad 7 1278030 9.28 0.309 
Chile 12 757813.7 15.35 0.299 
Colombia 33 1144306 5.90 0.205 
Costa Rica 6 51466.46 8.70 0.215 
Côte d'Ivoire 5 322843.5 6.20 0.497 
Ecuador 12 257713 8.09 0.234 
Egypt 11 987864.2 0.66 0.117 
Ethiopia 11 1136300 4.06 0.467 
France 28 670043 1.81 0.297 
Germany 5 356946.1 4.02 0.430 
Greece 6 132606.9 8.78 0.741 
Guatemala 10 108837.1 3.87 0.256 
Guyana 7 211856.2 0.34 0.153 
Honduras 6 112607.4 7.93 0.252 
Indonesia 36 1899947 10.04 0.484 
Iran 18 1627547 2.84 0.347 
Israel 6 20802.25 12.72 0.420 
Italy 9 300944.5 8.91 0.392 
Japan 9 372837.4 12.31 0.456 
Jordan 5 89625.78 0.69 0.371 
Kenya 11 587356.4 5.66 0.253 
Kyrgyzstan 7 199805.5 3.22 0.390 
Madagascar 6 593420.5 1.99 0.471 
Malawi 8 119214.7 8.44 0.381 
Mali 6 1259402 3.90 0.052 
Mongolia 17 1564339 15.25 0.479 
Morocco 8 678573.4 0.75 0.102 
Mozambique 11 790580.9 4.51 0.310 
Myanmar 19 671109.7 4.95 0.171 
Namibia 12 828093.6 3.95 0.155 
Nepal 11 147844.8 7.00 0.372 
New Zealand 16 270343.9 24.67 0.438 
Nicaragua 8 128772.9 2.15 0.197 
Niger 6 1187618 15.82 0.336 
Norway 8 385008.5 9.29 0.211 
Oman 6 309646.8 0.99 0.215 
Pakistan 19 874986.5 4.08 0.123 
Panama 6 75415.08 2.85 0.366 
Paraguay 7 402610.4 2.80 0.231 
Peru 17 1300250 6.42 0.173 
Philippines 11 297533.6 8.15 0.176 
Romania 6 238259.4 2.25 0.380 
Serbia 5 88354.28 3.00 0.337 
Slovenia 5 20216.8 5.42 0.179 
Spain 11 506605.2 2.80 0.374 
Suriname 6 145883.3 9.46 0.470 
Tajikistan 7 142617 15.23 0.266 
Thailand 13 516875.3 17.91 0.523 
Turkmenistan 8 470756.6 2.95 0.464 
Uganda 8 243142.2 7.76 0.361 
Uzbekistan 8 448299.3 1.99 0.099 
Vietnam 13 328681.7 4.85 0.363 
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Table S4.3. Mann-Kendall trend results by country in each decade.  Green signifies 
positive trends, red signifies negative trends, blue signifies no significant trend and 
grey signifies that not enough area was protected in that time period to detect a 
trend.  *Denotes countries with “hot moments” and Ϯ denotes countries included in 
randomized PE simulations. 
 
1954-1963 1964-1973 1974-1983 1984-1993 1994-2003 2004-2013 
Argentina 
Australia 
Bolivia 
Botswana* 
Chile 
Germany 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Kenya 
Serbia 
Spain 
Tajikistan 
Uganda 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Chad* 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Ethiopia* 
France 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Japan 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Mozambique 
New Zealand 
Niger 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Romania 
Serbia 
Spain 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Argentina 
Australia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chile 
Ecuador* 
Honduras 
Iran 
Israel 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Kyrgyzstan 
Madagascar 
Namibia* 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Panama 
Peru 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Thailand 
Turkmenistan* 
Uganda 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
C. African 
Republic 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
Ethiopia 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras* 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Jordan** 
Kenya 
Kyrgyzstan 
Madagascar 
Mongolia 
Namibia 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua* 
Peru 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
Uganda 
AustraliaϮ 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
Bulgaria 
CanadaϮ 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
France 
Germany 
Honduras 
Israel 
Mali 
Namibia 
New Zealand 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Romania 
Spain 
Suriname* 
Tajikistan* 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Bolivia 
CanadaϮ 
Chile 
Honduras 
IndonesiaϮ 
Israel 
Mali 
MongoliaϮ 
Myanmar* 
Nepal 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
PeruϮ 
Philippines 
Serbia 
Slovenia 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
C. African 
Republic 
Angola 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Chad 
France 
Greece 
Iran 
Italy 
Kyrgyzstan 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali* 
Mozambique* 
New Zealand 
Niger 
Norway 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Thailand 
Turkmenistan 
Cambodia 
Italy 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
BrazilϮ 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Egypt* 
Greece 
Guatemala 
IndonesiaϮ 
Iran* 
Italy 
Japan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Madagascar 
MongoliaϮ 
Morocco 
Myanmar 
Norway 
Oman* 
Panama 
PeruϮ 
Serbia 
Slovenia 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
Argentina 
AustraliaϮ 
Bhutan 
Botswana 
BrazilϮ 
Bulgaria 
Cameroon 
C. African 
Republic 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Ethiopia 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Iran 
Japan 
Jordan 
Morocco* 
Namibia 
Niger* 
Norway 
Romania 
Spain 
Suriname 
Botswana 
C. African 
Republic 
Costa Rica 
Mali 
Myanmar 
Slovenia 
Afghanistan* 
Angola 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Cambodia 
Chad 
Colombia 
Costa Rica* 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Ethiopia 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Indonesia 
Italy 
Malawi 
Mongolia 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Pakistan* 
Paraguay* 
Philippines* 
Romania 
Serbia 
Tajikistan 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
Romania 
Afghanistan 
Australia 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
Brazil 
Cambodia* 
Cameroon 
Chile 
Colombia 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Egypt 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iran 
Israel* 
Italy 
Myanmar 
Nepal* 
Niger* 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama* 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Serbia* 
Suriname 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan* 
Vietnam* 
Angola 
Australia 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Cameroon 
Chile 
Germany 
Israel 
Italy 
Kyrgyzstan 
Malawi 
Namibia 
Philippines 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Ethiopia 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Israel 
Jordan 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Cambodia 
C. African 
Republic 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Jordan 
Mongolia 
Afghanistan 
Angola 
Botswana 
C. African 
Republic 
Chad 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Ethiopia 
Guyana 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Angola 
Chad 
Costa Rica 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Egypt* 
Kenya 
Kyrgyzstan 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mozambique 
Bangladesh* 
Egypt 
Guyana 
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Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Suriname 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
Morocco 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Oman 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Suriname 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
Mali 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Oman 
Suriname 
Angola 
Chad 
Malawi 
Mali 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Oman 
Malawi 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Pakistan 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Uzbekistan 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
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Table S4.4. Spearman correlation results by country in each decade.  Green 
signifies positive correlations, red signifies negative correlations, blue signifies no 
significant correlation and grey signifies that not enough area was protected in that 
time period to detect a correlation. *Denotes countries with hot moments.  
 
1954-1963 1964-1973 1974-1983 1984-1993 1994-2003 2004-2013 
New Zealand 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Ethiopia* 
Kenya 
New Zealand 
Argentina 
Bulgaria 
Iran 
Israel 
New Zealand 
Peru 
Serbia 
Bulgaria 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Spain 
Australia 
Brazil 
Cambodia 
Chile 
Germany 
Guatemala 
Mongolia 
New Zealand 
Philippines 
Serbia 
Slovenia 
Bangladesh 
Brazil 
Chile 
France 
Germany 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Argentina 
Australia 
Bolivia 
Botswana* 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Chad 
Chile 
Ethiopia 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mozambique* 
Niger 
Norway 
Romania 
Serbia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Thailand 
Uganda 
Argentina 
Australia 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Cambodia* 
Cameroon 
Canada 
C. African 
Republic 
Chile 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras* 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Israel* 
Italy 
Japan 
Jordan** 
Kenya 
Kyrgyzstan 
Madagascar 
Mongolia 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal* 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua* 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama* 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Romania 
Serbia* 
Slovenia 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Uzbekistan* 
Vietnam* 
Angola 
Argentina 
Australia 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Cameroon 
Chad 
Chile 
Côte d'Ivoire 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Romania 
Serbia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Suriname 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
Uganda 
Afghanistan* 
Australia 
Bangladesh* 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica* 
Ecuador* 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Indonesia 
Italy 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Kyrgyzstan 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mongolia 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Norway 
Pakistan* 
Panama 
Paraguay* 
Philippines* 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Tajikistan 
Thailand 
Turkmenistan* 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
Japan 
Argentina 
Australia 
Bolivia 
Bulgaria 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Colombia 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Italy 
Jordan 
Mali 
Mongolia 
Morocco* 
Myanmar* 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Peru 
Philippines 
Romania 
Thailand 
Japan 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bulgaria 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
Egypt* 
France 
Greece 
Indonesia 
Iran* 
Israel 
Italy 
Kyrgyzstan 
Mali 
Myanmar 
Norway 
Oman* 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Romania 
Spain 
Suriname* 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
Afghanistan 
Angola 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
C. African 
Republic 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Iran 
Israel 
Italy 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Suriname 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Afghanistan 
Angola 
Bhutan 
Botswana 
Cambodia 
C. African 
Republic 
Chad 
Costa Rica 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Ethiopia 
Guyana 
Israel 
Kenya 
Kyrgyzstan 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger* 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Serbia 
Suriname 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
Cambodia 
C. African 
Republic 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Jordan 
Mali 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Oman 
Panama 
Afghanistan 
Angola 
Botswana 
C. African 
Republic 
Chad 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Ethiopia 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Angola 
C. African 
Republic 
Chad 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Egypt 
Ethiopia 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Mali 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia* 
Afghanistan 
Angola 
Chad 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Ethiopia 
Malawi 
Mali 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Niger* 
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Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
Paraguay 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
Niger 
Oman 
Suriname 
Uganda 
Oman 
Suriname 
Tajikistan* 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Uzbekistan 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
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Table S4.5. Sensitivity analysis to determine the effects of planning unit size on random protection equality simulation results 
using 100 km2, 2000 km2, 6000 km2 planning units and the average PA size within each country from 2004-2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Denotes a random PE value significantly greater than observed PE given the designated planning unit size 
 
2004-2013 Randomization Planning Unit Size (km2) 
Country True 
PE 
100 95% CI 2000 95% CI 6000 95% CI Avg. 
PA 
size 
95% CI 
Australia 0.445 0.470* (0.460,0.481) 0.461 (0.443,.478) 0.451 (0.423,0.479) 0.470* (0.460,0.481) 
Brazil 0.272 0.398 (0.255,0.541) 0.376 (0.204,0.548) 0.365 (0.192,0.537) 0.287 (0.257,0.317) 
Canada 0.349 0.390 (0.271,0.509) 0.372 (0.208,0.545) 0.360 (0.218,0.502) 0.390 (0.271,0.509) 
Indonesia 0.484 0.411 (0.286,0.535) 0.394 (0.251,0.538) 0.382 (0.237,0.526) 0.376 (0.199,0.553) 
Mongolia 0.479 0.436 (0.286,0.586) 0.420 (0.256,0.585) 0.406 (0.244,0.567) 0.424 (0.227,0.622) 
Peru 0.173 0.40* (0.189,0.610) 0.385 (0.169,0.602) 0.371 (0.159,0.583) 0.199 (0.161,0.237) 
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Table S4.6. List of models that were considered as a good fit to our data (∆AICc≤4) 
 
No Model Terms K LL AICc ∆AICc wi Cum. wt 
1 Hot Moments + No. PAs + 
Change in Area+ Hot 
Moments x No. PAs + 
Population Density + 
GDP+ Political Category + 
Start Category + 
Protection Gap + Time 
18 2477.412 -4918.28 0 0.090 0.090 
2 Hot Moments + No. PAs + 
Change in Area+ Hot 
Moments x No. PAs + 
GDP+ Political Category + 
Start Category + Protection 
Gap + Time 
17 2476.24 -4918 0.29 0.078 0.168 
3 Hot Moments + No. PAs + 
Change in Area+ Hot 
Moments x No. PAs + 
Population Density + 
Political Category  + Start 
Category + Protection Gap 
+ Time 
17 2476.13 -4917.78 0.51 0.070 0.238 
4 Hot Moments + No. PAs + 
Change in Area+ Hot 
Moments x No. PAs + 
Population Density + No. 
Ecoregions + GDP+ Political 
Category + Start Category + 
Protection Gap + Time 
19 2478.094 -4917.58 0.70 0.063
5 
0.301 
5 Hot Moments + No. PAs + Change in 
Area+ Hot Moments x No. PAs + 
Political Category + Start Category + 
Protection Gap + Time 
1
6 
247
4.8
19 
-4917.21 1.07 0.052
6 
0.354 
6 Hot Moments + No. PAs + Change in 
Area+ Hot Moments x No. PAs + 
Population Density + No. Ecoregions + 
Political Category + Start Category + 
Protection Gap + Time 
1
8 
247
6.8
42 
-4917.14 1.14 0.051 0.405 
7 Hot Moments + No. PAs + Change in 
Area+ Hot Moments x No. PAs + No. 
Ecoregions + GDP+ Political Category 
+ Start Category + Protection Gap + 
Time 
1
8 
247
6.4
12 
-4916.28 2.00 0.033 0.438 
8 Hot Moments + No. PAs + Change in 
Area+ Hot Moments x No. PAs + 
Population Density + Start Category + 
Protection Gap + Time 
1
5 
247
3.2
59 
-4916.14 2.14 0.031 0.469 
9 Hot Moments + No. PAs + Change in 
Area+ Hot Moments x No. PAs + 
Population Density + Political 
Category + Start Category + Time 
1
6 
247
4.2
84 
-4916.14 2.15 0.031 0.499 
10 Hot Moments + No. PAs + Change in 
Area+ Hot Moments x No. PAs + 
Population Density + No. Ecoregions + 
1
6 
247
4.2
45 
-4916.06 2.22 0.030 0.529 
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Start Category + Protection Gap + 
Time 
11 Hot Moments + No. PAs + Change in 
Area+ Hot Moments x No. PAs + 
Population Density + No. Ecoregions + 
Political Category + Start Category + 
Time 
1
7 
247
5.1
44 
-4915.8 2.48 0.026 0.555 
12 Hot Moments + No. PAs + Change in 
Area+ Hot Moments x No. PAs + 
Population Density + GDP + Political 
Category + Start Category + Time 
1
7 
247
5.1
22 
-4915.76 2.52 0.025 0.581 
13 Hot Moments + No. PAs + Change in 
Area+ Hot Moments x No. PAs + Start 
Category + Protection Gap + Time 
1
4 
247
1.9
42 
-4915.55 2.73 0.023 0.604 
14 Hot Moments + No. PAs + Change in 
Area+ Hot Moments x No. PAs + No. 
Ecoregions + Political Category + Start 
Category + Protection Gap + Time 
1
7 
247
4.9
89 
-4915.49 2.79 0.022 0.626 
15 Hot Moments + No. PAs + Change in 
Area+ Hot Moments x No. PAs + 
Population Density + GDP+ Political 
Category + Start Category + Time 
1
8 
247
5.9
72 
-4915.4 2.88 0.021 0.647 
16 Hot Moments + No. PAs + Change in 
Area+ Hot Moments x No. PAs + 
Political Category + Start Category + 
Time 
1
5 
247
2.8
46 
-4915.31 2.97 0.020 0.668 
17 Hot Moments + No. PAs + Change in 
Area+ Hot Moments x No. PAs + 
GDP+ Political Category + Start 
Category + Time 
1
6 
247
3.7
89 
-4915.15 3.13 0.019 0.686 
18 Hot Moments + No. PAs + Change in 
Area+ Hot Moments x No. PAs + 
Population Density + GDP + Start 
Category + Protection Gap + Time 
1
6 
247
3.5
76 
-4914.72 3.56 0.015 0.701 
19 Hot Moments + No. PAs + Change in 
Area+ Hot Moments x No. PAs + 
Population Density + No. Ecoregions + 
GDP+ Political Category + Start 
Category + Protection Gap + Time 
1
7 
247
4.5
67 
-4914.65 3.63 0.015 0.716 
The 19 best models retained by AICc (∆AICc <4) selection are presented. Country, Year and World Region 
were included as random factors in all models to account for repeated measures in individual countries. 
ΔAICc is the difference in AIC compared to the best model (given in bold). The AIC weight is given by wi and 
represents the probability that a given model is the best among the models presented.  
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Table S4.7. Results from performing a correlated Bonferroni technique to account 
for potential increases in type I errors. Proportion of countries with significant 
increasing and decreasing trends for uncorrected and corrected Mann-Kendall trend 
results for each time period. Proportions are only calculated out of the number of 
countries that protected enough area to detect a trend or correlation. Uncorrected 
results are presented in the main text of Chapter 4 as corrected results did not 
change the narrative of our results. 
 
 Uncorrected Corrected 
Proportion 
Increasing 
Proportion 
Decreasing 
Proportion 
Increasing 
Proportion 
Decreasing 
1954-2013 0.909 0 0.864 0 
1954-1963 0.371 0.029 0.171 0 
1964-1973 0.609 0.087 0.435 0 
1974-1983 0.464 0.036 0.321 0 
1984-1993 0.475 0.017 0.254 0.017 
1994-2003 0.468 0 0.298 0 
2004-2013 0.417 0.042 0.208 0.021 
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Supplementary Figures 
 
 
 
 
Figure S4.1. A) Overall (1954-2013) trends in protection equality and B) overall 
Spearman correlation results between annual change in area protected and annual 
change in protection equality 
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Figure S4.2. Maps of decadal Mann-Kendall trend results in Protection Equality. Results for each period from the Mann-Kendall 
trend test.  Red signifies decreasing trends, green signifies increasing trends, and blue significes nos ignificant trends in 
Protection Equality during each period.  Light Gray countries were not included in our analyses and dark gray countries did not 
protect area in enough years to detect a trend.
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Figure S4.3. Maps of decadal Spearman’s correlation results between Protection Equality and the change in the proportion of 
area protected. Red signifies negative correlations (only Japan in the two last decades), green signifies positive correlations, 
and blue significes nos ignificant correlations during each period.  Light gray countries were not included in our analyses and 
dark gray countries did not protect area in enough years to detect a correlation. 
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Appendix 5: Supplementary Materials for Chapter 5 
 
Table S5.1 Summary statistics for countries included in analysis 
 
Country No. of 
Ecoregio
ns 
Country 
area 
Prop. of 
area 
protecte
d (2015) 
Total area 
lost to 
downsizi
ng 
Prop. of 
protected 
area lost 
to 
downsizi
ng 
Total 
prop. 
converte
d 
Worst 
Case 
PE 
BAU 
PE 
Rando
m PE 
Optim
al PE 
Worst 
Case 
PE 
BAU 
PE 
Rando
m PE 
Optim
al PE 
PE 
Ratio 
Azerbaijan 5 86331.43 0.10 -292.29 -0.04 0.78 0.48 0.58 0.57 0.66 0.47 0.58 0.57 0.65 0.9887 
Belize 5 22110.34 0.36 -39.62 0.00 0.27 0.41 0.52 0.61 0.85 0.41 0.52 0.61 0.85 0.9987 
Bolivia 17 1089460.
46 
0.23 -15680.24 -0.06 0.42 0.46 0.48 0.62 0.91 0.46 0.48 0.62 0.90 1.0013 
Brazil 50 8551882.
37 
0.27 -28329.26 -0.01 0.51 0.46 0.48 0.61 0.92 0.46 0.48 0.60 0.92 1.0010 
Bhutan 10 38913.72 0.49 -1356.53 -0.07 0.29 0.69 0.71 0.78 0.99 0.68 0.70 0.77 0.96 0.9750 
Botswana 7 580673.8
6 
0.19 -5692.03 -0.05 0.25 0.68 0.60 0.69 0.80 0.67 0.58 0.68 0.78 0.9785 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
6 323746.8
2 
0.22 -967.74 -0.01 0.79 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.94 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.94 0.9999 
Congo - 
Kinshasa 
19 2343630.
36 
0.10 -10952.25 -0.05 0.83 0.22 0.23 0.32 0.62 0.22 0.23 0.32 0.61 0.9860 
Congo - 
Brazzaville 
4 343953.9
7 
0.11 -3988.35 -0.10 0.32 0.62 0.60 0.51 0.86 0.59 0.59 0.50 0.83 0.9508 
Dominican 
Republic 
5 48348.22 0.22 -1008.78 -0.10 0.70 0.58 0.63 0.63 0.67 0.57 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.9837 
Ecuador 13 258343.5
3 
0.19 -3211.61 -0.06 0.61 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.65 0.35 0.39 0.44 0.64 0.9820 
Egypt 11 987737.5
5 
0.11 -2497.43 -0.02 0.18 0.32 0.48 0.66 0.80 0.31 0.48 0.65 0.80 0.9938 
Gabon 4 266330.2
9 
0.15 -1820.57 -0.05 0.23 0.73 0.81 0.85 1.00 0.71 0.80 0.83 0.99 0.9692 
Ghana 5 239866.2
2 
0.14 -87.46 0.00 0.88 0.39 0.39 0.61 0.86 0.39 0.39 0.61 0.86 0.9990 
Guinea 5 246356.6
2 
0.04 -75.50 -0.01 1.00 0.52 0.52 0.65 0.76 0.52 0.52 0.65 0.76 0.9975 
Guatemala 12 109779.6
4 
0.25 -258.46 -0.01 0.68 0.19 0.21 0.44 0.88 0.19 0.21 0.44 0.88 1.0039 
Indonesia 38 1902277.
94 
0.11 -3798.56 -0.02 0.81 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.83 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.82 0.9908 
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India 50 3166982.
08 
0.04 -3956.65 -0.03 0.93 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.61 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.61 1.0060 
Kenya 13 589920.0
6 
0.10 -18462.85 -0.31 0.65 0.31 0.26 0.34 0.60 0.28 0.23 0.31 0.58 0.9151 
Cambodia 8 182457.2
9 
0.26 -2550.83 -0.05 0.53 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.98 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.96 0.9810 
Madagasca
r 
7 594541.1
8 
0.03 -96.58 -0.01 0.99 0.51 0.54 0.63 0.75 0.51 0.54 0.63 0.75 0.9992 
Mali 6 1258086.
50 
0.05 -18997.63 -0.32 0.42 0.09 0.11 0.31 0.55 0.13 0.14 0.29 0.68 1.4519 
Mozambiqu
e 
14 791637.7
8 
0.17 -10702.08 -0.08 0.56 0.35 0.36 0.42 0.81 0.34 0.35 0.41 0.79 0.9717 
Namibia 12 827805.6
6 
0.37 -10030.93 -0.03 0.19 0.64 0.76 0.88 0.90 0.63 0.75 0.87 0.89 0.9886 
Nigeria 15 914174.7
3 
0.12 -366.43 0.00 0.84 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.82 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.82 0.9999 
Pakistan 21 877132.5
1 
0.10 -2427.28 -0.03 0.83 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.48 0.27 0.28 0.33 0.48 0.9959 
Philippines 11 297671.7
5 
0.15 -775.41 -0.02 0.70 0.35 0.40 0.52 0.75 0.35 0.40 0.52 0.75 1.0025 
Rwanda 4 25472.54 0.09 -495.64 -0.22 0.86 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.66 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.52 0.9096 
Thailand 15 517030.3
1 
0.18 -717.59 -0.01 0.74 0.47 0.49 0.53 0.81 0.47 0.49 0.53 0.81 1.0042 
Turkmenist
an 
9 490263.7
7 
0.03 -1003.68 -0.07 0.86 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.30 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.30 1.0129 
Tanzania 18 946737.5
9 
0.36 -10857.90 -0.03 0.44 0.57 0.56 0.61 0.84 0.56 0.56 0.61 0.83 0.9919 
Uganda 9 243121.7
4 
0.14 -11971.70 -0.34 0.73 0.45 0.46 0.51 0.58 0.43 0.44 0.52 0.52 0.9477 
Venezuela 25 918430.6
4 
0.41 -5890.55 -0.02 0.43 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.91 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.91 1.0000 
Vietnam 14 330215.4
3 
0.07 -1195.84 -0.05 0.64 0.33 0.33 0.43 0.77 0.33 0.33 0.42 0.77 1.0031 
South 
Africa 
18 1224065.
39 
0.05 -563.65 -0.01 0.65 0.41 0.47 0.38 0.63 0.41 0.47 0.38 0.64 1.0027 
Zambia 11 755808.4
7 
0.35 -30260.72 -0.11 0.63 0.58 0.56 0.63 0.81 0.57 0.55 0.62 0.78 0.9893 
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Supplementary Text 
 
Conversion simulations 
 
For random and business as usual (BAU) protection scenarios we considered land 
availability by calculating the expected amount of land that would be converted in each 
country ecoregion from 2015-2045. To do this, we used the annual rate of conversion in 
each country’s ecoregions between 1993 and 2009. This rate is based off  the Human 
Footprint dataset (HFP, Venter et al. (2016)), and calculated following a method developed 
by Chauvenet et al. (in prep).  Briefly, ecoregions were divided into 1 km raster grids and 
each cell was assigned to one of three categories: protected, converted, or available in 
1993 and 2009.  Cells overlapping with protected areas were considered ‘protected’, cells 
not overlapping with protected areas with HFP values higher than 3 (in a 0-50 scale) were 
considered ‘converted’ (Venter et al. 2016). All other cells were considered to be ‘available’ 
for protection or conversion. We assumed a non-linear conversation rate where the 
amount of ecoregion lost was a function of area available; with this approach conversion 
rate was expected to slow down as less area became available for conversion. We then 
multiplied the observed rates of conversion by the total area of an ecoregion to determine 
the amount of area expected to be converted in 2045.  
 
If the rate of conversion was negative and thus resulted in the amount of area in 2045 
classified as ‘converted’ being negative (i.e. land was potentially restored), we assumed 
the amount of intact land was equal to the total area of the ecoregion. ‘Available’ land for 
protection was thus calculated as the difference between the amount of intact land and the 
area protected as of 2015. The amount of available, converted and protected area in each 
country ecoregion always equalled the total area of that ecoregion in that country. 
 
Incorporating expected conservation rates captures important land use dynamics that will 
impact how much of an ecoregion can be protected in the future. However, it does come 
with some limitations. The most obvious limitation is that protection and conversion occur 
simultaneously, whereas our approach only considered one 30 year time step. By 
incorporating more than one time step, some protection could likely be achieved in 
ecoregions predicted to have high conversion rates before all intact area is converted. 
Since highly converted areas are likely those with high competition for other land uses, 
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and thus are potentially underrepresented in the protected area network, protection in 
these ecoregions may reduce some impacts of PADDD. However, these areas would also 
likely be more susceptible to PADDD events. Future work should explore the dynamics 
between conversion, protection and downsizing in further detail.  
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Figure S5.1. The proportion of area protected (as of 2015) predicted to be lost to 
downsizing in each country (±SE) 
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Figure S5.2. The proportion of area protected in each country across the worst case 
(no future protection), business as usual (BAU), optimal and random protection 
scenarios. Worst case has the least proportion of area protected because no area 
was added. Optimal has the most because no conversion was not considered. In 
some cases, random protection resulted in more protection than the BAU scenario 
because in the random scenario, if an ecoregion was too converted protection was 
displaced to another ecoregion. 
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f  
Figure S5.3. The proportion of area expected to be converted across countries in 
2045. 
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Figure S5.4. Protection Equality across countries of interest as of 2015 
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Figure S5.5. The distribution of the Protection Equality ratio across protection 
scenarios. Mali, Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda were outliers across all scenarios, and 
Congo was an additional outlier in the worst case, random and BAU scenarios.  
 
